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[E]quity has no power to compel a man who changes
employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory.1
A foundation of the modem law of intellectual property is that
firms own some of the ideas that exist in the minds of their
employees. Ownership of employee knowledge is a legal construct
that is now an accepted part of our culture and economy. Its
development and enforcement in the nineteenth century, however,
was a prolonged and painful contest between the perceived exigencies
of economic development and the ideology of "free labor," and
between the norms of artisan production and the expansion of the
factory system. These very real economic and legal struggles were
fought out partly at the highly abstract level of competing habits of
legal discourse about property and contract, and partly in the daily
* Professor of Law and William Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School. The research for
this Article was supported by grants from the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, and by Loyola Law School. I received outstanding research assistance from the
Hagley archivists Christopher Baer, Michael Nash, and Marjorie McNinch, and from
Loyola students Kristin Beattie, Michael Blacher, Eric Compere, Robin Diem, Kelly
Firment, Jennifer La Macchia, An Le, and Geoffrey Moore. This work also benefited
from the insights of Erwin Chemerinsky, David Cruz, Ariela Gross, Roger Horowitz,
Gillian Lester, Deborah Malamud, Gregory Mark, Stephen Siegel, Hilary Schor, Clyde
Spillenger, Nomi Stolzenberg, Dalia Tsuk, participants at the 1999 Law & Society
Association meeting, the 2000 Business History Conference, and workshops at Loyola
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1. Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 132 N.Y.S. 37,39 (App. Div. 1911).
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lives of employees and firms. This is the story of the struggles that
created the modern law.
Today's legal wrangling over employee recruitment occurs within
the framework of doctrinal categories that developed when today's
most salient concepts and practices -"corporate control of
intellectual property" and "management of human capital"-were
almost unimaginable. The practices were unimaginable because
corporations in the modern form, as institutions capable of amassing
enormous wealth and systematically conducting business activity, did
not exist. The concept of "intellectual property" did not exist either
as a field of law or as a form of property right.2 Today's practices and
doctrines developed in the context of radical changes in the American
law and workplace culture, which were brought about by the
nineteenth-century industrial revolutions. The conflict between
employee freedom and corporate control of intellectual property
sharpened as courts realized the importance of knowledge to
economic development and began to recognize workplace knowledge
as an asset of the firm rather than an attribute of the employee.
The invention of the trade secret doctrine in the mid-nineteenth
century enabled employers to enjoin revelation of secret information
by current or former employees. At the same time, courts expanded
2. Although today's disputes are not simply a phenomenon of the Information
Revolution's emphasis on intellectual property and a technology-generated burst of
employee mobility, these phenomena do shape the terms of the debate. See, e.g., William
M. Carley, Secrets Suit: What Did He Know?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1998, at B1; Terzah
Ewing, Dow Chemical Sues GE over Trade Secrets, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1997, at A3; Erik
Larson, Modem Operandi: In High-Tech Industry, New Firms Often Get Fast Trip to
Courtroom; Silicon Valley Is a Hotbed of Trade-Secrecy Suits Against Former Workers,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1984, available at 1984 WL-WSJ 208449; Brandon Mitchener, Lopez
Charged with Betraying GM Secrets to VW, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1996, at A3; Emily
Nelson, Wal-Mart Accuses Amazon.com of Stealing its Secrets in Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 19, 1998, at B12; Emily Nelson & George Anders, Wal-Mart, Amazon.com Settle
Fight over Recruitment and Trade Secrets, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 6, 1999, at A2; Gabriella
Stern & Brandon Mitchener, VW Agrees to Give GM $100 Million to Settle Lopez Trade-
Secret Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997, at A3; see generally ROBERT B. REICH, THE
WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY CAPITALISM (1991)
(describing the "new economy" as a "global web" of "symbolic analysts" who are (highly
paid) "problem solvers," "problem identifiers," and "strategic brokers" with little loyalty
to individual corporations or nations); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE:
CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (explaining
that the highly mobile workforce in Silicon Valley contributed to the rapid diffusion of
new technologies, innovation, and the large number of start-up firms); John K. Markey &
James F. Boyle, New Crimes of the Information Age, 43 BOSTON BUS. J., May-June 1999,
at 10; Lester C. Thurow, Poaching Patents, 19 CAL. LAW., Nov. 1999, at 23 ("In today's
economy, skills and knowledge are becoming the only sources of a sustainable, long-term
competitive advantage in the corporate world.").
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the permissible uses of post-employment covenants not to compete so
as to prevent dissemination of knowledge. Together, these doctrinal
developments created a new obligation-sometimes articulated as an
express or implied contract, and sometimes expressed as a "duty of
trust and confidence"-not to use knowledge acquired on the job
elsewhere. The nineteenth-century law of trade secrets and
restrictive covenants thus defined the bounds of permissible
entrepreneurship. Equally as significant, these doctrines both
generated and reflected a profoundly new perspective on the nature
and control of workplace knowledge.
3
Two questions dominated the nineteenth-century development
of this law at the intersection of intellectual property and
employment: (1) What legitimate interests did the employer have in
maintaining monopoly control over knowledge? (2) How should that
interest be reconciled with the employee's right (or obligation) to
work and with the public's interests in free competition and in the
fruits of everyone's work? Judges and lawyers addressed these issues
in a period of rapid social, economic, and technological changes that
followed the disappearance of the artisanal relationship among the
master, the journeyman, and the apprentice. Legal recognition of
trade secrets and covenants not to compete imposed stricter controls
on the use and dissemination of knowledge than had existed in the
pre-industrial artisanal workplace. This legal change to the modern
corporate management of intellectual property.
Yet, the development of the concept of an employer's ownership
interest in employee knowledge was not without difficulties. Courts,
treatise-writers, and lawyers did not immediately understand how
3. Two other developments were also important in this regard: the evolution of the
employer's shop right in employee patents for inventions and the evolution of the work-
for-hire concept in copyright. Both the shop right and the work-for-hire doctrine grant
intellectual property rights to employers in the creative products of employees based on
the employer's right to control and benefit from all aspects of the employees' work. I have
dealt with the ownership of workplace knowledge issues at the intersection of patent law
and employment law elsewhere. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the "Fuel of
Interest" from the "Fire of Genius": Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1998).
Although a thorough study of the origins of the work-for-hire doctrine has not been
published, related issues are probed in the scholarship on the "invention" of authorship
and the development of copyright law. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (1994); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION
OF COPYRIGHT (1993); THE CONSTRUCrION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds.,
1994).
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inchoate knowledge that formerly would have been considered an
attribute of the skilled craftsman could be an asset of a firm. Initially,
therefore, they focused on the tangible embodiments of technological
creativity-the blue prints, the notebooks containing formula, the
machines-rather than on abstract knowledge itself. Even when they
did begin to recognize the possibility of property in ideas or
knowledge, it was an unpalatable prospect to enjoin a man not to use
the contents of his brain in a society infused with an ideology of free
labor (at least for some).
This significant chapter in the history of intellectual property and
employment law raises historiographic issues about the role of law in
economic development and the importance of law as an ideological
structure shaping the terms of the free labor debate.4 Existing
scholarship on the history of trade secrets and noncompete
agreements has focused principally on evolving judicial, business, and
public attitudes toward competition.5  With some significant
variations on the theme, the usual story goes like this. At times, the
courts favored robust competition and regarded with hostility
contractual restrictions on the ability to practice a trade. In sixteenth-
century England, this hostility stemmed from concern about the
economic and political power of the guilds and the cities' control of
4. This is a debate among legal historians about the extent to which courts used law
instrumentally to promote economic development, see e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977), and the extent to which law
was a more autonomous ideological structure that developed according to its own logic,
see e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993). Part of the debate also concerns how law was a force
shaping the actions of business and labor, and vice versa. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH,
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991). As I hope to
show, there is considerable support for all of these positions in the history of intellectual
property in the workplace. More interesting than the question whether law drove the
market or vice versa is the process by which courts characterized facts and developed legal
categories that made the application of law to fact seem determinate when in fact it was
anything but.
5. See, e.g., 8 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 56-62
(1926); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 272-91
(1991); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 4-29 (1986); Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements
Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630-46 (1960); see also 1 KURT H. DECKER,
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 22-26 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing cases from the fifteenth to the
eighteenth centuries in England); Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669,721-31 (1982) (and sources
cited therein). On the rhetoric of the judicial and legislative debates about competition,
see generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992:
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (1996).
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trades that effectively restricted the availability of products.6 In
America, without the tradition of guild and city control of trade,
adherence to the English precedents' hostility toward restrictions was
a logical response to the endemic shortages of skilled labor and
technological know-how.7
This variant of a dominant thesis of nineteenth-century legal
historiography-that judges used law to promote economic
development 8-does, in some respects, account for the treatment of
trade secrets and restrictive covenants. In devising new rules to
govern ownership of ideas and skill, judges, treatise-writers, and
lawyers perceived the issue as one of economic policy and used the
law to achieve certain economic goals. In enforcing contracts-at
first, only if they were express, and later by recognizing such contracts
as implied-to maintain secrecy of the employer's methods, courts
created a new species of "intellectual" property at the expense of
older notions of artisanal independence. This was undoubtedly a case
of "creative destruction" of one form of economic privilege to create
another-the corporate intellectual property.9 But, unlike in other
areas, such as changes in water rights and legislatively conferred
bridge charters, this was not a self-conscious process of trading one
form of property right for another. Here, a major part of the legal
6. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 57. On the craft guilds in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries, see EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 126-38 (rev. ed. 1920), CHARLES
GROSS, THE GILD MERCHANT (1890), 3 EPHRAIM LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 10-183 (7th ed. 1937) (on select industries), and 4 LIPSON at 330-51 (on the
craft guilds in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries). On the scholarly dispute of a century
ago as to the role of law in diminishing the power of the English craft guilds from the late
middle ages until the sixteenth century, see SHEILA KRAMER, THE ENGLISH CRAFT
GILDS AND THE GOVERNMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ACCEPTED THEORY
REGARDING THE DECAY OF THE CRAFT GILDS (2d prtg. 1968). One ought not take for
granted the nineteenth-century perspective on the operation of the medieval craft guilds;
the obsession with economic theory, laissez faire, and fair competition was the intellectual
currency of the nineteenth century, not necessarily the fifteenth. See Gervase Rosser,
Crafts, Guilds and the Negotiation of Work in the Medieval Town, PAST & PRESENT, Feb.
1997, at 3, available at 1997 WL 17730943.
7. On the potency of the free labor ideology in nineteenth-century America, see
generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1995); JONATHAN A. GLICKSTEIN,
CONCEPTS OF FREE LABOR IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (1991); ROBERT J. STEINFELD,
THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1991).
8. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 4; 1. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
9. See generally STANLEY I. CUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION:
THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (Repr. ed. 1990).
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change was a gradual shift to recognizing knowledge, especially
inchoate knowledge, as a form of property, and then recognizing that
property as belonging to someone other than the employee who
possessed it.
The conventional view of this law as the precursor of modem
antitrust and economic policy fails to illuminate certain aspects of the
history of trade secrets and restrictive convenants material. As
applied to trade secrets and restrictive covenants, an exclusive focus
on competition policy is anachronistic, reflecting the economic
concerns of the late-century laissez-faire era more than the
perspective of the antebellum period. The antebellum concerns
about monopoly and free trade were different from the Gilded Age
anxieties. 10
By contrast, in the early to middle nineteenth century, courts and
firms assessed firm ownership of workplace knowledge as much in
ethical as in economic terms. The moralistic tone in which judges,
litigants, and businesses framed the debate seems odd to the modern
sensibility, which is accustomed to seeing these issues in terms of
economic (dis)incentives to hire and innovate, the regulation of a
market in technology, and the economic advantages of a rapid
diffusion of information. This aspect of trade secret and restrictive
covenant law is a product of the "moral economy" of the early
nineteenth century, in which notions of honor, trust, and the moral
value of work ("industry") loomed far larger than they did at the end
of the century.
The development of this doctrine also forged in the law a new
epistemology of technical know-how. Judges, lawyers, employers,
and workers based their legal arguments about the nature of
workplace knowledge on views that were very different from ours. In
creating the concept of "intellectual property" in a rapidly
industrializing society, courts worked out the legal consequences of
10. Most of the extant scholarship on the history of restrictive covenants relies to some
extent on a number of economic histories written shortly after the turn of the twentieth
century. These histories studied the guild and city regulation of trade in pre-industrial
England from the implicit or explicit perspective of legitimating the Progressive-era legal
regulation of monopolies and large corporations by showing extensive economic
regulation to have been a feature of the common law for centuries.
11. Much modern scholarship on employee "human capital" and intellectual property
focuses on the legal issues from the perspective of economics. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch,
The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 683 (1980);
Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 (1993)
(arguing that the justifications for limited enforceability of restrictive covenants are
unpersuasive).
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the increasingly social nature of the production of technological
knowledge.' 2 Changing assumptions about the duties of master and
servant left their imprint on the law's handiwork over the course of
the century, as did the evolving judicial understanding of the value of
workplace knowledge and the desirability of its dissemination. The
expansion of scientific and technological research at universities and
the first corporate efforts to systematize the development of new
technology through research and development also made their mark
on the law.13 These profound changes in the organization of
knowledge both contributed to the new legal rules and were made
possible because judges and lawyers were prepared to regard
knowledge as a business asset to be bought, managed, and sold.'
4
The doctrinal developments are only part of the story. The law
reflected in the treatises and cases very likely did not reflect how
businesses and workers thought about their own situations. Of
course, a disjunction between "the law on the books" and "the law in
action" is not news to anyone with a passing acquaintance with recent
law and society scholarship (or to one who recalls the era of the
national fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit). However, a particular
ambiguity characterizes the relationship between the law and the
practice of trade secrets and restrictive covenants. It has been
contended, for example, that the Silicon Valley phenomenon of high
12. I argue that the social context in which scientific or technological knowledge is
developed shapes the legal system's regard for the value and rightful use of the
knowledge. A related point has been made by a historian of science who has argued that
the social context of the development of scientific knowledge in the seventeenth century
affected perceptions of veracity. See STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH:
CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 5,40-41 (1999).
13. On the development of the modem forms of organization of academic knowledge,
see generally THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN MODERN AMERICA, 1860-1920
(Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds., 1979). On the development of modem industrial
research and development, the work of David Hounshell stands out. See DAVID A.
HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCrION, 1800-1932 (1984);
see also sources cited infra note 105; Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff,
Inventors, Firms and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Century United States, in LEARNING BY DOING IN FIRMS, MARKETS, AND NATIONS
(Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al. eds., 1999).
14. A history of trade secrets and restrictive covenants presents two particular legal-
historiographic challenges. First, the notion that these cases are about "owning
knowledge" reflects the view, by now a dich of the Information Age, that knowledge is
economically valuable and that firms must "manage" knowledge-which is usually treated
as an abstraction. While nineteenth-century lawyers were certainly capable of significant
feats of abstraction, they did not endeavor to generalize from the synthesis of trade secrets
and restrictive covenants concepts any general understanding of who owned workplace
knowledge. See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OFTHE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
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labor mobility and rapid diffusion of new technology occurred in
California, rather than elsewhere, for two reasons. First, California's
restrictive law of trade secrets was not enforced as it is written.
15
Second, California's flat prohibition on post-employment restrictive
covenants was enforced exactly as written.
16
The debate about the effect of the law regarding employee
intellectual property on the Silicon Valley phenomenon suggests that
one cannot begin to understand the nature and operation of the law
of trade secrets and post-employment restrictive covenants without
studying both the doctrine in the books and the practices of firms.
Pending a more comprehensive study of corporate archives, I studied
a sample of several large and small firms in a number of different
industries, including explosives/chemistry (E.I. du Pont de Nemours
Company ("Du Pont")), railroads (the Pennsylvania Railroad and the
Reading Railroad), textiles (two medium-sized Pennsylvania-based
firms), and steel (Lukens Steel Co.). 17 My principal source in this
Article is the records of the Du Pont company, which was the only
one of these firms that kept well-archived records showing that it paid
systematic attention to controlling the use of its employees'
knowledge. The Du Pont company, from its founding in 1802, was
acutely aware of the value of its employees' knowledge and
intellectual capital. As such, and because of its well-documented
records, Du Pont is an ideal case study. Precisely because of its
attention to these issues, Du Pont is not representative of the firms in
that era. Nevertheless, Du Pont does provide some insight into how
the few firms that did care about ownership of employee human
15. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF A HIGH VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on
file with author).
16. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 575 (1999).
That courts are usually unwilling to enforce post-employment restrictions in
California does not mean that employers do not insist that employees sign them anyway.
Anecdotal evidence and a scattering of cases suggest that employers see an in terrorem
value of such contracts, regardless of their enforceability. See, e.g., Application Group,
Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Ct. App. 1998); David Maharaj, Aetna
Discards "Non-Compete" Tactic for Retaining Workers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at C1
("Even though having workers sign so-called non-compete contracts is illegal in
California, some employers use the threat of enforcing them to dissuade their employees
from leaving. Non-compete contracts, experts say, have become more popular among
employers as workers increasingly jump from one job to another, taking their training and
knowledge with them.").
17. All of these archives are available at the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware.
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capital used the law to protect their investment in developing
intellecual property.
This Article is organized chronologically. Part I begins with the
legal regime at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when
covenants not to compete were not yet used to control employee
knowledge and trade secrets did not exist as a legal concept. After
examining the seeds of the trade secret rule in treatises and a few
cases, and the dominant approach to contractual restraints on the
practice of a trade articulated in a seminal English case, Part I looks
to how Du Pont adapted itself to the absence of legal protection for
its technology in the early nineteenth century. It examines in detail
two episodes in which Du Pont resorted unsuccessfully first to the law
and, later, to public humiliation of disloyal employees and
competitors to assert the illegitimacy of its competitors' efforts to get
technology by enticing away Du Pont employees. Part II examines
the first recognition of using trade secrets and restrictive covenants
doctrines to control employee knowledge, beginning shortly after the
Civil War and continuing until the 1880s. Part II also examines the
scant records of Du Pont practice in this era and compares it with
anecdotal evidence of information-sharing among other firms. Part
III covers 1890-1920, which witnessed the major transformation of
these doctrines to the form they have today.
After describing the establishment of the obligation to guard
trade secrets as an incident of all employment relations and the
expansion of the uses of restrictive covenants to guard company
secrets, I return to Du Pont. Du Pont brought a trade secret suit
against Walter Masland, a research chemist who had been in charge
of the company's effort to develop artificial leather and who left to
start his own artificial leather business.18 Interestingly, although Du
Pont was a pioneer in corporate research and development and a
catalyst of legal change in bringing the Masland suit, the company
integrated into its employment practices only some of the new rules
that had developed. Thus, Du Pont both led and lagged behind the
wave of legal change chronicled in this Article. It is my hope to show
how the "law" -doctrines and institutions-simultaneously
constitutes and is constituted by social practices and, ultimately, by
how we understand the line between our "selves" and the world in
which we live and work.
18. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 216 F. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
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I. Secrets and Contracts, 1800-1860
A. The Legal Doctrines Restricting Dissemination of Workplace
Knowledge, 1800-1860
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the law recognized
few ways that employers could restrict their employees' use of
knowledge in subsequent employment. Enticement prohibited hiring
away another's employee, but it did not prevent a free employee from
leaving and taking his knowledge with him.19  An action for
enticement lay irrespective of whether the employee possessed any
valuable knowledge.20 Enticement protected the employer's right to
the employee's labor, not to his or her knowledge. The existence of
the action reflected judicial awareness of the economic costs of
employee mobility. But, because employees could, at the end of a
term of employment, freely depart with whatever skill and knowledge
they had acquired, there was no legal protection for the value of
employee knowledge.
Legal regulation of artisanal work relations explicitly
contemplated that the apprentice eventually would become a
journeyman or a master and, as such, would be free to use all
knowledge that he had acquired. Although courts enforced
covenants not to compete in connection with the sale of a business,
they did not allow masters to extract them from apprentices.
21
19. Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 425, 428 (1827); John
Nockleby, Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth
Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510,
1514-15 (1980).
20. See, e.g., TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND
CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT AND OF THE POWERS OF THE
COURTS OF CHANCERY 536-37 (3d ed., 1862, repr. ed. 1970) ("Whenever a servant is
enticed from his master's service, the master is entitled to his action of trespass on the
case, with a per quod.").
21. In A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Holdsworth states that, beginning in the early
seventeenth centuries, courts allowed masters to restrain newly freed apprentices from
using their "trade secrets" to compete, although it is unclear from the text or the single
citation whether this was a widely accepted rule, and there is no mention of how "trade
secret," as he called it, was defined. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 58. Other
scholarship on apprenticeship notes the hostility that courts showed toward the efforts of
masters to restrict competition from persons who had completed apprenticeships and were
thus fully entitled under the guild system to make full use of the "mystery" in which they
had been instructed. See, e.g., CHEYNEY, supra note 6, at 133.
On the role of apprenticeship contracts and the duty to guard the master's secrets in
fostering technological innovation in pre-industrial Europe, see S.R. Epstein, Craft Guilds,




In the pre-industrial economy, craft knowledge was transmitted
through families or from master to apprentice. The secrecy of recipes
and techniques that passed from generation to generation enabled a
family or a firm to gain a reputation and to retain exclusive control of
production. 22 Apprenticeship indentures recognized the value of
guarding secrecy while ensuring the passage of knowledge by
specifying that the master was to instruct the apprentice and to reveal
his "mystery" to him, and, in return, the apprentice pledged to keep
these techniques secret during the term of the apprenticeship.23 As
the concentration of production associated with industrialization
eliminated the possibility of owning a workshop in most trades, the
master-apprentice relationship eroded and soon was no longer the
dominant form of work organization. 24 One of the most significant
consequences of the decline of the artisan relationship by which the
master was obligated to train the apprentices was a change in the way
that knowledge was transmitted among generations and within
trades.25 The mutual obligations to instruct and to guard the secrets
of the craft were eventually supplanted by a new set of rules.
The replacement of the artisanal system of controlling
dissemination of knowledge by the combination of patents, trade
secrets, and contracts was gradual. The class of employees whose
22. WJ. RORABAUGH, THE CRAFr APPRENTICE: FROM FRANKLIN TO THE MACHINE
AGE IN AMERICA 32-33 (1986).
23. The duty of the apprentice to guard the master's secrets was a standard term
included in form apprenticeship agreements. See id. One such form agreement, executed
for a boy apprenticed in 1829 to William Whittaker & Sons of Philadelphia, a textile mill,
stated that the boy, Henry Barber, "doth covenant and promise his said master faithfully
to serve, his secrets to keep, and his lawful commands every where readily to obey." 1829
Apprenticeship agreement between William Whittaker & Sons of Philadelphia and Henry
Barber, (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library , Wilmington, Delaware, Accession
1471, Box 198). For his part, the master "doth covenant and promise to use the utmost of
his endeavours to teach, or cause to be taught or instructed, the said apprentice in the
trade or mystery of [here was written in the blank 'a cotton spinner']." See id. The duty to
guard secrets was a standard term in apprenticeship agreements as early as the fifteenth
century. See Indenture of Apprenticeship (1459), reprinted in ENGLISH ECONOMIC
HISTORY: SELECT DOCUMENTS at 147 (A.E. Bland et al. eds., 1914) ("[Tjhe aforesaid
John Goffe shall well and faithfully serve the aforesaid John Gibbs and Agnes his wife as
his masters and lords, shall keep their secrets, shall everywhere willingly do their lawful
and honourable commands, shall do his masters no injury nor see injury done to them by
others....").
24. See, e.g., ALAN DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION IN LYNN (1976); RORABAUGH, supra note 22, at 32-33; Charles G. Steffen,
Changes in the Organization of Artisan Production in Baltimore, 17904820, at 36 WM. &
MARY Q. 101 (1979); Christopher L Tomlins, The Ties That Bind Master and Servant in
Massachusetts, 1800-1850,30 LAB. HIST. 193 (1989).
25. RORABAUGH, supra note 22, at 32-33.
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knowledge and experience made them especially valuable were the
first-generation descendants, not of the apprentice boys, but of the
more middling sort-journeymen in the crafts, as well as mechanics,
machinists, and men with some education in chemistry or drafting.
This class of employees historically had not been bound by the
apprentice's duty of confidence. The independence and the
entrepreneurial spirit of these men were recurring images in the
republican antebellum culture and the developing commercial and
manufacturing economy.26 The development of one unified law of
master and servant and the rise of factory production during the
second industrial revolution after 1870 were necessary before courts
would obliterate the legal distinctions among different statuses of
working men and assert a duty of confidentiality for all employees
ranging from factory laborers to research chemists.
Today, trade secret doctrine accepts as given that employment is
a relationship of "trust and confidence" that obligates the employee
to keep some information secret.27 In 1800, trade secret doctrine as
such did not exist. Only some employment relations were
characterized as confidential and, therefore, incorporated an
obligation not to divulge workplace secrets. The relationship of
master to apprentice explicitly incorporated a duty of confidence.
The guilds shored up this restriction by prohibiting the dissemination
of knowledge outside the guild. The household servant's obligation
to keep family confidences affected a significant number of workers
in a pre-industrial economy in which the boundaries among family,
26. See generally DAWLEY, supra note 24; TOMLINS, supra note 4; SEAN WILENTZ,
CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING
CLASS, 1788-1850 (1984).
27. See, e.g., FRANCIS CURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE (1984) (examining the
nature and incidents of the "indisputable" proposition under English law that "an
employee owes a duty of fidelity to his employer" which is breached by the revelation of
confidential information); EMPLOYEE DUTY OF LOYALTY: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY
1 (Stewart S. Manela et al. eds., 1995) ("The employment relationship is one of trust,
confidence and loyalty" which obligates employees to use and to refrain from using
information in certain ways.); TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Arnold H.
Pedowitz et al. eds., 1997). Kim Lane Scheppele has linked the duty of confidence that is
the basis for trade secret protection to the philosophical and economic justifications for a
right of privacy. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY
IN THE COMMON LAW 231-47 (1988). The duty of confidence is not, however, the sole
basis that courts assert for trade secrets; as Professor Robert Bone's extensive recent study
points out, trade secret doctrine relies variously on duty of confidence, property, and
contract notions. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search
of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241,244-45 (1998).
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household, and workplace were quite indistinct.28 Under certain
circumstances, an agent might have had a fiduciary responsibility that
would include guarding the confidences of a principal. Skilled
workers would have been bound by none of these obligations. -The
superintendents, partners, skilled chemists, and machinists whose
work was crucial in early industrialization were not deemed
analogous to apprentices, household servants, or fiduciaries. Not
until the creation, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, of a
homogeneous law of "master and servant" applicable to workers of
all stations,29 would there have been any basis to apply to all work
relationships the limited duties of confidence that existed in a few
such relationships.
A similar break with the past exists in the realm of restrictive
covenants. Today, noncompete covenants are widely used against
former employees to protect trade secrets or other "proprietary
information" by preventing the employee from working in any other
occupation requiring the knowledge or skill which the employer seeks
to control.3 0 In the past, English law allowed the use of restrictive
covenants in connection with the sale of a business or the formation
or dissolution of a partnership to enable the buyer of the business or
partnership effectively to acquire the business goodwill.31 There was,
28. The law of master and servant evolved from a variety of different legal relations,
including those of master and apprentice, head of a household and his staff, and principal
and agent. The nineteenth-century treatises, following Blackstone's lead, typically treated
master and servant as a species of the law of domestic relations. See sources cited infra
notes 29 and 86.
29. On the development of a law of "master and servant" governing all workers,
rather than the category of household servants to whom the concept "servant" had applied
in the eighteenth century, see Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the Employment
Relationship, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 71-98 (Christopher L. Tonlins & Andrew J.
King eds., 1992); Tomlins, supra note 24.
30. In a few states, the only legitimate use of post-employment restrictive covenants is
to protect trade secrets. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600 et seq. (West 1994)
(making covenants not to compete unenforceable except in connection with the sale of a
business or the dissolution of a partnership; the use of such agreements to protect trade
secrets is a judicially created exception to the statutory ban); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
445.761 (1945) (restrictive post-employment covenants were unenforceable except for 90
days), repealed by 1984 Mich. Pub. Acts 274, § 17.
31. Covenants not to compete were also used occasionally to divide up territory so as
to avoid competition among firms. Courts in the United States were hostile to such
covenants, and the development of the law of antitrust in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century severely restricted the enforcement of them. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol.
Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396 (1889) (holding that agent who negotiated a contract to eliminate
competition in gas prices by dividing territory is not entitled to compensation for his
services because the contract is void as a restraint of trade). In United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Circuit
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however, no evidence of judicial approval of such covenants against
employees before the late nineteenth century. When courts began, at
the end of the nineteenth century, to apply the same concepts to
employment relationships, they obscured the novelty of enforcing
restrictive covenants against employees by relying on eighteenth-
century cases having little to do with employment.
The English courts had long held that some restrictive covenants
were contrary to public policy, and the American courts adopted this
common law rule. The early cases relating to sales of business and,
later, to post-employment restrictive covenants, therefore, offer the
only perspective on what judges deemed to be the public's interest in
the dissemination of knowledge that a covenant sought to restrict.
Since the question was whether to enforce a contract, the cases
compelled judges to reconcile liberty of contract values with other
values, including the value of restricted labor and trade and that of
freely usable knowledge. Thus, courts explicitly had to consider
whether the employee's knowledge was alienable. Courts also had to
consider whether or how much value must be paid for such
knowledge, whether employers were likely to exploit employees in
seeking to control the use of knowledge, and whether the employer's
interest justified the restriction on an employee's freedom (or
obligation) to work.
32
The pre-industrial concern with the power of masters and guilds
to restrict trade continued to inform the development of the law, as
Judge Taft stated that an agreement not to compete would be valid only if it was ancillary
to the main purpose of another lawful contract, such as a sale of business or an
employment contract. Taft's opinion, in the words of Herbert Hovenkamp, "fused the
neoclassical model of competition with the legal doctrine of combinations in restraint of
trade" and in the process "created the illusion that the law of combinations in restraint of
trade had always been concerned with 'competition,' neoclassically defined."
HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 287.
32. Although the laws of trade secrets and restrictive covenants not to compete are
linked by an important commonality, the sources of the law are confusingly disparate. The
law was borrowed from England, and English cases remained important precedent in
American courts throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Further, the
rules were worked out and the litigation occurred in myriad courts and procedural
settings: state and federal courts, the law courts and the equity courts, under common law
and statute. Noncompetition covenants sometimes would be litigated on the law side in a
suit for damages, and sometimes in equity seeking specific performance. The early
English cases involved covenants that were suits on a bond; pursuant to the covenant, the
employee agreed to pay a specified sum if he worked in violation of the terms, and the
litigation was a suit on the debt. In many cases, however, the employer preferred specific
enforcement of the covenant because of the difficulty of ascertaining and collecting
damages. When the employer sought an injunction to restrain the employee from
working, the action was in equity.
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the landmark decision of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 33 remained a common
starting point for judicial analysis of restrictions on the dissemination
of knowledge. Mitchel's hostility to restrictive covenants was a
response to the guild tradition that skilled artisans could practice only
a single trade in a single area.34 If an artisan promised not to practice
his trade, he gave up his livelihood. In the centuries before Mitchel,
when the economy was still reeling from the death of half the
workforce due to the Plague, the inability to practice one's trade was
not only disastrous for the individual but a serious loss to the public
as well. Enforced idleness would also run afoul of the Statute of
Labourers, which responded to the labor shortage caused by the
Plague by regulating wages and making it a crime for an able-bodied
person without independent means to refuse to work.35 As the most
pressing labor shortage faded over time and the overwhelming power
of the guilds dissipated, the English law's hostility to restraints on
trade diminished. Although the Parliament enacted legislation
restricting craftsmen's attempts to prohibit competition by former
apprentices,3 6 courts eventually began to allow some covenants not to
compete.
33. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). In upholding a limited restriction, the court declined
to follow the much-cited Dyer's Case from 1414 which had held that any restriction on the
practice of a trade, irrespective of reasonableness, was void. Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5,
Michaelmas, pl. 26 (Eng. 1414). The Dyer's Case remained a common citation in English and
American cases into the twentieth century. Perhaps the judicial and scholarly fondness for it
may be attributed to the intemperance of the language of the judge in condemning such
covenants. The judge said, about the party who sought to enforce the covenant: "Per Dieu si
le plaintiff fuit icy il irra al prison, tanque i ust fait fyne au Roye." ("By God, if the plaintiff
were here he would go to prison until he paid a fine to the King.").
Holdsworth cited some cases from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries upholding
covenants in limited circumstances, typically in connection with the sale of a business and
with the efforts of guilds to control the trade in a particular town. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 5, at 58-59.
34. See CHEYNEY, supra note 6, at 50-62, 83-115, 133-38; Handler & Lazaroff, supra
note 5, at 721-24; 1 LIPSON, supra note 6, ch. 8; 8 id. at 279-94,347-51; TREBILCOCK, supra
note 5, ch. 1; Blake, supra note 5, at 632-38; Charles E. Carpenter, Validity of Contracts
Not to Compete 76 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 246 (1928); William L. Letwin, The English
Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. Cmn. L. REV. 355,379-80 (1954).
35. 23 Edw. 3 (Eng. 1349), reprinted in ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY: SELECT
DOCUMENTS at 164-67 (A.E. Bland et al. eds., 1914). On the Statute of Labourers and
subsequent related legislation, see MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTrvE 45-55 (1989).
36. In 1536, Parliament enacted the Act for Avoiding of Exactions Taken Upon
Apprentices, which prohibited any master to "compel or cause any apprentice or
journeyman, by oath or bond... that he, after his apprenticeship or term expired, shall
not set up or keep any shop .... " 28 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1536), reprinted in ENGLISH
ECONOMICHISTORY: SELEC DOCUMENTS, at 284-86 (A.E. Bland et al. eds., 1914).
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Mitchel was the watershed. It is the seminal case on restrictive
covenants and early trade secrets, as most nineteenth-century cases
on these issues cited it.37 In Mitchel, the defendant was a baker who
apparently violated a restrictive covenant he had signed when he
leased his bakery to the plaintiff.38 The defendant argued that the
covenant was void because he was a baker, had served an
apprenticeship in it, and could not be restrained from practicing his
trade.39 The court upheld the covenant, and gave an elaborate
opinion for doing so. 40 Because of the opinion's thoroughness and
attention to policy, as well as its "impressive display of synthetic and
analytical reasoning," 41 Mitchel was influential. Its approach to the
validity of restrictive covenants shaped the nineteenth-century courts'
approach to the issue in the employment relationships even though
Mitchel did not concern employment but, rather, the sale of a
business.
Mitchel established a multifactored analysis of reasonableness
that has ever since dominated the law's approach to contractual
restraints on the practice of a trade and thus to the dissemination of
workplace knowledge. First, the opinion analogized the situation to
the grant by the Crown of limited monopolies to serve the public
interest, including the system of patents.42 The court also noted that
prior cases had determined the public interest to allow the restriction
of some trades to particular persons, or the exclusion of "foreigners";
on this basis, the court suggested it might be in the public interest to
"prevent a town from being overstocked with any particular trade. '43
The court explained that enforcement of covenants would protect
artisans by enabling them to sell a business more easily.44
Mitchel also recited the arguments against enforcing restrictive
covenants. First, there was the law's favor for "trade and honest




41. TREBILCOCK, supra note 5, at 11.
42. Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348.
43. Id. at 350.
44. The court made this point by describing the hypothetical
case of an old man, who finding himself under such circumstances either of body
or mind, as that he is likely to be a loser by continuing his trade, in this case it will
be better for him to part with it for a consideration, that by selling his custom, he
may procure to himself a livelihood, which he might probably have lost, by
trading longer.
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industry."45 Restrictive covenants may cause "mischief," "1st, to the
party, by the loss of his livelihood, and the subsistence of his family;
2dly, to the publick, by depriving it of an useful member.
46
Furthermore, the court continued, such agreements are subject to
abuse:
[A]s for instance, from corporations, who are perpetually labouring
for exclusive advantages in trade, and to reduce it into as few hands
as possible; as likewise from masters, who are apt to give their
apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many
indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, lest they should
prejudice them in their custom, when they come to set up for
themselves.47
The court devised a limited rule to accommodate these
competing considerations: the law presumes restrictive covenants
invalid, but the party seeking enforcement may prove that, in the
particular circumstances, it is "a just and honest contract."48 A "just
and honest contract" must, first of all, be supported by adequate
consideration. 49 In addition, the restriction should be only such as
necessary to benefit the person seeking enforcement (i.e., limited in
time, in geographic scope, and in the occupations that are
prohibited).50 Finally, the public must not be unduly injured by the
restriction.5 1
Mitchel established the outlines of a multifactored
reasonableness rule that has been applied in trade secret cases as well
as in the enforcement of restrictive covenants. But this apparent
continuity in the law masks significant discontinuity in the nature of
its application. The proposition that injunctive restrictions against
former employees are permissible restraints of trade or labor was not
established in Mitchel; further, this proposition was not established in
the United States until shortly after the Civil War.
The classic explanation for the changing law of restrictive
covenants was that it was an imperative of economic development. As
William Holdsworth explained, "[T]he law as to contracts in restraint of
trade has, more than any other class of contracts, been moulded by




48. Id at 352.
49. See id. at 348.
50. Id
51. Id at 351.
52. 8 HoLDswORTH, supra note 5, at 56.
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consisted mainly of attitudes about the desirability of regulating
commerce and industry.53 Holdsworth attributed changing attitudes to
the ebb and flow of the political power of the "merchant class":
[A]fter the Revolution [of 1688] .... [the] Whigs were backed by
the merchants; and the mercantile opinion which favoured freedom
of trade got more weight in the Legislature. It was inevitable that
this changed point of view should react upon the courts, and that, in
the light of it, they should revise their views as to the validity of
contracts in restraint of trade.54
And, so was the court influenced in Mitchel v. Reynolds. Holdsworth's
somewhat reductionist economic explanation of the inevitability of legal
change captures some of the truth, for the judicial rhetoric plainly does
reveal economic concerns. I think, however, that it underestimates the
ideological influences on the law, both those endogenous to the legal
system in the sense that they were the products of legal categories and
perspectives, and those that stemmed from the manner in which the
merchants, manufacturers, and the employees regarded workplace
knowledge. Moreover, it is not obvious that a "freedom of trade"
perspective would necessarily favor enforcement of restrictive
covenants.
The judges' growing understanding of the alienability and the
value of employee skill led courts to recognize ever more legitimate
uses for restrictive covenants. Courts eventually agreed that
covenants could be used to protect "trade secrets," a concept that
became more capacious over time. Some courts further recognized
that covenants could be used to protect an undefined category of
"proprietary information" in addition to trade secrets. Similarly,
courts changed their assessments of which relationships with
customers were business goodwill, and hence company property, and
which were simply an aspect of an employee's personality or
experience. Moreover, in applying the Mitchel rule that a covenant
must be reasonably limited, the scope of a permissible covenant
expanded to keep pace with the expanding category of knowledge
that could be deemed as corporate asset.
Regarding Mitchel from the perspective of controlling employee
knowledge also helps explain the opinion's confusing and commonly
litigated distinction between valid partial restraints -covering a
limited territory-from the invalid general restraints-covering all of
53. Id.
54. Id. at 59.
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England. 5 The general-partial distinction in Mitchel made policy
sense because, as the court found, "what does it signify to a
tradesman in London, what another does at Newcastle? and surely it
would be unreasonable to fix a certain loss on one side, without any
benefit to the other. 5 6 American courts struggled to apply this
distinction in the context of state versus national restrictions.57
Eventually, courts on both sides of the Atlantic abandoned the
partial-general rule in favor of a more flexible doctrine that limited
the scope of valid covenants to the extent of the employer's market. s
Just as English statutes, both before and after Mitchel, forbade
masters from using restrictive covenants to prevent their apprentices
from setting up for themselves at the termination of the
apprenticeship, some American states enacted legislation regulating
apprenticeships by including prohibitions on contracts that restricted
competition by former apprentices. Chancellor Kent's Commentaries
on American Law described a New York statute that
specially and justly provided, that no person shall take from any
journeyman or apprentice any contract or agreement, that, after his
term of service expired, he shall not set up his trade, profession, or
employment in any particular place; nor shall any money or other
thing be exacted from any journeyman or apprentice, in restraint of
the place of exercising his trade.
59
Such statutes no doubt informed the courts' early understanding
of some abuses of restrictive covenants.60 Yet, just as courts and
55. See Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 349.
56. Id at 350.
57. Story's COMMENTARIES ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE no doubt contributed to
this, as he repeated the partial-general distinction. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 120 (1836).
58. Some courts' unwillingness to enforce covenants that covered an entire state or the
entire United States was criticized by scholars of the era in their effort to allow firms greater
latitude to restrict competition from former employees. An article in the 1890 HARVARD
LAW REVIEW summarized the law and asserted that it demonstrated that a restraint could be
valid even though it covered an entire state or nation so long as it was "reasonable," and
reasonableness was to be determined by looking at whether such a broad restraint was
necessary for the employer and whether it harmed the public (notice that harm to the
employee was not part of the inquiry, nor was the adequacy of consideration). Amasa M.
Eaton, On Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV. L. REV. 128,136 (1890).
59. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 263 (1826) (quoting N.Y.
REV. STAT., ii. 160, §§ 39,40).
60. The St. George Tucker edition of BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES from 1803 may
have been influential in leading American courts to see their indigenous artisanal tradition
differently than England's. In the passage on the law of master and servant in which
Blackstone discussed the English statutes restricting the practice of a trade to those who
had served an apprenticeship in it, Tucker noted in the footnotes that Virginia law, unlike
English law, did not so restrict entry into a trade. 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
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treatise-writers did not cite the express obligation in apprenticeship
indentures to guard secrets as the basis of the trade secret obligation,
they also failed to cite the later statutory restrictions on restrictive
covenants against former apprentices as the analogous precedent. In
short, courts and commentators did not look to positive law, but to
other sources in developing an approach to the ownership of
employee knowledge.
Joseph Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,61 first
published in 1836, was the first treatise to discuss the principles that
later became the law of trade secrets, and it remained the only
commentary on that subject until after the Civil War. His discussion
was extremely brief. One sentence stated simply that "a person may
lawfully sell a secret in his trade or business, and restrain himself from
using that secret." 62 A more fertile statement came in the discussion
of injunctions to enforce copyrights, in which Story said that equity
would "restrain a party from making a disclosure of secrets
communicated to him in the course of a confidential employment.
And it matters not, in such cases, whether the secrets be secrets of
trade or secrets of title, or any other secrets of the party important to
his interests. ' 63 Yet the cases cited as support suggest that Story may
have intended this sentence as nothing more than a description of the
obligations owed in the few employment relations that were already
recognized as being confidential. Courts later used Story's
propositions, however, as a basis for expanding the number of
employment relations that incorporated a duty of confidence.
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 427-28 (1803). The early American judges who turned to
this Americanized edition of Blackstone might have taken inspiration that the tendency
toward monopoly posed by the English tradition of regulating apprenticeship did not exist
in the freer American economy, and that restrictive covenants were not likely to be
abused in the same way. On the other hand, American anti-monopoly sentiment, plus a
shortage of skilled labor, might have led courts to be especially hostile to restrictive
covenants. On the pre-industrial efforts of the colonies and states to regulate the artisanal
relations so as to prevent monopoly and encourage training and quality manufacturing,
see 1 JOHN R. COMMONS ET AL., HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 43-47,
340 (1918).
61. See 1 STORY, supra note 57.
62. Id. at 121. Interestingly, this statement had no citations to support it, although
Yovatt v. Winyard, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (Ex. Ch. 1820), and Bryson v. Whitehead, 57 Eng.
Rep. 29 (V.C. 1822), would have been apt citations. When Story first published the
COMMENTARIES in 1836, there were no American cases on this issue; the first, Vickery v.
Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837), was decided a year later.
63. 2 STORY, supra note 57, at 389.
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Story cited three English cases for the proposition that equity
would restrain the disclosure of secrets learned in confidential
employment. The first, and most analogous, was Yovatt v. Winyard,
64
in which a veterinarian's journeyman had surreptitiously copied his
employer's medicine recipes that he had been explicitly forbidden to
see or use. The Lord Chancellor concluded that the journeyman had
breached a duty of trust and confidence and, on that basis, enjoined
the former employee from using or publishing the purloined recipes.65
According to the court's description of the employment agreement,
the defendant was "to be instructed in the general knowledge of the
business, but was not to be taught the mode of composing the
medicines. '66 The plaintiffs counsel conceded that the court might
not protect the secret if the proprietor had himself communicated it.
Here, since the defendant had first learned of the secret in breach of
duty, he could be enjoined from using the knowledge.67
Later English cases, often cited by American courts and by later
editions of Story's treatise, repeated the same point. If the employee
"was permitted to acquire, and did acquire, a full knowledge" of the
trade secret to enable him to perform his duties, the employer could
not afterwards "restrain him from using any knowledge so acquired
or any secret so disclosed. ' 68 At its origins, therefore, the law
prohibited employees from illicitly learning secrets, but not from
using knowledge that they acquired through their work.
69
The other two cases Story cited had even less to do with what
later became the law of trade secrets. One, Cholmondeley v.
Clinton,70 held that a solicitor's clerk, who later became a solicitor for
an adversary of his former employer's client, could not use for the
benefit of his new client any knowledge that he had acquired while
working as a clerk.71 In contemporary parlance, the case concerned
attorney-client privilege and conflicts of interest; the court simply
stated the unremarkable proposition that an attorney cannot switch
from representing the defendant to the plaintiff in the same case.
72
64. 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (Ex. Ch. 1820).
65. ld at 426.
66. Id.
67. lId
68. Morison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 501 (V.C. 1851) (enjoining defendant from
using secret recipe for patent medicine because he had learned the recipe illicitly).
69. Merryweather v. Moore, 2 L.R.-Ch. 518 (Eng. 1892).
70. 34 Eng. Rep. 515 (1815).
71. Id. at 515.
72. Id. at 518. The former clerk, Montriou, had worked as clerk and then as solicitor
for a firm that represented Lord Clinton in matters concerning his land holdings. In that
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Story's third citation, Evitt v. Price,73 held that a firm of attorneys
could get an injunction forcing an accountant to return their account
books after the accountant refused to relinquish their books until he
received payment due to him.74 Neither of these cases is wholly
unrelated to the ownership of information, of course. However, a
lawyer's duty to guard client confidences, which was well established
by the middle ages,75 is a far cry from a general duty of all employees
to protect all secrets of every employer.
Story's own creativity played a role in the invention of trade
secret doctrine. 76 The synthetic and systematizing work of treatise-
writing revealed the possibilities that had not been apparent before.
Yet, the absence of any other treatise asserting that employees had a
duty of confidence suggests that Story's comments were about the
available remedies for breach of an existing duty of confidence, not a
description of all employment as confidential relationhips. Other
early treatises contained no mention of the duty to guard secrets. For
example, Chancellor James Kent's Commentaries on American Law
described the relationship of principal and agent as one in which the
principal confides the management of some business to the agent, and
the agent undertakes the "trust"; however, that treatise mentioned
employment, Montriou prepared abstracts and deeds and developed considerable
knowledge about the titles to Lord Clinton's estates. Id. at 515. During that time Earl
Cholmondeley claimed title to one of Lord Clinton's estates by virtue of some defect in
Clinton's title. Id. About a year after dissolution of the law partnership, Montriou
became solicitor to Cholmondeley to represent him in litigation concerning the estate.
The court enjoined Montriou from using for Cholmondeley knowledge he had acquired
while representing Clinton. Id. at 519.
73. 57 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1827).
74. Id. at 659.
75. James A. Brundage, Keeping the Client's Secrets: An Ethical Obligation of
Medieval Advocates (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal
History, Princeton, Oct. 21, 2000) (on file with author).
76. Story did not single-handedly invent the trade secret rule; his overstatement of the
principle recognized in the precedents should be understood as the nineteenth-century
treatise-writer's tendency toward abstraction and generalization. Not every later trade
secret case cited Story, which suggests that the trade secret concept developed for reasons
other than Story's influence. Furthermore, that a treatise states a legal principle that does
not find solid support in the cases cited does not mean that the author conjured the
principle out of thin air. Cf generally Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule Revisited: A Challenge to Its Origins as Based in the
Development of Advanced Capitalism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75 (1995); Jay M.
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118
(1976). All of us have written enough footnotes to know the sometimes-attenuated
relationship between what one knows to be the law and the sources one can find ready at
hand when the time comes to polish the footnotes. If that can be a problem in the modern
age of easily accessible libraries and electronic research, imagine the difficulties
confronting a treatise writer in the early nineteenth century.
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nothing of a duty to guard secrets.77 Tapping Reeve's The Law of
Baron and Femme contains no such mention.7 8 Neither do other
treatises that discuss the law of master and servant or equity mention
anything of a duty to guard secrets.79
The other early antecedents of trade secret doctrine were an
1822 English decision, Bryson v. Whitehead,80 and an 1837 American
case, Vickery v. Welch,8 both of which granted specific performance
of an agreement for the sale of a secret recipe in connection with the
sale of the business (a dye recipe in Bryson and a chocolate recipe in
Vickery).82 Both of these cases established a novel rule that the
recipe, a discrete thing reflected in a written form, was an asset of a
business that could be sold; once sold, however, the seller lost the
right to use that recipe.83 Interestingly, in Vickery the defendant had
argued that the seller's obligation to refrain from selling the recipe to
anyone else was void as a restraint of trade, citing Mitchel v.
Reynolds.84 The court was unpersuaded:
The public are not prejudiced by the transfer of [the chocolate
recipe] to the plaintiff. If it were worth any thing, the defendant
would use the art and keep it secret, and it is of no consequence to
the public whether the secret art be used by the plaintiff or by the
defendant.8
5
If Story was the unwitting antecedent of the trade secret rule that
all employment entails a confidential relationship, these cases are the
equally unwitting precursors of the modem notion that trade secrets
are a species of property in ideas. Throughout most of the century,
however, trade secret law recognized the existence of property rights
77. 2 KENT, supra note 59, at 614-15.
78. REEVE, supra note 20. This work does not mention trade secrets in the section on
the law of master and servant, on the law of apprentices, or even in the section on the
powers of chancery courts.
79. See generally SIR EDWARD FRY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF CONTRACTS (1858); THEOPHiLUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (6th ed. 1873);
JAMES SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EMBRACING HUSBAND AND
WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY AND MASTER AND
SERVANT (1905).
80. 57 Eng. Rep. 29 (V.C. 1822).
81. 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837).
82. Bryson, 57 Eng. Rep. at 31; Vickery, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) at 523.
83. Bryson, 57 Eng. Rep. at 35-37; Vickery, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) at 526.
84. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
85. Vickery, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) at 527. Six years later, New York adopted the concept
of a trade secret as being the saleable property of a business. Jarvis v. Peck, 10 Paige. Ch.
118 (N.Y. 1843); accord Hard v. Seeley, 48 N.E. 428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865) (enforcing
covenant ancillary to the sale of a business by which seller promised not to reveal "the art
and mystery of compounding and manufacturing" a medicine known as "Dermador").
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only in things and not in ideas.86 As we will see, when Du Pont aimed
to prevent the dissemination of its secret methods of manufacturing
gunpowder, it sought to prosecute the theft of the drawings of its
machinery and of some devices for refining powder. It did not,
because it could not, prosecute the misappropriation of the
knowledge embodied in them or the efforts of its competitors to
obtain the knowledge by hiring former Du Pont employees.
Especially later in the nineteenth century, trade secrets were
often characterized as property, both in the cases and in popular
parlance. 87 Until the twentieth century, however, this property right
was limited: Courts ordered the return of trade secrets if they were
things but did not enjoin the use of the knowledge expressed in those
things. Judges emphasized the presence of physical things in part
because they did not understand inchoate knowledge to be a firm's
asset. For example, in an early Pennsylvania case, McGowin v.
Remington,88 a surveyor in Pittsburgh had left his maps and surveying
instruments with his former assistant while he started a new business
elsewhere. When he returned to Pittsburgh, the assistant refused to
relinquish the maps and instruments and was busy copying the maps
for his own use. The court ordered the defendant to return the maps
and instruments, along with the copies he had made.8 9
Why did courts not recognize (at least initially) that employers
could have property rights in intangibles? In that era, there were
property rights in intangible things-for example, courts recognized
future interests in property. Focusing only on the tangible objects
certainly had the advantage of allowing courts to avoid a problem
86. In Peabody v. Norfolk, the first American case to hold that an employer could sue
a former employee for misappropriating a trade secret, the court said that the employer
"has a property in" a secret process enforceable against "one who in violation of contract
and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use." 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868).
In that case the employee breached an express contract requiring him to guard the secrecy
of designs for machinery and provided exact copies of drawings of the machinery to a
competitor of his former employer-thus the opinion was founded on contract, property,
and confidence notions. Peabody is discussed infra in Part II.A.
87. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 5, at 82. For example, a reference in a non-legal
publication (a book publishing secret recipes for various medical and household purposes
which the author claimed to have obtained while working for several technical journals)
referred to "all those recipes and so-called 'trade secrets' which have been so extensively
advertised and offered for sale." JOHN PHIN, TRADE "SECRETS" AND PRIVATE RECIPES:
A COLLECTION OF RECIPES, PROCESSES & FORMULAE THAT HAVE BEEN OFFERED
FOR SALE BY VARIOUS PERSONS AT PRICES RANGING FROM TWENTY-FIVE CENTS TO
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS iii (Industrial Publication Co., 1887) (on file with the Hagley
Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware).
88. 12 Pa. 56 (1849).
89. Id. at 58, 63.
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that was both practically and ideologically difficult. It obviated the
need to distinguish knowledge that courts were willing to prevent
employees from using in subsequent employment from that which
was an inalienable aspect of a person's skill, intelligence, or life
experience. Granting the employer the physical things, rather than
the right to control the former employee's use of knowledge, was also
a more acceptable legal remedy in a society infused with the ideology
of free labor.
Early trade secret cases also reveal that courts did not regard the
obligation to keep secrets to be a feature of every employment
relationship. A New York decision, Deming v. Chapman,90 is
illustrative. In Deming, an employer had obtained a preliminary
injunction based on an express written contract that the employee
would not divulge the employer's technique for marbleizing iron or
slate.91 The New York supreme court dissolved the injunction,
suggesting two reasons why actions to protect such secrets were not
cognizable. 92 First, the court reasoned that such actions could not be
tried in equity because the court would necessarily have to learn the
secret in order to determine whether it was a secret and what to
enjoin, thus destroying the secrecy of the process.93 Second, the court
suggested that the federal patent law was the sole source of
protection for such economically valuable and novel information.94
The court's view that it lacked the ability to grant equitable
enforcement even of a signed contract promising to keep a particular,
named secret suggests the novelty of the employer's claim. 95
The court's belief that patent was the only legal protection for
technology reflects a widely held view during much of the nineteenth
century. Even as courts began to expand the trade secret doctrine
90. 11 How. Pr. 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854).
91. Id.
92. L at 382. The court also based its ruling on the ground that the employer lacked
an equitable claim to the secret because it had been revealed to him in breach of a duty to
the one who had invented it. Id. at 382-83.
93. Id.
94. Ma2
95. Id. at 383. One additional fact suggests that the Deming court did not believe the
law recognized an obligation of employees to guard secrets. The opinion is not clear about
whether the defendant was in fact a former employee. If there had been any recognized
duty of employees to guard secrets, one would expect the court to have emphasized
whether Chapman was an employee and what obligations of secrecy flowed from
employment. One can infer from a sentence in which the court notes that the plaintiff,
Deming, obtained a "written instrument" like Chapman's "from three other employees,
only one week before Chapman's" that Chapman was an employee. Id. at 382-83
(emphasis added).
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later in the century, employers were slow to realize the doctrine's
potential as an alternative to patent protection. At the turn of the
twentieth century, Du Pont focused mainly on patents, as it required
employees to assign patents to the firm after 1904. However, it did
not attempt to restrain by contract the disclosure of trade secrets or
post-employment competition until the company's trade secret
litigation against former research chemist, Walter Masland, made
obvious the inadequacy of contracts focusing only on patent
assignments.
As Deming indicates, antebellum courts did not see employment
contracts as imposing a duty of confidentiality regarding technology.
Deming went further in refusing to enforce even an express written
contract. The courts did, however, begin to recognize the use of
restrictive covenants in preventing employees from using their
knowledge about customers. In 1825, in Homer v. Ashford,96 an
English court first recognized that an employer asserted a legitimate
interest in preventing the employee from soliciting former
customers. 97 Across the Atlantic, however, no American court ruled
on whether covenants could be used to protect customer
information.98 Homer is noteworthy even though it found no
96. 130 Eng. Rep. 537 (C.P. 1825).
97. Id. at 539.
98. Massachusetts courts published the largest number of covenant cases in the
antebellum era. They very early determined the public interest to allow restrictive
covenants in connection with the sale of a business, and in all of the five cases decided
between 1811 and 1828 on such covenants, the courts rejected the contentions that
consideration was inadequate. In essence, the courts concluded that the defendant had
sold his business for a reason and had received value for the sale, and the courts were
disinclined to accept post hoc arguments that the consideration for the covenant that was
part of the sale was insufficiently beneficial. See, e.g., Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng)
223,228 (1811).
The first case in which a Massachusetts court held a covenant unenforceable was an
1837 case in which the defendant, in connection with the sale of stock in an iron foundry,
covenanted never to work as an iron founder or caster, or even to be "interested...
directly or indirectly" in the iron foundry or casting business. Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass.
(19 Pick.) 51, 51 (1837). The covenant was limited neither in duration nor in geographic
scope. The court declined to enforce the covenant, stating in very broad terms the evils
associated with restrictive covenants. Although the policies it invoked in its reasoning-
the deprivation of the capacity to earn a livelihood, the loss to the public of the services,
the diminution of competition-suggested a broader ruling, the decision rested on the rule
that unlimited restraints were invalid. Id at 54.
Massachusetts' leading role in trade secret and restrictive covenant cases before 1870
invites explanation. Unfortunately I must be cautious in venturing any. First, relying
mainly on published decisions without having searched court records for unpublished
dispositions, I cannot be sure that Massachusetts courts did indeed decide more cases as
opposed simply to publishing more. Second, at least by the later part of the century,
courts in each state freely cited cases from other states and England, thus reducing
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immediate following in the United States because of the breadth of its
reasoning and its insistence on the needs of commerce as a basis for
wider enforcement of restrictive covenants. In Homer, the defendant
had worked for a saddler's ironmonger in the job of clerk and
traveling salesman.99 The court enforced a covenant prohibiting the
defendant from soliciting in specified towns for fourteen years.100 The
court proffered the needs of growing businesses as a basis for the
ruling: "Manufactures or dealings cannot be carried on to any great
extent without the assistance of agents and servants," the court
reasoned.10  "These must soon acquire a knowledge of the
manufactures or dealings of their employers. A merchant or
manufacturer would soon find a rival in every one of his servants, if
he could not prevent them from using to his prejudice the knowledge
acquired in his employ."'l  In the context of those facts, the
"knowledge" to which the court referred is knowledge of customers'
needs and, more generally, business goodwill. It is not all of the
employee's knowledge of his trade.
The court thought that protecting the employer's customer
relationships would benefit the public's interest in trade:
"Engagements of this sort between masters and servants are not
injurious restraints of trade, but securities necessary for those who are
engaged in it. The effect of such contracts is to encourage rather than
cramp the employment of capital in trade, and the promotion of
industry.' 0 3 The court emphasized that the relationship between the
salesman and the customers was a product of the employer's
"liberality," and a covenant was necessary to prevent its abuse: "We
know the influence that a rider has over the customers of his
employer, and with how much effect he may use the argument-
differences among states in theory, although certainly differences remained in application
and interpretation of the widely cited precedent. In later phases of this project, I plan to
study possible local variation in leading industrializing states in the context of nineteenth-
century differences in state policies regarding law, commerce, and governmental
involvement in economic development. See OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY HANDLIN,
COMMONWEALTH 226-27 & n.123 (2d ed. 1969) (discussing these cases); See generally
Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA,
1776-1860 (1948); Cf. JONATHAN PRUDE, THE COMING OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER: TOWN
AND FACTORY LIFE IN RURAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1810-1860 (1983).
99. 130 Eng. Rep. at 537-38.
100. Id. at 538.
101. Id- at 539.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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encourage young beginners. This influence is gained by the liberality
of his employer, and ought not to be used against him." 1°4
That commercial employers should prevent solicitation of their
customers involved no affront to the individuality of skilled
employees. That an industrial employer should prevent its skilled
craftsmen from using knowledge of their own trade, however, seemed
a far more alarming infringement on the very selfhood of craftsmen,
engineers, and factory superintendents. The distinction between
technical and commercial knowledge also found support in cases
going back to Mitchel. Courts had long recognized that restrictive
covenants could be used to transfer business goodwill when the
person bound was the seller of a business or a partner in a dissolving
partnership. But even cases that involved customer relations were
troubling sometimes, particularly as salesmen and dental and medical
assistants argued that their relations with customers or patients were
largely a product of their own talent, personality, or experience.
In sum, apart from apprenticeship and fiduciary relationships,
none of the various and different early nineteenth-century
employment relationships incorporated a duty of confidentiality. Nor
was there any basis in the American cases to use restrictive covenants
to restrain employees, and English cases were few and conflicting on
this point. There simply was no basis in the law for most people who
employed assistants to prevent them from using in a later
employment the knowledge that they acquired in an earlier
employment. In other words, workplace knowledge and skill
remained, in the eyes of the law, an attribute of each worker, not an
asset of a firm.
B. The Early Practice in Restricting the Dissemination of Knowledge: The
Du Pont Powder Yards, 1808-1812
The limits of the available legal doctrine from the standpoint of
employers is illustrated in two episodes from Du Pont's early history.
For the first hundred years of its existence, the Du Pont company was
104. Id. at 540. Some English courts expressed reservations about the use of covenants
to restrict former employees from soliciting the business of a firm. In two cases the courts
questioned whether employers did have a legitimate interest in protecting customer
relations but the holding in each rested on the overly broad geographic scope of the
prohibition. Ward v. Byrne, 151 Eng. Rep. 232, 238 (C.P. 1831) (declining to enforce a
nine-month prohibition on solicitation, reasoning that "the public are altogether losers for
that time of the services of the individual, and do not derive any benefit whatever in
return"); Horner v. Graves, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 288 (C.P. 1831) (declining to enforce a
covenant barring the practice of dentistry within 100 miles of the city of York that was to
last so long as the plaintiff maintained a practice).
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basically a family-controled manufacturer of explosives. Most of the
economically valuable knowledge about the chemistry and
manufacture of gunpowder was developed or possessed by the du
Pont family members and their close associates. For the most part,
the du Ponts managed the company and supervised its research
throughout the nineteenth century.105 Thus, the company's approach
to employee intellectual property depended on close family control
supported by informal sanctions and self-help. The legal rules that
now form the principal weapons in the employer's arsenal for
protecting economically valuable knowledge-nondisclosure and
noncompete agreements and trade secret litigation-were either
unavailable or unknown to the du Ponts.10 6 Interestingly, Du Pont
did not begin to use contracts to restrict its employees' later use of
knowledge until the second decade of the twentieth century.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the company relied mainly
on secrecy and reputational sanctions to make it difficult for
employees to take company secrets to competitors. 07 In common
105. Du Pont has captured the attention of many scholars interested in the history of
technology and business, but most of the works have focused on the company in the
twentieth century. The history of Du Pont research and development in the twentieth
century is told in DAvID A. HOUNSHELL & JOHN KENLY SMITH, SCIENCE AND
CORPORATE STRATEGY: Du PONT R & D, 1902-1980 (1988). David A. Hounshell,
Interpreting the History of Industrial Research and Development: The Case of E.L du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 134 PROc. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 387 (1990) is a fascinating essay on the
writing of this leading work. A leading work of business history is ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR. & STEPHEN SALSBURY, PIERRE S. DU PONT AND THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN CORPORATION (1971). A very sympathetic, even romantic, telling of the
nineteenth-century history of the Du Pont company for a popular audience is WILLIAM S.
DUrTON, Du PONT: ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY YEARS (1942). The family is the
subject of WILLIAM H.A. CARR, THE DU PONTS OF DELAWARE (1964). Many of the
histories of the family and the company in the nineteenth century rely on an
understandably sympathetic book by BESSIE GARDNER DU PONT, E.I. DU PONT DE
NEMOURS AND COMPANY, A HISTORY, 1802-1902 (1920), as well as on the vast quantity
of notes and documents she assembled in preparing the history; her notes are preserved
intact at the Hagley Museum & Library in Wilmington, Delaware. A far less sympathetic
discussion of Du Pont in the twentieth century is GERARD COLBY ZILG, DU PONT:
BEHIND THE NYLON CURTAIN (1974).
106. Most who have written about the Du Pont company and the family that founded it
begin the company name with a capital D and the family name a lower case d. See, e.g.,
sources cited supra note 105.
107. On du Pont family management of the company and supervision of the research in
the late-nineteenth century and early twentieth, see CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 34.
Chandler illustrates the phenomenon of family control over research and development
with an episode from the research on smokeless powder at Du Pont's Carney's Point
plant. The research was supervised by Francis G. du Pont, the brother of the head of the
company, and assisted by Pierre S. du Pont, who became the head of the company in the
twentieth century. Though Pierre later wrote that the Du Pont company invention of
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with other antebellum business proprietors whose superior
technology gave them a competitive edge, such as Samuel Slater of
Massachusetts, the du Ponts carefully guarded their secret processes
by restricting access to the mills and discouraging employee mobility.
Slater, who himself had copied designs he had seen elsewhere, "swore
early employees to secrecy about 'the nature of the works'; he paid
his key operatives elevated rates to prevent their 'aiding and assisting
another mill'; and he was 'ever cautious of admitting strangers to
view' his technology. '" 10 8
On the rare occasion when the du Ponts resorted to legal
proceedings, they relied on the law of criminal theft and an action for
enticement. Only in the early twentieth century, when the company
had grown too large for the du Pont family members to manage
research and production by themselves and when reputational
sanctions had lost their bite, did the company begin systematically to
resort to contracts and occasionally to trade secret litigation to
protect its claims to employee knowledge. The change in Du Pont
company practice reflects, in microcosm, the change in the law. The
respects in which Du Pont company practice diverged from the legal
entitlements are as revealing, however, as the ways in which its
practice mirrored the law.
Eleuthere Irenee du Pont de Nemours, a French aristocrat who
prided himself on having studied the chemistry of gunpowder under
the famous chemist, Lavoisier, came with his family to the United
States in 1800 to start a business (and, not incidentally, to escape the
difficult situation confronting aristocrats after the French
Revolution). The family bought land along the Brandywine river
near Wilmington, Delaware, to build a powder mill and commenced
the business in 1802.109 Du Pont correctly believed that his chemical
knowledge would enable him to manufacture gun powder superior to
any then made in the United States.110 It was not long before others
tried to discover what accounted for du Pont's superior product. The
chronicle of du Pont's efforts to guard his secrets and to marshal both
smokeless powder for use in shotguns was the product of the "inventive genius of Francis
G. du Pont," the patent was issued to Pierre and Francis jointly because Pierre had
accidentally discovered it while working in the laboratory at Carney's Point. Id. at 34-35.
108. PRUDE, supra note 98, at 44-45 (quoting letters written by Samuel Slater).
109. This early history is told in the first several chapters of DUTrON, see supra note
105. I have also drawn some of the background material on the family and the business
from JOHN BEVERLY RIGGS, A GUIDE TO THE MANUSCRIPTS IN THE ELEUTHERIAN
MILLS HISTORICAL LIBRARY 21-25, 576-80 (1970).
110. DU PONT, supra note 105, at 37 (observing that du Pont's "unusual experience as
both chemist and machinist" was essential to his success).
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law and public opinion in his defense reveals a great deal about early-
nineteenth-century attitudes toward ownership of knowledge in the
workplace.
The Brandywine mills consisted of a number of stone buildings
along the bank of the river which supplied the power, the water, and
the security from unwanted visitors. The mills were in many respects
a remote and self-contained enclave, with a blacksmith shop to make
parts, and separate buildings for the multiple steps of the refining
process. Du Pont regulated working conditions closely to ensure
continuous production, to produce quality powder, and to reduce the
risk of explosion. In many respects, therefore, the organization of
work was more like the factories that later would develop in textiles
than the artisanal, small-shop mode of production that was more
typical in the first decades of nineteenth-century America. Du Pont's
personal involvement in and control over the process of the
manufacturing presaged the factory-based, employer-controlled work
process of the later century more than the artisanal, worker-
controlled process of the pre-industrial skilled crafts. Du Pont's early
mills thus seem to resemble some of the rural, moderately financed,
and proprietor-run mills of Massachusetts in that era.'
A Virginia firm, Brown, Page & Co., sought to build a powder
mill in Richmond. Eager to learn the secret of Du Pont's success,
they sent an agent, Charles Munns, to Wilmington in the autumn of
1808 to recruit powdermen from Du Pont's Brandywine mills. Munns
set himself up at The Buck, a local tavern, where he entertained Du
Pont employees. He offered to pay them wages far more generous
than Du Pont paid if they would agree to go to Richmond to work for
Brown, Page."2 He inquired about the machines that Du Pont used
in the different parts of the powder mills, and asked Du Pont
powdermen to make or steal drawings of the machinery. Munns was
especially keen to get a brass pounder and some parchment sieves
that were used to mix powder. He asked an assistant millwright,
Joseph Baughman, to make a copy of the pounder but Baughman was
111. See PRUDE, supra note 98, at xiv.
112. Letter from Raphael Duplanty, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., to James Rogers
(Feb. 7, 1809) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware,
Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48); Letter from Peter
Bauduy to Daniel Call (1809) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48); Charge
to the Jury in Munns v. Du Pont, 17 F. CAS. 993 (D. PA 1811) (NO. 9926) (on file with
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont
Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
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afraid to do so in the Du Pont blacksmith's shop so he took one
instead.113 Munns also obtained a number of the parchment sieves
from the mill.11 4 Munns arranged to meet the workmen at The Buck
to sign contracts with them, boasting that he would "destroy" the Du
Pont firm.115
Du Pont and his partner, Peter Bauduy, learned of the meeting
and went to the tavern determined to break it up. They beat Munns
severely and ordered him to leave the neighborhood.11 6 Du Pont and
Bauduy were later indicted for assault and battery and fined $15 each.
Munns and two Du Pont workmen went to Richmond. When du
Pont discovered that the brass pounder was missing, he tracked
Munns and Baughman down in Richmond and had them arrested and
returned to Delaware for trial on the theft charges.117 The alderman
who searched Munns at the time of his arrest found parchment sieves,
a detailed description of the brass pounder, and the letters between
Munns and Brown, Page describing Munns' escape from Wilmington
after the altercation with du Pont and Bauduy."
8
The letters formed the basis of Du Pont's unsuccessful legal
proceedings against Munns. They also reveal something of Brown,
Page's attitude toward Du Pont's works. In the first place, the
correspondence leaves no doubt that Brown, Page's goal in sending
Munns to Wilmington was to get information about Du Pont's
processes. Munns promised that he could deliver, boasting that "we
shall be upon a par with the Brandywine mills."11 9 Brown, Page urged
both Munns and Du Pont's erstwhile powder mixer, Hans Peebles, to
113. Letter from Raphael Duplanty to James Rogers, supra note 112.
114. Charge to the Jury in Munns v. Du Pont, supra note 112.
115. Id. ("C. Munns knew it perfectly well, we can prove his having bragged of having
broke us up to make use of his own expressions, by having procured our hands and
machinery: he was also aware that what he was doing was not right.").
116. Letter from Brown, Page & Co. to Charles Munns (Dec. 18, 1808) (on file with the
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont
Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48); Charge to the Jury in Munns. v. Du Pont, supra note
112.
117. Letter from Peter Bauduy to Daniel Call, supra note 112; Letter from Peter
Bauduy to James Hudson (1809) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
118. Charge to the Jury in Munns. v. Du Pont, supra note 112.
119. Letter from Charles Munns to Brown Page & Co. (Dec. 23, 1808) (on file with
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont
Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
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get to Richmond as soon as possible so they could complete their own
mill.
120
Brown, Page argued to Du Pont that the millwright whom
Munns had contacted "like any other mere mechanician... was
perfectly at liberty to dispose of his own time & [sic] services as his
interests might suggest.' 2' Yet their correspondence with Munns
suggests that they knew their efforts were questionable, at least as a
matter of custom or morals if not as a matter of law. Brown, Page
told Munns:
[T]he severe drubbing inflicted on you by Mr. Du Pont & his
associates [was excusable].... Mr. D has no doubt acted very rashly
& improperly, but taking all circumstances into consideration, we
think it will be prudent to take no notice of what is past-He
certainly had cause to irritate him, in as much as you were
endeavoring to obtain secrets appertaining to his business from his
men employed by him. 22
The tone of the letter suggests both a desire to insulate the firm
from responsibility for whatever injury Munns had suffered in the
course of his employment and, perhaps, annoyance at Munns'
complaining about the injuries.
The Du Pont partner's outrage at the efforts to entice away their
workers was hardly noteworthy, as the law prohibited enticement.' 3
What was significant was the special concern du Pont and Bauduy
exhibited about the theft or copying of their technology and their
dismay to learn that the law offered no remedy. They advised Brown,
Page by letter that they would institute litigation "under theimpression that laws are intended to protect laborious innocence
against the machinations of envious malevolence."' 24
Privately, however, du Pont doubted whether that law did, in
fact, protect "laborious innocence." In a letter to the firm's lawyer, a
Du Pont partner wondered whether Munns could be guilty of
120. Letter from Raphael Duplanty, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., to Daniel Call
(1809) (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood
Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48); Letter from Brown, Page &
Co. to Charles Munns, supra note 116.
121. Letter from Brown, Page & Co. to E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Jan. 7, 1809)
(on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood
Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
122. Letter from Brown, Page & Co. to Charles Munns, supra note 116.
123. See Nockleby, supra note 19, at 1514-15.
124. Letter from Du Pont to Brown, Page & Co. (Jan. 21, 1809) (on file with Hagley
Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive,
Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
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enticement.1 25 Du Pont hoped that even if there was "a defect in the
tenor of the law" through which this conduct might slip, "we presume
the Judge has it left to his discretion to extend the said law in some
measure when convinced that the injury done is extremely prejudicial
to the party injured, and aware that the case had not been foreseen at
the time the laws were enacted.' 1 26
Du Pont inquired of a Richmond lawyer, Daniel Call, whether
the company could sue Brown, Page, and was disappointed with the
answer. Du Pont could maintain an action, Call said, against any of
the partners of Brown, Page who "were privy to the enticing away of
your workmen.1127 But, since they had no patent right to the design
of the mills or to the machinery taken or copied, "I rather think no
action can be sustained for taking the copies, it being what the law
calls 'damnum absque injuria.' '128
Learning that the law offered no protection for the information
itself was an important lesson for du Pont and his partners. For some
years thereafter, the firm chose to rely heavily on informal sanctions
and public opinion, rather than on legal remedies, to protect the
secrecy of its technology. As du Pont complained about Brown, Page:
[W]e will at least satisfy our selves by publishing their transaction
with their own letters and exposing to light their infamous conduct.
We hope that publication will be sufficient to prove [sic] every man
of honor that they do not deserve the appellation of Gentlemen by
which they have hitherto been qualified. 29
That du Pont and his partners did not share the modern sensibility
about the harm of employee mobility is obvious from how they
conceptualized the injury the company suffered from the Munns
affair. Du Pont seemed especially alarmed that the prospect of high
wages the firm's competitors offered to get those secrets would make
the workman "unruly." Raising their expectations, du Pont lamented,
would leave "no possibility for us to maintain under the same severe
regulations persons persuaded that other people will treat them
better than we do.' 130 The danger of powdermen becoming resentful
125. It is unclear why Munns and Brown, Page & Co. would not be liable for
enticement, inasmuch as Baughman and Hans Peebles, a refiner, had left du Pont's
employ.
126. Letter from Raphael Duplanty to James Rogers, supra note 112.
127. Letter from Daniel Call to E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.? (Jan. 21, 1809) (on file
with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont
Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
128. Id.
129. Letter from Raphael Duplanty to Daniel Call, supra note 120.
130. Id.
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seemed especially great because powder mills were hazardous, and du
Pont feared that discontented workmen were likely to be careless.
He observed, "The safety of our family, the safety of the families in
our employ, the safety of the farmers who live in our neighborhood
has imposed upon us the absolute duty of making choice of steady,
sober men and of establishing the most rigid discipline among our
workmen. '131 Time and again, du Pont described his competitors'
overtures to his employees not only as dishonorable but also as likely
to promote unjustified unrest among workers who should otherwise
be satisfied with their position at the Brandywine mills.
By the spring of 1810, Munns had landed on his feet. He was the
superintendent of a powder mill at Frankford, near Philadelphia. Not
content to let success in business be his revenge, he sued du Pont and
his partners for malicious prosecution, claiming $100,000 in
damages.132 The suit alleged that du Pont and Bauduy lacked
probable cause to have Munns arrested in Virginia and to institute
the criminal charges in Delaware. United States Supreme Court
Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, presided. Munns brought
the suit at least in part to recoup the funds he had spent in his defense
against du Pont's civil and criminal proceedings against him, as he still
owed his lawyers fees for the defense.
133
Munns suffered a nonsuit. Justice Washington's charge to the
jury exhaustively summarized the evidence and suggested that du
Pont had sufficient proof that Munns was involved in the effort to
steal the brass pounder and the sieves. The judge also noted the care
that du Pont had taken to preserve the secrecy of his powder mills.1M
The issues he posed for the jury were (1) whether du Pont had
probable cause to have Munns criminally prosecuted for arranging
the theft of his equipment and copying his machines and (2) whether
du Pont lacked malicious intent in pressing the charges.
131. 1&
132. Letter from CJ. Ingersoll to E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Dec. 18, 1810) (on
file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du
Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
133. Letter from Charles Munns to William Clarke Frazer (Dec. 14, 1810) (on file with
the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont
Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
134. Case of Malicious Prosecution, Munns v. Du Pont, 17 F. Cas. 993 (D. Pa. 1811) (on
file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts,
Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48, File: Special, Munns Lawsuit (documents)).
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In nonsuiting Munns, the jury-composed of grocers and other
merchants of Wilmington 135-must have determined both that du
Pont had probable cause and that he lacked malicious intent. The
evidence as the judge presented it to the jury was undisputed; their
only task was to apply the law to it. If the law were clear that Munns
had done no wrong, the jury could not have returned the verdict that
du Pont had probable cause to have him arrested and, probably,
would not have concluded that du Pont lacked malice. Conversely, if
the law were clear that Munns was not entitled to learn Du Pont
technology by the means that he chose, one would think that du
Pont's action against him would have been successful.136 The various
pieces of litigation involving du Pont and Munns thus reveal the
ambivalence of the law-at least as represented by a few courts at
that time in Wilmington-toward du Pont's right to restrict the
dissemination of the company's secrets. If it were indeed undisputed,
as a matter of fact, that Du Pont employees took the pounder and
sieves with them when they departed for new employment, either du
Pont had cause to seek criminal prosecution for their theft, or the
employees were entitled to take them.
The Du Pont company's difficulties with competitors trying to
learn its methods by recruiting away its employees may have
prompted it to take even more care to exclude strangers from its
mills. In 1811, shortly after the Munns litigation drew to a close, the
company posted a list of rules in the powder mills. The rules forbade
"strangers of any description" to enter the powder yard and required
the men to eject any strangers who entered. 137 The problem of
employee mobility, however, remained.
The same year, Thomas Ewell, who owned considerable real
estate in Georgetown and Washington, wanted to establish himself as
135. Jury in Munns v. Du Pont, 17 F. Cas. 993 (D. Pa. 1811) (on file with the Hagley
Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive,
Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
136. In Munns' malicious prosecution suit, the judge informed the jury that Munns had
been acquitted of the criminal charges. However, the judge also stated that the
prosecution had sought to require Munns to pay the costs of the prosecution pursuant to a
Delaware law that evidently required the accused to pay the costs of a prosecution for
which there was probably a cause. Munns agreed voluntarily to do so in order to forestall
the court from making a formal finding that the prosecution had been supported by
probable cause. Case of Malicious Prosecution, Munns v. Du Pont, supra note 134. No
record remains in the Du Pont archive of the civil proceeding that du Pont instituted
against Munns. Munns' malicious prosecution suit was based entirely on the criminal
proceedings.
137. Factory Rules (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware,
Eleuthera (Bradford) du Pont Collection, Accession 146, Box 3, Folder 30.
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powder maker for the United States government. Du Pont jealously
watched this potential competitor and, being unwilling to share his
secrets, rejected Ewell's overtures to form a partnership of sorts,
ostensibly because the market for gunpowder was already
oversupplied.138 He also rejected Ewell's request to borrow one of
the superintendents from the Brandywine nills. 1 39 Du Pont sought to
convince Ewell that he would learn nothing valuable by hiring away
any of the Du Pont workers: "[O]ur manufactory is entirely
superintended by our E.I. Du Pont and his brother and.., the hands
employed under them are nothing but common labourers who
understand nothing of the principles and nature of the work they are
set about."' 4 As in the Brown, Page dispute, Du Pont was concerned
about the possible loss of its secrets. However, Du Pont was also
concerned that Ewell's "bribes" to the workers, "offering them two or
three times as much wages as they [were] worth" to get Du Pont
company secrets, would cause unrest.
141
Ewell replied and protested his innocence of "brib[ing] your
hands to desertion from you." He attempted again to persuade du
Pont to join him in his new mill. Anticipating the rejection of that
overture, Ewell offered to pay du Pont in cash to provide specified
information and technical assistance. Interestingly, he sought the
most basic of information about making gunpowder: "the rule for
adding water to the composition-for pounding-the rule for judging
when the composition is sufficiently mixed."' 42 He also wanted to
hire one of du Pont's "hands acquainted with the mechanical part"
along with "a complete set of punches for making holes in the various
sifters for granulating the powder." Finally, he requested the
opportunity "to attend a month at your mill for improvement in the
mechanical operations." 143
While Ewell was trying to persuade du Pont to collaborate with
him, he was, at the same time, trying surreptitiously to get
138. Letter from E.I. du Pont, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., to Thomas Ewell (Dec.
14, 1811) (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Eleuthera
(Bradford) du Pont Collection, Accession 146, Box 2, Folder 13.
139. Letter from Thomas Ewell to E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Dec. 8, 1811) (on
file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Eleuthera (Bradford) du
Pont Collection, Accession 146, Box 2, Folder 13.
140. Letter from E.I. du Pont to Thomas Ewell, supra note 138.
141. Id.
142. Letter from Thomas Ewell to E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., (Dec. 22, 1811) (on
file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Eleuthera (Bradford) du




information about Du Pont methods. Ewell wrote to one of Du
Pont's powdermen, professing that "Honor & gentlemanly feeling
prohibit my holding out any inducements to you to quit those with
whom you now are. And I am sure you wd. not yield-were I to wish
you-to act contrary to engagements existing."144 But, he added,
"you possess information-and I want it immediately. There is no
impropriety in yr. parting with this. It is your right-all men sell it-
and the man must be a fool who will complain of your doing it.
'145 It
is interesting that Ewell thought (or at least claimed) that "honor &
gentlemanly feeling" prohibited him from getting his competitor's
knowledge by enticing away an employee but allowed him to buy the
information from the employee outright. At the time, this was a
correct statement of what the law permitted, whatever it reflects
about prevailing notions of honor and "gentlemanly feeling."
Du Pont regarded Ewell's overtures to his powdermen as
"villainy," and it led to a protracted dispute between them. In April
of 1812, du Pont fired off an angry missive, complaining that Ewell's
efforts to recruit away Du Pont employees were "raising the
pretensions" of his workman.146 He proclaimed, "More than twenty
other hands who know very well that they possess as much
information as the ones you wish to bribe must naturally suppose they
ought to receive the same exorbitant wages." 47 As with Munns, du
Pont feared the destructiveness of raising the pretensions and the
price of manual labor. Here, however he asserted as well his property
rights in his employees' knowledge:
[Tihe proportion of skill and knowledge which we may have
acquired by continual study and repeated experiments is a private
property upon the possession of which depends our existence in the
manufacturing line, and for the communication of which no
pecuniary consideration, or cash as you called it, could be an
adequate compensation.'"
He concluded by appealing to a distinction between honorable
and despicable competition:
144. Letter from Thomas Ewell to Charles Munns (Nov. 24, 1811) (on file with Hagley
Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Eleuthera (Bradford) du Pont Collection,
Accession 146, Box 2, Folder 13.
145. Id.
146. Letter from E.I. du Pont, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., to Thomas Ewell (Apr.
8, 1812) (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood




[A] fair competition is certainly useful in every branch of Industry,
it compels every one to improve: to such competition... we never
will object, but to be stealing in the dark the improvements of
others is a mean unworthy action which inevitably annihilates all
kind of useful exertion.
149
The letter closed with a threat, not of litigation (perhaps the
episode with Charles Munns and Brown, Page had convinced du Pont
of the futility of resorting to the law) but of humiliation. If Ewell
enticed away any Du Pont hands or, indeed, if he so much as
employed any man who had ever worked for Du Pont, du Pont
threatened to "expose" that conduct by publishing a letter Ewell had
written to a Du Pont employee, Hugh Flannigan, attempting to entice
him away.
50
Ewell's response recast the claim of moral right in the dispute by
suggesting that du Pont was a grasping foreigner who refused to
contribute to the improvement of American manufactures or to
reward the talent of American workmen. (Ewell's claim to being the
true American evidently was based on his having emigrated from
England in 1794 and married a granddaughter of Martha
Washington. 151) He accused du Pont of exploiting his labor and
protested his own innocence in driving up wages, as he said he would
pay only "common wages" to all but the most skilled. Ewell also
scoffed at du Pont's claim to have a right to protect his secret
knowledge:
There is no truth in your declaration that cash could not pay you
for your property in the skill in making gun powder. It is for that
article you have with peculiar caution erected a french manufactory
at Brandywine not with the slightest claim to originality more than
myself.... You display the falsehood of your estimation of your
"common laborers" by complaining, as a great grievance, of their
loss, from bribing and by the advance of wages .... Your men have
a little knowledge of the practical part for which I would pay well,
and it is infamous in you to keep them in slavery, and from the
benefit you know their knowledge is worth to them, gained by
experience in the greatest danger .... Any but a miserable, narrow
149. 1&.
150. The letter that du Pont threatened to publish said "Mr. Mitchel your friend tells
me you are an excellent hand at the manufacture of Gunpowder, and that you had
expressed a willingness to engage with the powder makers at New York with Mr. Quigg."
Letter from Thomas Ewell to Hugh Flannigan, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Mar. 27,
1812) (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood
Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48). Ewell offered $800 per year
and a wage increase after six months "if you manage well." I&.
151. DU PONT, supra note 105, at 38 n.2.
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minded and selfish wretch, would promote their success after
faithful servitude .... 152
Ewell responded to du Pont's threat of humiliation by suggesting that,
if du Pont would open his workmen's private letters, he was the sort
of vile foreigner who would stop at nothing to injure his competitors:
You forget it was an American you were addressing. You fancied it
was one of those animals, overbearing in prosperity, servile in
adversity, commonly called frenchmen. Know then, if I ever
hesitate to give employment to one of your men, it will not be from
fear of you or of publicity to your wrath; because I prefer your open
enmity to your friendship, as most sensible men do that of your
nation .... 153
The tone of the correspondence, along with subsequent events,
suggest that both du Pont and Ewell anticipating making their letters
public. In this context, Ewell's invocation of American chauvinism
was a clever rhetorical move. Ewell had emigrated to the United
States from England only four years before du Pont arrived from
France. He was hardly more "American" than was du Pont. In 1812,
a low point in U.S.-British relations, an erstwhile Englishman who
wanted to sell gunpowder to the United States no doubt needed every
shred of patriotic legitimacy he could get if his competitor was to be a
man who came from France. Ewell's insistence that he was the true
American should be understood as an effort to prove his loyalty,
which might have seemed particularly important as du Pont was
about to embark on the project of manufacturing the gunpowder
essential to a war against England.
Ewell fired the opening shot in the war for public opinion by
publishing an advertisement in the Wilmington newspaper addressed
"To Powder Makers" seeking "an able superintendent of
character. ' 154 By promising "regular promotion in the establishment
from the more laborious work and low wages to better situations; so
that all will have the prospect of reward for faithful and diligent
attention," Ewell undoubtedly meant to suggest that du Pont failed to
give his own employees the chance to profit from their skill and
152. Letter from Thomas Ewell to E.I. du Pont, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Apr.
12, 1812) (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood
Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48, File: Special, Ewell Corres.
(out)).
153. Id.
154. Du Pont Advertisement, To Powder Makers, in THE WATCHMAN (Wilmington,
Delaware) (April 14, 1812) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
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ability. 55 Ewell had copies of the advertisement posted at the homes
of powder workers in Wilmington and distributed to the workmen at
Du Pont's mills 5 6
Meanwhile, Ewell kept up his correspondence with Hugh
Flannigan, offering a generous salary and asking him to bring more
hands. Flannigan apparently wanted assurances that Ewell really
would provide better conditions than he had at Du Pont's mill. Ewell
reassured him both about working conditions and that Flannigan and
Quigg would be paid well above the market. Ewell also sought to
assure Flannigan that he and Quigg would be the only powdermen in
the mill being so well paid, apparently because Flannigan was as
concerned about his relative status as he was about his absolute
compensation. Ewell impressed upon him the dire need he had for
his "skills & management.' 1 57
Not to be outdone in the public opinion battle, in June of 1812,
du Pont wrote and published a pamphlet called "Villainy Detected."
The pamphlet accused Ewell of incompetence in the manufacture of
gunpowder and of "villainy" in his efforts to get Du Pont knowledge
by offering "extravagant wages" to workmen.158 The pamphlet
announced du Pont's intention "to enter a suit at law against Dr.
Ewell, in hopes of obtaining redress and in order to put a stop to such
unjustifiable proceedings.' 59 However, "in the mean time," the
pamphlet continued, du Pont considered it "a duty towards the
government who have been deceived & to themselves who have been
injured" to reveal Ewell's perfidy in attempting to pass himself off as
a competent powder maker only by enticing away someone else's
workman.160 And the pamphlet then published the letter Ewell wrote
to Flannigan.
Interestingly, du Pont did not appear to make any effort to
restrain an early non-family partner in the Du Pont firm, Peter
Bauduy, from using the firm's techniques when he started a
competing mill on his estate near Wilmington. This was not because
155. 1&
156. I& The clipping has with it a handwritten note stating: "the following singular
advertisement has been published in the Watchman of Wilmington Delaware, posted up at
the workers home in Wilmington and distributed in hand bills to all the workmen of E.I.
Du Pont & Co. Manufactory."
157. Letter from Thomas Ewell to Hugh Flannigan, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
(May 3, 1812) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware,
Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series C, Box 48).
158. E.I. DU PONT, VILLAINY DETECTED (1812).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Bauduy left the firm on good terms; the dissolution was acrimonious
and led to protracted litigation. The extant correspondence about
Bauduy's methods was from E.I. du Pont's father to a French partner,
and confidently stated: "even though he has taken many of our
workmen, though he uses almost the same machinery and methods of
mixing-no powder compares with ours-all because of Irenee's skill
and his marvelous industry.'
161
The episodes involving Munns and Ewell reveal that du Pont
understood the value of the secrecy of the firm's powder-making
techniques and that the law offered inadequate protection for them.
They also reveal an attitude about the social and economic costs of
employee mobility that was steeped in moral notions of loyalty and
duty. Enticing employees to get their knowledge was as dishonorable
as it was unfair. It was destructive partly because it reduced the
incentive to invest in research, but also because it made the
powdermen dissatisfied with their position. The dissatisfaction might
harm the firm because it would cause dangerous carelessness, but also
because labor turnover would reduce production and disseminate
information about Du Pont's technological advantages to other
employers.
When du Pont learned in 1812 that he had little recourse for the
theft of sketches of his unpatented powder mill and machinery, he
was presumably not alone in thinking that the law should provide a
remedy. However, the English and American law of trade secrets did
not develop and restrictive covenants were not enforced against
employees until after 1860.162 When du Pont's lawyer opined that
Munns' and Peebles' misappropriation of powder manufacturing
techniques was damnum absque injuria, Call revealed the limits of the
law as much as the limits of his own imagination. It was only twenty
years later that the earliest seeds of trade secret doctrine sprouted in
the first edition of Joseph Story's treatise on equity, but none of the
cases on which Story relied had been decided when Call wrote. No
161. Letter from E.I. du Pont de Nemours to Johanno (believed May 1817) (quoted and
translated in DU PONT, supra note 105, at 51-52).
162. Although a twentieth-century enthusiast claimed ancient origins for the notion of
employer property in ideas, see generally A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman
Law; The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 837 (1930), English and American law did
not recognize such a claim until the latter half of the nineteenth century. My focus is
principally on American cases; however, because English cases were routinely cited in
American treatises and cases until well into the twentieth century, I discuss the leading
English cases when relevant. The English law of trade secrets is summarized in TREBILCOCK,




doubt, the need for such a doctrine was evident to many lawyers.
How that doctrine could be stitched together from existing precedent
was not.
I. The Development of Trade Secrets as an Obligation of
Employment and the Use of Contracts to Control Knowledge,
1860-1890
There was no case until after the Civil War that recognized an
obligation of employees to guard the secrets of the workplace.
Neither was there any case enforcing a restrictive covenant ancillary
to an employment agreement. The principal doctrinal development
on these issues during the first two postbellum decades was to
recognize both of these propositions. The import of the initial
recognition, however, went unrealized in the courts and in company
practices until the end of the century.
A. The Creation of Trade Secret Obligations of Employees and the Early
Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants Ancillary to Employment
The duty of employees to protect trade secrets was first
established in the United States in the influential 1868 Massachusetts
case, Peabody v. Norfolk. 63 Neither the litigants nor the judge
acknowledged the novelty of the claim or the ruling. The defendant
machinist had been employed as an engineer in the plaintiff's factory,
which manufactured gunny cloth from jute.164 Norfolk had agreed in
writing not to reveal information about machinery used there.165
Upon allegations that Norfolk had quit Peabody's employment and
aided others in constructing a factory with machines like Peabody's
(and had provided them copies of the original drawings of Peabody's
machines), the court enjoined Norfolk from revealing the secrets to
those with whom he was involved in building the other factory. 66
The potential importance and evident novelty of the case was not
even hinted at in the pleadings. Obviously, it was not in Peabody's
interest to note that the relief sought was unprecedented, nor would a
lawyer in that era likely think it his role to advocate major change.
So, Peabody's lawyer employed the rhetorical strategy of making the
claim seem so obvious as to be a matter of common sense. In the bill
of complaint, he portrayed his client as a small-time entrepreneur-
163. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
164. Id. at 453.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 460-61.
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inventor who had begun by conducting "experiments" to develop the
machinery on his farm and had employed Norfolk as a machinist to
assist "in originating, inventing, adapting, and perfecting" the
machinery. 167 When the trials of the machinery were successful,
Peabody employed Norfolk to aid in the construction of a factory
housing the equipment to manufacture gunny cloth on a larger
scale.168 Although the pleadings emphasized the misappropriation of
the drawings themselves, Peabody sought and received an injunction
requiring Norfolk to return the drawings and to refrain "from
communicating... any knowledge of the said machinery or of the
models and plans of the same," from "building any such machinery
for any other person or persons," from "communicating said secret
process of manufacturing Jute cloth from Jute butts as aforesaid," and
"from using said process in company with any other person or
persons or by himself."1 69
Norfolk's new employer, James Cook, demurred to the bill.170 In
his brief in support of the demurrer, Cook contended that the
promise was void as a restraint of trade because it "restrains him from
ever using during his life at any time or place the skill acquired in this
employment. '171 He also argued that the machinery's design and
operations were not secret because all who worked in or visited the
factory could observe the machinery in operation. 172
Given that Norfolk had copied drawings of the machines,
Peabody cannot be read as stating a rule prohibiting employees from
using general knowledge of machine design. Further, Justice Gray's
statement of the case emphasized that it was the plaintiff who
designed the machinery, not Norfolk's new employer, and thus the
injunction was solidly in the tradition of patent law: to protect the
167. Bill of Complaint, Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868), (on file with the
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 771).
168. Peabody, 98 Mass. at 459.
169. Bill of Complaint, Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868), (on file with the
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 771). Du Pont's
lawyer in the Masland case made a copy of the Peabody v. Norfolk pleadings from the
ones in the Social Law Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
170. Demurrer, Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (on file with the Hagley
Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, 3ox 771).
171. Points for James P. Cook, Peabody v. Norfolk (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 771).
172. Points for James P. Cook, Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (on file with
the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 771), and the
court, 98 Mass. at 459, relied on the sixth edition of Story's COMMENTARIES ON EOUITY
JURISPRUDENCE. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 319-21
(6th ed. 1853); see also STORY, supra note 62, at 261.
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right of one who "invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of
manufacture... against one who in violation of contract and breach
of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to
third persons."'173 Although Norfolk had agreed that he would "not
give any parties information, directly or indirectly, in regard to the
machinery, or any portions of it,"'174 later courts did not read the
decision as allowing an employer to control all employee knowledge.
Moreover, Peabody was read to establish a duty to guard trade
secrets irrespective of whether the employee in question had
expressly agreed to do so.
For at least two decades after Peabody, courts did not broadly
construe the scope or duration of the duty to guard secrets. James
High's treatise on injunctions described Peabody in narrow terms that
equity would protect the inventor or discoverer of a secret from
revelation by "one who, in violation of his contract and in breach of
confidence, undertakes to apply the process to his own use or that of
third persons."' 75 High thus specifically mentioned the existence of
the express contractual promise of secrecy that had been the
foundation of the Peabody holding.
A New Jersey equity court in 1886 refused to conclude that an
implied (or at least oral) employee agreement not to divulge the
employer's suppliers and customers extended beyond the term of the
employment. 76 The court explained:
It may be regarded as an undertaking on the part of the employee
not to injure his employer's business in that way so long as he shall
remain in his service. The employee, notwithstanding such
agreement, might himself, after leaving the employment, use the
knowledge he had obtained. He might sell to the customers of his
late employer, and buy of those from whom the latter purchased,
and do both in competition with him.177
The court denied the plaintiff the opportunity even to show that the
defendants had specifically agreed not to compete with him although
it allowed him to prove that the defendants were obligated not to use
the employer's processes for tanning leather.178 In his treatise on the
law of master and servant, Horace Wood echoed this rule. Wood
stated it was impermissible for an employee "while engaged in his
173. Peabody, 98 Mass. at 458.
174. Ld. at 453.
175. JAMEs L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INUNCIONs 408 (1873).
176. Salomon v. Hertz, 40 NJ. Eq. 400,403 (1885).
177. Id
178. Id. at 402-403.
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master's service, to diminish his business or detract from his profits
during the term, yet he may solicit trade from his master's customers
for himself, when he shall set up in the same business for himself,
after the term has expired.
'179
Wood's statement of the law aptly summed up the development
of trade secret law during the twenty-five years after the Civil War.
Courts had recognized the important principle that some employees
were obligated not to disclose secrets of the trade. What qualified as
a protectable secret remained very limited. And the basis for
confidentiality was still grounded fairly clearly in express contract; it
was not regarded as inhering in all employment relations. High's
treatise on injunctions grounded the obligation to guard secrets in the
pre-existence of a confidential relationship, as with "attorneys,
agents, or in other confidential relations.
'180
During this era, covenants not to compete were first recognized
to be a basis to protect employers' rights in knowledge and
information possessed by former employees. One of the earliest
published American cases involving a restrictive covenant ancillary to
an employment contract was Keeler v. Taylor,18' an 1866 Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision. Keeler involved a "mechanic," who had
agreed, in consideration for training in the manufacture of platform
scales plus $1, never to make platform scales for anyone else or to
convey the information he learned to anyone else.182 The mechanic
agreed that he would pay his former employer $50 for any scales
made in violation of the agreement. 183 He worked for the plaintiff for
seven years and then set up for himself in the manufacture of
scales.184 Under the norms of the artisanal relationship, the mechanic
would have been free to leave at the end of the customary seven-year
apprenticeship, taking his knowledge and skill with him. The
employer, however, chose to litigate to repudiate the old way of doing
things.
Although later cases confronted with these facts would likely
have enforced the contract on the ground that the plaintiff's
manufacturing techniques were trade secrets, the Pennsylvania court
did not. The court held the agreement unenforceable because it
179. HoRACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 225
(2d ed. 1886).
180. HIGH, supra note 175, at 15.
181. 53 Pa. 467 (1866).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 468.
184. Id.
[Vol. 52
"restrained the industry of the defendant, not in a particular locality,
but everywhere, not for a specified period, but for a lifetime ... ."185
The contract was also objectionable because it levied "a tax or duty"
upon "the industry of all who may derive their information from" the
employee.186 The employer had no entitlement to monopolize the
method because he was neither the inventor nor the patentee of the
scales, but simply had taught his employee "his handicraft."' 7
Finally, the court concluded that an equity court should "regard the
hardship of the bargain, and the prejudice to the public."' 88 Although
the court did not press the point, the employee must have argued that
the contract lacked consideration: Why would anyone regard training
in the manufacture of platform scales as valuable if the knowledge
could not be used elsewhere? Implicit in the court's reasoning is that,
in the absence of a patent, an employer could not restrain his
employees' subsequent use of the knowledge of the trade they had
learned, just as master craftsmen could not restrain their apprentices
from setting up for themselves once they had learned the trade and
completed the requisite seven-year term of appreticeship.
Most courts in this era appeared no more willing to allow
commercial employers to restrain former employees from soliciting
customers than they were to allow manufacturers to restrain the use
of technology. Massachusetts was the only state to report a decision
on a post-employment restraint on soliciting customers. Even that
case, Morse Twist Drill Co. v. Morse, 189 did not squarely establish that
such covenants would routinely be enforced, for the case was more
akin to a sale of business than a simple employment relationship. The
employee who was enjoined, Morse, had formed the plaintiff Morse
Twist Drill company in order to manufacture and sell a twist drill that
he had invented, the patent for which he had assigned to the firm.190
When Morse sold the company, moved to another state, and began
soliciting the customers of the firm he had founded, the court
enjoined him on the ground that the competition effectively
appropriated "a part of that which he has sold to the plaintiffs."' 91
Both Keeler and Morse Twist Drill used the existence of a patent
as marking out the boundaries of knowledge that employees could be
185. IM. at 470.
186. Id. at 468.
187. Id. at 470.
188. Id.
189. 103 Mass. 73 (1869).
190. Id. at73.
191. 1& at77.
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enjoined from using. To the extent that Morse was enjoined from
soliciting customers, it was because he was trying to sell the same
thing to the same people after he'd sold his patent rights and business.
Thus, the few trade secret and covenants cases before 1890 imposed
only modest limits on the kinds of knowledge that employees could
use and the circumstances in which they could use them. By and
large, employees remained free to use all knowledge acquired during
the course of their employment. Nevertheless, in recognizing new
uses for covenants and a duty of some employees to guard some
secrets, a couple of Massachusetts courts articulated a crucial new
rule. The importance of these doctrinal developments was not
immediately recognized by other courts or treatise-writers, as there
was little development in the law for an entire generation afterward.
B. Workplace Practices
That possible uses of these new cases were not brought to the
attention of firms is evident from Du Pont's records. There is no
record that the Du Pont company tried to bind employees through
restrictive covenants or nondisclosure agreements. If such efforts had
been made in any systematic way, there would have been a record in
Du Pont's voluminous files. Of course, cases like Peabody were few
and none was decided in Delaware. Although later scholarship
portrayed Peabody as a watershed, there is no evidence that it was so
perceived in its day. Neither, given the difficulties of legal research
and the sketchy treatment of it in treatises, would lawyers for other
firms have run across it.
What one saw instead at Du Pont was rapid growth of a company
that was keen to learn as much as possible about everyone else's
methods while taking few legal steps to protect its own. The company
wanted to avoid conflict over recruitment and, therefore, refused to
hire employees from competitors as a matter of policy. 192
Nevertheless, it eagerly acquired technology by whatever methods
seemed least likely to provoke litigation - whether by buying up
192. Letter from A.V. du Pont to Frederick Wright (Nov. 2, 1847) (on file with the
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont
Archive, Group 5, Series A, Box 2) (rejecting application for employment and describing
company's policy against hiring outsiders); Letter from unknown to Charles McKinney
(Dec. 1843) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Du Pont
archive, Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series A, Box 1) (declining
application for employment and describing company's policy not to hire those who have
worked at other powder factories).
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competitors, purchasing patents,193 or touring competing mills. 194 Du
Pont did attempt, until the 1860s, to prevent the dissemination of
knowledge (as well as to maintain quality control) by building only as
many powder mills as members of the firm could personally
supervise. Even that changed when Lammot du Pont developed a
way to make powder from soda instead of saltpetre (soda was
cheaper and easier to obtain). The increased demand for the new,
improved Du Pont powder led the family to expand the business and
to abandon the tight family-only supervision of the production
process.195
Du Pont may also have protected itself from the loss of
employees by being somewhat benevolent (or at least paternalistic)
toward its employees. Whereas early in the century E.I. du Pont
seemed most concerned with the physical, social, and economic
dangers of raising the pretensions of his powdermen, later du Ponts
painted a more benevolent picture of du Pont sons and cousins, with
their sleeves rolled up, working alongside their men.196 These
retrospective accounts of the family and the business emphasized
respect for the workmen and that the company supported the widows
and children of men who had died in powder mill explosions (and that
a number of du Ponts died along with them).197 While one may
discount the self-congratulatory aspects of these du Pont histories, the
relatively close community they describe has some basis in truth. The
193. During the last third of the nineteenth century, Du Pont purchased the patents of
independent inventors and, in many cases, contracted with the inventors to provide their
services in developing and improving the patent. HOUNSHELL & SMITH, supra note 105,
at 38. The acquisition of patents from independent inventors rather than from persons
employed by the firm was common among all companies in this era. Lamoreaux &
Sokoloff, supra note 13; Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Long-Term
Change in the Organization of Inventive Activity, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA 12686,
12687-90 (1996).
194. Lammot du Pont made an extensive tour of European powder mills in 1858 for the
sole purpose of learning the latest methods. Journal entry of Lammot du Pont (1858) (on
file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Longwood Manuscripts,
Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series A, Box 2); Letter from Lammot du Pont to Mother
(Apr. 4, 1858) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware,
Longwood Manuscripts, Du Pont Archive, Group 5, Series A, Box 2). Sixty years later,
when Du Pont was considering diversifying into the manufacture of dyestuffs, the
Development Department emphasized the need "to secure as soon as possible from the
experienced chemists and workers in England, France, Italy or Switzerland, the
information now existent in the art." Quoted in HOUNSHELL & SMITH, supra note 105, at
82.
195. DU PONT, supra note 105, at 80.
196. See id.
197. See id see generally DUTTON, supra note 105.
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du Pont family house, along with housing for some powder mill
workers, a school, and a church were all nestled along the bank of
Brandywine River in the nearby area.
Du Pont's attention to the value of maintaining the secrecy of its
methods is not typical of all nineteenth-century firms. I reviewed
some of the archives of the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroads, the
Lukens Steel Company, and a few mid-Atlantic textile mills and
machine shops. Although most of them left records of sporadic
efforts to obtain employee patents in particular cases, none showed
an awareness of the value of protecting employee knowledge from
their competitors and of the possible uses of the law in doing so.
Attitudes about ownership or control of employee knowledge clearly
varied among sectors of the nineteenth-century economy. The
difference may be attributable to the fact that Du Pont's chemistry-
based industry, as compared to an industry where employee skills are
mechanical, used knowledge which was most easily characterized as
secret information rather than as general skill or technique. The
difference may also be attributed to the du Ponts' view that they were
more likely to be innovators than imitators, and thus they were
generally likely to be more at risk from others learning their methods
than from being unable to learn methods of others. Whatever the
reason, other sectors of the economy reveal a much more
forthcoming group of manufacturers eager to share their recent
developments with their customers and competitors.
198
The modest expansion of the doctrines of trade secrets and
restrictive covenants in the 1860-1890 period was far outstripped by
the development of a variety of institutions committed to the rapid
diffusion of technology in many sectors of the economy. The
comparative paucity of cases in the era, at least as compared to the
sixty years preceding and the thirty that followed, may have
something to do with the fact that, unlike Du Pont, many individuals
and firms eagerly shared their knowledge and technology and
tirelessly participated in networks of learning. Phillip Scranton's
careful research has shown how certain sectors of the economy
198. See generally PHILLIP SCRANTON, ENDLESS NOVELTY: SPECIALTY PRODUCTION
AND AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1865-1925 (1997); Robert C. Allen, Collective
Invention, J. ECON. BEI-IAV. & ORG. 1, 1-10 (Mar. 1983) (arguing that firms in the
nineteenth-century British iron and steel industry shared, through informal disclosure and
publication in the engineering literature, information about technical advances in furnace
design and operation with other firms in the industry and with potential entrants).
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functioned because employers and skilled craftsmen freely shared
information about the latest techniques.199
Entire publications were dedicated to the dissemination of
technological advances. A review of several years' worth of issues of
the magazines Practical Machinist, American Machinist, and Scientific
American from the mid- to late-nineteenth century reveals a popular
literature about the detailed workings of all the wonders of the
industrial age. These magazines published detailed drawings and
chemical formulae along with descriptions of machinery, factories,
and processes. Practical Machinist ran regular columns on patent law
and occasional columns on other relevant legal issues, like
termination of employment contracts.2°° Its editors aimed to inform
the readership of the relevant law both with respect to work relations
and with respect to protecting economically valuable technology. The
focus was entirely on the termination of employment contracts on the
one hand, and patent rights on the other. The connection between
the emerging law of master and servant and the need to protect
intellectual property was not discussed.
Skilled workers and practical men of learning also participated in
societies like the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASIMiE)
that were important institutions in the dissemination of technical
knowledge. The professionalization of engineering that occurred
during this era was partly an effort by engineers to seek a certain
independence from the strictures of the master-servant relationship.
Then, as now, some firms considered it advantageous to have free
access to the technical improvements devised by others, even at the
expense of losing a monopoly on some of their own. Also, some firms
199. See generally SCRANTON, supra note 198; PHILIP SCRANTON, FIGURED
TAPESTRY: PRODUCTION, MARKETS, AND POWER IN PHILADELPHIA TEXTILES, 1885-
1941 (1989).
200. A sample of several early issues of PRACTICAL MACHINIST in 1859 and 1860
included articles on the law of unjust dismissal of employees with stated term contracts,
see PRACTICAL MACHINIST, Oct. 19, 1859, at 11 (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware), enticement of employees with stated term contracts, see
PRACTICAL MACHINIST, Nov. 2, 1859, at 30 (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library,
Wilmington, Delaware), and a discussion of the developing law of patents when the
patentee had employed "a servant" to assist in the development of the invention, see
PRACTICAL MACHINIST, Jan. 4, 1860, at 98 (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library,
Wilmington, Delaware). None of the issues I reviewed (which covered a two-year period
from 1859-1860) mentioned trade secrets or the enforceability of restrictive covenants.
A sample of AMERICAN MACHINIST published between February 1880 and June
1882 (on file with the Los Angeles County Library, Downtown Branch, Los Angeles,
California) revealed similar sorts of articles, focusing mainly on how to obtain a patent
and the perils of the patent application process.
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no doubt wanted to advertise to their customers their own
technological superiority. The widespread practice of sharing
technological advances documented in publications, in societies like
the ASME, in trade schools, and in periodic expositions suggests that
many companies preferred to publicize their technological advances
(probably relying on patents to protect their monopoly) rather than
to claim legal protection for them as secrets.
201
Although the employee's duty to guard trade secrets received its
first recognition in 1868, the duty remained quite limited even by the
last decade of the century. The duty was grounded in express
contract or in a traditionally confidential relationship like that of
attorney and client; it did not arise simply from the fact of
employment. The information that the duty protected was mainly
201. One of the complexities of understanding the ways that firms handled
economically valuable knowledge is in assessing when they sought to guard methods as
secrets and when they sought to share them as advertisements. Scranton's work suggests
that often firms considered it in their interest to share information, although he does not
attempt to explain when they would have chosen openness rather than secrecy. Robert
Allen argues that British iron firms considered it economically advantageous to share
technological advances with their competitors. See Allen, supra note 198, at 17-20.
The archive of the Lukens Steel Company bears out Allen's thesis and suggests that
the company did not appear to regard much of its process as secret. Lukens managers
toured other firms to see how they operated and provided information about their
operations to others. See, e.g., Letter from C. Ducas to C. Huston (Dec. 22, 1917) (on file
with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Lukens Steel Company archives,
Accession 50, Box 1993, File 10) (reporting on visit to Bethlehem Steel Co. to learn about
their wage payment system); Letter from A. Goodfellow to P. Baker (Jan. 21, 1921), (on
file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Lukens Steel Company
archives, Accession 50, Box 2001, Folder 22) (describing a visit to Harrisburg Pipe & Pipe
Bending plant to see their continuous furnaces); Letter from C. Huston to A. Goodfellow
(July 24, 1922) (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Lukens
Steel Company archives, Accession 50, Box 2001, Folder 22) (asking for blue print of
method of connecting sectional bottom plates to send to Midvale Steel & Ordnance Co.).
This information, however, is anecdotal. I found nothing in the archive showing that no
information was regarded as secret. I focused my study on the nineteenth-century history
of the firm (the firm was founded in 1810 but the nineteenth-century records are
incomplete), all files having to do with employment, and the files having to do with their
involvement in a joint venture to manufacture the Jacobs-Shupert firebox, which was
claimed to be explosion-proof. See CHRISTOPHER T. BAER, A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY
AND RECORDS OF THE LUKENS STEEL Co. 2 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware). The only evidence I found that the
firm regarded any information as being its intellectual property was evidence of some
patents for particular inventions, such as for the Jacobs-Shupert firebox. See Agreement
Between Lukens Co. and A. Baird Regarding Patents Related to Jacobs Firebox Patents
(on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Lukens Steel Company
archives, Accession 50, Box 2058, Folder 13) (Baird was not a Lukens employee, he had
been employed on the Santa Fe railroad); Agreement Between Lukens Co. and Jacobs
Regarding Firebox Patents (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, Lukens Steel Company archives, Accession 50, Box 2058, Folder 7).
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discrete, tangible things like recipes or drawings. The use of contract
to expand the duty beyond the limits of Peabody appeared
nonexistent. Although Massachusetts courts would enforce
restrictive covenants against employees, there was still plenty of room
for employees to claim that economically valuable knowledge was
part of the general knowledge of persons in their trade and that
equity could not enjoin its use. It was not until the last decade of the
nineteenth century that the trade secret rule expanded from its
relatively limited beginnings as a way to protect rights to specific and
discrete information such as recipes to a more general duty of an
employee to refrain from revealing or using any information the
employer considered secret.
In sum, by the 1870s, Du Pont could have obtained, but did not
obtain, legal protection for the drawings of its powder mill machinery
and particular chemical formulae if it had expressly contracted with
its employees not to divulge specified information that the company
regarded as secret. Not until the end of the century would the
company likely have succeeded in protecting the full range of its
employees' know-how about powder making, such as techniques for
mixing powder so as to minimize the risk of explosions, the
advantages of using one sort of mixing device as opposed to another,
or the rules of thumb for preserving or mixing powder in different
weather conditions.2°2 Yet the company did not claim trade secret
protection for any of these. There is no evidence that Du Pont could
have obtained protection for its knowledge by restraining all
competitive employment by its employees, as courts had not yet
accepted the use of restrictive covenants to protect technology. The
major expansion in the doctrine and the dramatic changes in company
practice occurred in the years that followed.
M. The Expansion, 1890-1930
Profound doctrinal change occurred between approximately 1890
and 1910 as courts rapidly expanded the employee's obligation to
guard trade secrets, changed the justification for it, and
enthusiastically embraced restrictive covenants as a means to control
the use of a broad range of workplace knowledge. Significant change
202. See, e.g., Stone v. Goss, 55 A. 736 (N.J. 1903) (affirming an injunction against a
chemist and his new employer against using plaintiff's secret formula for a depilatory,
against using a process for making the depilatory that the chemist had developed while in
the employ of the plaintiff, and against using any information derived from the employee
with reference to the secret process).
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in company practices at Du Pont followed closely behind, as the
company began in 1908 to insist that much of the chemical knowledge
in their newly founded research laboratories were trade secrets and
sued a former Du Pont research chemist in 1914 to enforce that claim.
The doctrinal developments in this era were so radical and so
significant that, for the first time, I will discuss trade secrets and
restrictive covenants separately. As with Parts I and II, company
practices are discussed in the final section.
A. Trade Secrets
Trade secret doctrine expanded and changed significantly
between roughly 1890 and 1920. The changes can be grouped into
four categories. First, the rhetorical underpinnings of the doctrine
changed perceptibly. The early focus on breach of trust shifted to an
increased emphasis on misappropriation of property. Second, the
earlier reliance on express contracts as the basis of a duty to protect
trade secrets shifted to an assertion that the duty was an implied term
in all employment. Contract ceased being a description of the actual
understanding of the parties and instead became prescriptive of the
proper content of every employment relationship. Third, the types of
knowledge that courts regarded as trade secrets expanded from
discrete items to more inchoate know-how, and from the employer's
own discoveries to improvements that had originated in the
employee. Fourth, and finally, the available remedies for the loss of
trade secrets grew more effective with the invention of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine.
(1) From Breach of Confidence to Property in Ideas
As trade secret doctrine expanded, courts decided that
employers owned not merely the drawings or objects but the ideas
expressed in them. The basis for the employee's duty to protect
secrets became the employer's property right in the ideas rather than
the employee's breach of a particular confidence. The contrast
between the old rationale and the new one is illustrated by a pair of
cases from Ohio and Pennsylvania at the turn of the century.
The Ohio case involved the issue of whether an employer owned
the design of a mill used in a tube factory or just the drawings and
patterns for it.203 The plaintiff employed one Harry Nuttall in a
factory in which it had a mill.20 4  The defendant, which was
203. Nat'l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 459 (Cir. Ct. 1902).
204. Id. at 460.
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constructing its own mill, employed Nuttall to' get the plaintiff's
patterns so that it could construct a mill identical to the plaintiffs.
20 5
The court thought it obvious that Nuttall had breached a duty of
loyalty in working for the competitor while also working for the
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff owned the patterns themselves.
20 6
Nevertheless, the court did not think that the defendant could be
enjoined from constructing the mill or from using Nuttall's knowledge
of the mill's design.2Y The court particularly emphasized that Nuttall,
not the plaintiff, had conceived the idea for the design: That the
patterns themselves were trade secrets, the court said,
does not mean that, when I employ a man who has skill,
knowledge, and experience in a particular line, ask him to furnish
me the knowledge... and he then supplies me an article,... the
idea or ideas he evolves become the property of the employer as a
trade secret
208
Rather, the court thought that "the only property interest that
the employer can claim is the product of his skill, the industry, and
the intelligence of that workman, i. e. [sic], he owns the pattern, but
he does not own the idea."20 9 The court reasoned that the narrow
definition of a trade secret followed from what it termed the "natural
rule of right":
That a man shall have the benefit of all his intelligent thought and
enterprise, of all that he may discover by industry and ingenuity
.... Therefore, if these mill owners desire to cripple a man's
enterprise and his energy and intelligence, to hamper him in his
future employment by requiring that he shall not give to that future
employer the benefit of his skill or the things that he has developed
for the former master, they must contract to that effect.210
By contrast, the Pennsylvania case, decided only two years later,
stated quite emphatically that the employer owned "property in the
design, in the idea, and in the mental conception, as well as in the
piece of paper on which it is expressed. '21 ' Although the court
ordered the defendant only to return the misappropriated blueprints,
it obviously envisioned that the remedy would preclude the defendant
from using the plaintiff's design.212 Interestingly, in response to the
205. Ma at 460-61.
206. Id at 461.
207. Id at 464-65.
208. Id. at 464.
209. Id. at 464-65.
210. Id at 465.
211. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4,8 (Pa. 1904).
212. See id. at 8-9.
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defendant's argument that he had breached no duty because it was
the custom in the industry for draftsmen to make blueprints of their
work and to retain them for their own use, the court said: "If there be
such a practice, it is a reprehensible one. '213 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court maintained a staunch position that any trade customs
by which skilled craftsmen owned their special knowledge or recipes
were simply "contrary to law. '214 The corporate control of all aspects
of the production process that Frederick Winslow Taylor trumpeted
during this era-scientific management-manifested itself here in the
assignment to the firm of the craft knowledge that formerly had been
the attribute as well as the possession of the employee.
Yet, the issue of whether an employee breached the trade secret
obligation only if he took written information with him was not
resolved even when courts began to see that trade secrets could
encompass ideas as well as things. Many courts persisted in holding
that departing employees could use the knowledge in their head, and
would enjoin only the use of information copied down before the
employment terminated.215 This came to be called the "memory
rule. '216 Thus, in an 1892 English decision often cited by the
213. Id. at 8.
214. Dempsey v. Dobson, 39 A. 493, 493 (Pa. 1898) (in dispute between carpet
manufacturer and dyer formerly employed by it, court refused to consider evidence of
trade custom that dyers own yarn samples and recipes because such a custom would be
"unreasonable" and "contrary to law"). I describe Dempsey and the background to it in
detail elsewhere. See Fisk, supra note 3, at 1154-56.
215. On criticism of the memory rule, see Blake, supra note 5, at 655-56 (noting the
criticism of the rule but suggesting that it may be "helpful to courts and probably
approximates good sense in most cases" because it can serve as a proxy for those customer
relationships that the employee played a significant personal role in creating or
maintaining). Recent cases criticizing the memory rule include: Stampede Tool
Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. App. 1995); Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v.
Rucker, 971 P.2d 936 (Wash. 1999). Cases protecting only written trade secrets include:
DeGiorgio v. Megabyte Int'l, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 1996), and Pearce v. Austin, 465
So.2d 868 (La. Ct. App. 1984). Of course, reducing something to writing (or otherwise
affixing it) is not irrelevant in the legal system, nor in the law of intellectual property.
After all, copyright depends on whether an idea has been somehow fixed.
216. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958) articulated the memory
rule for trade secret protection, with an ambiguous qualifier at the end. The agent cannot,
after the termination of agency, use "trade secrets, written lists of names, or other similar
confidential matters .... The agent is entitled to use general information concerning the
method of business of his principal and the names of the customers retained in his
memory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent." Id; see also Hamilton Mfg. Co.
v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 408 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1908) (refusing to grant relief upon
finding that employee, after resigning, "noted down such of the dimensions of that
machine as he could recall, and that from such notes and his recollection, the blueprint
was made"); Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 117 A. 753 (Md. 1922) (customer list
not a trade secret where employee did not surreptitiously copy the list and new employer
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American courts, the court enjoined a former employee from using
drawings of fire engines that he had copied before departing from the
workplace, where he had been trained as an engineer and
draftsman.217 In response to the employee's argument that he was
entitled to use the drawings because his former employers had been
obligated to train him, the court said, "if he can carry them in his
head, no one can prevent his doing that and making use of them. '218
Others rejected the written/unwritten distinction as artificial,
pointing out that employees with good memories could pirate
valuable secret information simply by memorizing it.219 Critics of the
memory rule were fond of pointing out that tort liability ought not
turn on whether former employees have bad memories or excellent
recall. Yet, the distinction between written and unwritten knowledge
persisted. The persistence of the memory rule lay in the appeal of
property concepts to define the scope of the employer's rights. It was
a bright-line rule that loosely corresponded to the judges' intuitive
sense of the difference between trade secrets and general
could have discerned the list simply by observing where the employee stopped on his
weekly rounds); Grand Union Tea Co. v. Dodds, 128 N.W. 1090, 1091 (Mich. 1910)
(affirming injunction against using list of customers but stating that employee cannot be
restrained from selling commodities to any person "so long as he does not use any
property belonging to the complainant, or copies thereof that were surreptitiously made");
Boosing v. Dorman, 103 N.E. 1121 (N.Y. 1913) (affirming denial of injunction against
former employee using knowledge of customer identities and preferences acquired during
employment with plaintiff); S.W. Scott & Co. v. Scott, 174 N.Y.S. 583, 586-87 (App. Div.
1919) (employee cannot copy list of customers with whom he has no dealings, nor use a list
given to him, but he can use the knowledge he has acquired of customers' needs and
practices); Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 132 N.Y.S. 37,39 (App. Div. 1911)
("It is not charged that he made out or copied any lists of customers. All that clearly
appears is that he undertook to use in his new employment the knowledge [of customers,
their needs, and their contracts] he had acquired in the old. This, if it involves no breach
of confidence, is not unlawful .... "); Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 71 A. 802, 802 (R.I. 1909)
(trial court enjoined employee from using names and addresses he had surreptitiously
copied, but stated (ambiguously) that "equity will not enjoin against an employee carrying
away such skill and intelligence as he can carry in his head, other than trade secrets").
217. Merryweather v. Moore, 2 L.R.-Ch. 518 (Eng. 1892).
218. Id. at 524.
219. Cf Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 130 P. 1180, 1183 (Cal. 1913) (recognizing a
customer list as a trade secret in absence of evidence that plaintiff had copied the list
down); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 131 N.E. 307,310 (Mass.
1921) (although not criticizing the memory rule, the court enjoined former employees
from using plaintiff's trade secrets although finding no evidence of wrongful taking and
disclosure of plans, records, and other tangible property); Hackett v. A.L. & J.J. Reynolds
Co., 62 N.Y.S. 1076,1078 (App. Div. 1900) (knowledge of plaintiff's customers was "in the
nature of a trade secret" and therefore an agreement not to solicit them for six months was
reasonable).
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knowledge.220 However, the memory rule, like the distinction
between trade secrets and "general knowledge," was a legal
conclusion rather than an analytic tool. It marked a line between
knowledge that an employer could own exclusively and that which the
law would regard as the employee's inalienable attribute, but it did
not explain why the line was there.
(2) From Honor to Contract
The concept of an implied contract facilitated and legitimized the
expansion of the trade secret doctrine, from a relatively limited
obligation to guard a particular and highly confidential piece of
information or to convey a secret recipe along with the sale of a
business, into a general employee duty to protect all confidential
employment information. The implied contract concept allowed
courts to drastically revise traditional workplace norms while insisting
that they were simply enforcing a bargain.
This process began in the frequently cited 1892 decision in
Merryweather v. Moore, 21 the first English employment-related trade
secret case in which the court invoked an implied contract. The
defendant, a draftsman, had been an apprentice of the plaintiffs, who
designed fire engines.2 22  The defendant copied dimensions of
plaintiffs' designs shortly before leaving their employment, and the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin him from using or revealing the
information.223 The defendant argued that he was simply using the
knowledge of fire engine design that he had legitimately acquired.
2 24
The defendant further contended that his copying was not wrongful
because the plaintiffs, as employers of an apprentice, had a duty to
instruct him.225 Using contract principles, the court rejected the
contention that copying the plaintiffs' drawings was a legitimate way
to gain knowledge. The court observed, "[It was] a matter bargain. I
cannot imply from that relation any obligation on the part of the
employer to instruct the clerk .... ",226 The court also relied on a duty
of confidence wholly apart from the bargain: "[I]s not this an abuse
of the confidence necessarily existing between him and his employers
220. A somewhat similar move occurred in copyright law. See generally ROSE, supra
note 3, at 2-3.
221. 2 L.R.-Ch. 518 (Eng. 1892).
222. Id. at 518.
223. Id. at 519.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 523.
226. Id.
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a confidence arising merely out of the fact of his employment, the
confidence being shortly this, that a servant should not use, except for
the purposes of service, the opportunities which that service gives him
of gaining information?" 227
Merryweather signified the demise of the craft tradition and the
rise of the employment contract. The move to the implied contract in
determining all employment duties was evident. Three years later, in
Robb v. Green, Lord Esher expressly stated that copying the
employer's customer list "was a breach of the trust reposed in the
defendant as the servant of the plaintiff in his business" and that such
conduct is also a breach of contract. "I think that in a contract of
service the Court must imply such a stipulation as I have mentioned,
because it is a thing which must necessarily have been in view of both
parties when they entered into the contract."229
The transition from express contract to implied contract occurred
at roughly the same time in American cases. In a self-consciously
path-breaking opinion, William Howard Taft, who was then serving
as a superior court judge in Cincinnati, was one of the first judges to
find that the obligation to guard secrets was implied in the
employment relationship.230 He held that the technique for making
bells could be a trade secret and that employees could be enjoined
from using or disclosing it even in the absence of an express contract
not to disclose or use the employer's secrets.231 Dodds denied that he
had been instructed to keep the process secret, and the evidence
showed that his former employer had not "attempted to enjoin
secrecy upon their many subordinate employes [sic], but preferred
rather to rely upon the difficulty there would be in acquiring such a
complete knowledge of the bell-making as to enable them to
communicate it or use if if they wanted to." 32 Thus, there was no
basis for finding him to have breached a trust in using his knowledge.
Neither was there a basis for a finding that he breached an express
contract. Nevertheless, Judge Taft concluded that, because Dodds
had learned the technique in the course of his employment, "I am
inclined to think that his obligation to preserve such secret as the
227. Id. at 524.
228. 2 Q.B. 315,317 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1895).
229. Id.
230. Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (Super. Ct. 1887).
231. Id.
232- Id. at 157.
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property of his employer must be implied, even though nothing was
said to him on the subject.
'233
Implied contract fit easily with the courts' new understanding
that firms, not individuals, had now become pioneers of new
technology and that firms hired employees precisely for their
knowledge rather than just for what they could produce. Kodak was
instrumental in propagating this view, as it was a leader in industrial
research and development. Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach234 illustrates
how implied contract could be woven seamlessly into a fabric
combining the threads of the old notion of breach of confidence with
the threads of a new concept of corporate development of ideas. In
that case, the defendants had signed express contracts requiring them
to assign inventions that they might make in the course of their
employment to their employer.235 They started a competing business,
using secret Kodak processes in the development of which they
themselves had been involved.
236
The company deemed this a misappropriation of its investment
in research and development, and the court agreed.237 It was, said the
court,
[Kodak's] exercise of much skill and ingenuity [that built a
business,] the capital of which consists largely in certain inventions
and discoveries made by its officers, servants, and agents. The
world at large knows nothing of these inventions and discoveries,
because they are locked within the brains of those who conceived
them.23
8
Based on "an express and implied contract to give the plaintiff the
benefit of their inventive genius," the defendant had "legal and moral
obligations" to refrain from using the "inventions and discoveries"
which they had developed in any way that would cause "plaintiff's
serious injury. 2 39 "This is not legitimate competition, which it is
always the policy of the law to foster and encourage, but it is contra
bonos mores, and constitutes a breach of trust, which a court of law,
and much less a court of equity, should not tolerate."240 This rhetoric
about a need for the the law to protect the employer's investments in
233. Id. at 158.
234. 20 N.Y.S. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
235. Id. at 110.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 116.
239. Id.
240. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
process or product development combined with the loose treatment
of contractual obligations were particularly useful to Du Pont's
efforts in restraining their former chemist, Walter Masland, from
using alleged company trade secrets for manufacturing artificial
leather 24I
Implied contract rapidly colonized the entire field of trade secret
litigation2 2 Characterizing the duty to guard employer secrets as an
implied contract term had significant practical as well as rhetorical
advantages for employers. One advantage was procedural. Until the
merger of law and equity and the relaxation of traditional distinctions
between legal and equitable remedies, conceiving of a duty to
maintain secrets as a contract term potentially affected both the court
in which a claim could be brought and the available claims and
remedies.243 At the conceptual level, contract discourse legitimized
the spread of a new and significant duty that employees owed to their
employers. As the persuasive force of status-based obligations of
confidentiality associated with the notion of honor and the traditional
241. Letter from Edwin Prindle to E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. Chemical
Department (June 4, 1914) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 772).
242. In Little v. Gallus, 38 N.Y.S. 487 (App. Div. 1896), the court enjoined a former
factory superintendent and his assistant who had spent their entire working lives at a firm
from using knowledge acquired there, notwithstanding the absence of express agreements
to guard secrets and rejecting their contention that they would be unemployable because
all of their working knowledge grew from this single firm. The court remarked "we do not
see why the defendants ... are not under just as strong an obligation to observe and keep
sacred the trust reposed in them as they would be had they reduced the contract which the
law implies to writing." Id. at 489-90; see also Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 130 P.
1180, 1182 (Cal. 1913) ("equity will always protect against the unwarranted disclosure of
trade secrets"); Westervelt v. Nat'l Paper & Supply Co., 57 N.E. 552, 554 (Ind. 1900) (the
employer's "machine was a secret, and, under the facts alleged, even if no agreement was
made, one would be implied, that [the employee] was not to disclose the secret of the
construction of the machine"); Aronson v. Orlov, 116 N.E. 951, 952 (Mass. 1917) (equity
requires implied contract); 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 144 (Mich.
1897); MacBeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 86 A. 688, 693 (Pa. 1913) (implied duty
not to disclose); Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 71 A. 802, 805 (R.I. 1909) (not necessary that
there be an express contract).
243. Trade secret is traditionally described as an equitable doctrine, as is specific
performance of post-employment restrictive covenants and of negative covenants in
personal services contracts. See, eg., STORY, supra note 57, at 389 (on trade secret); F.W.
MAITLAND, EQUITY 237-65 (1st ed. 1909) (on injunctive relief for breach of negative
covenant in personal services contract); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941). Not all of the cases were brought in equity
before the merger of law and equity, however, because in some cases-mainly but not
exclusively those seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant-the employer was suing for
damages for breach of a contract. There was no discernible pattern of difference between
law and equity courts in the judicial attitude toward workplace knowledge.
January 2001] WORKING KNOWLEDGE
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
incidents of service disappeared, contract law provided a much-
needed alternative foundation for the employee's obligations.
Contract rhetoric also suggested that employees voluntarily assumed
and were compensated for whatever loss of mobility that was imposed
by trade secret protection.
Of course, employment had always been contractual in some
senses. Entry into the relationship was by contract, and some
obligations, including those related to training and the use of secret
knowledge, were at least partly determined by contract. Prior to the
nineteenth century, however, many employment obligations were
prescribed by the law and custom defining the status of master and
servant or master, journeyman, and apprentice. What was new in the
late nineteenth century was not that law prescribed certain
obligations in the work relationship. Rather, the novelty was that law
defined those obligations as contractual and that it, for the first time,
imposed a new rule that certain workplace knowledge was the
exclusive property of the employer.
Contract concepts were eagerly embraced by treatise-writers
seeking to rationalize all employment obligations under the rubric of
contract. Horace Wood's Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant
described the employee's duty to maintain the employer's secrets as a
species of express or implied contract even before that proposition
was clear in the case law: As Wood saw it,
even in the absence of an express contract on the part of the
servant, the [employment] relation will be deemed confidential, and
the law will imply a promise to keep the master's secrets thus
committed to him, and any attempt on his part to use the secret for
his own interests against the master, or to communicate it to others,
or to in any manner aid others in using it, will be a breach of his
contract with the master, which will be enjoined by a court of
equity, and which, if actual damages result from such breach, will
render him liable therefor in a suit by the master in a court of
law.244
Wood also listed the employee's failure to protect his employer's
secrets as grounds for discharge because it was "a breach of an
implied condition of the contract. 2 45
In an era known for the reluctance of the courts to imply contract
terms to protect one party against a perceived unfairness,246 the




courts' willingness to create implied contractual obligations to protect
employer secrets might seem anomalous. The courts implied the
additional term regardless of whether there was a written
employment contract and when there was. Courts even added such a
term in a contract for the sale of a business, in which the seller did not
covenant not to compete 4 7
On reflection, however, the rapid spread of an implied contract
basis for trade secrets should not be surprising. The law had always
prescribed some terms of employment. The reconceptualization of
employment from the artisanal to the factory model changed the
terms that courts were inclined to imply, and the rise of contract
discourse changed the asserted rationale for imposing them. As
courts became aware of the value of employee knowledge to firms,
they sought an expanded role for the law in facilitating economic
development by allocating rights in that knowledge. Contract was
rapidly becoming the dominant legal construct for analyzing the
rights and obligations of all employment relations. At the same time,
when the popularity of Frederick Winslow Taylor's scientific
management made it seem imperative that firms rationalize and
control every detail of employment and production, contract
provided the most powerful legitimating discourse for the significant
loss of workplace autonomy that Taylorism entailed.2 8
(3) From Discrete Infonnation to General Know-How
The period between 1890 and 1930 witnessed an additional
transformation of the trade secret concept, as the courts expanded the
types of information that could be claimed as trade secrets, and the
employers claimed as proprietary increasingly broad categories of
knowledge. Courts understood throughout the nineteenth century
that all sorts of craft knowledge was economically valuable. They
realized, for example, that the precise recipe for gunpowder was
valuable and so were the techniques for mixing, handling, and storing
246. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACr
(1979). This was, of course, the era in which Justice Cardozo caused a stir by recognizing
an implied covenant of good faith in every contract. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff
Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
247. Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 78 A. 698,700 (NJ. Eq. 1910). But see Dare v. Foy,
164 N.W. 179, 181 (Iowa 1917) (refusing to reform contract for sale of business and
goodwill to include covenant that seller would not compete, even though seller may have
led buyer to believe that he would not in the future engage in same business).
248. On the enormous popularity and widespread influence of Taylor's scientific
management, see generally ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK
WINSLOW TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY (1997).
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it. They also recognized that firms would want the exact dimensions
of a machine as well as rule-of-thumb knowledge about how to cast its
metal components and keep it in working order. What changed over
the century was not the judicial ability to imagine the economic value
of all the knowledge and experience of a skilled workman or plant
superintendent but the judicial ability to imagine such knowledge as
the exclusive property of a firm.
Once the judicial imagination about corporate ownership of
knowledge caught fire, the doctrinal consequences were significant.
The focus shifted from the drawings of a machine to the design
innovations contained in them;249 from the list of the customers to the
knowledge of their identities, locations, needs and their goodwill;250
and from the precise written formula for a substance to the general
knowledge of the process and techniques for making it.251 Negative
knowledge (i.e., what does not work to achieve a particular purpose)
came to be recognized for the first time as a trade secret so that an
employee could be restrained not only from using knowledge about
what works to make a product, but also from using knowledge of
what does not work. Compilations of publicly available facts gained
protection.252 As the category of trade secrets expanded, the category
of general knowledge, or even specialized skill and experience,
diminished. This was the period in which the definition of a trade
secret became what it is today.
No process of common law change is perfectly orderly and linear.
The expansion of the trade secret concept met resistance as many
litigants and some courts remained anxious to protect the right of the
employee to use "mechanical skill and experience. ' '123 Thus, in one
case, a manufacturer of slitter/rewinder machines sought to prevent a
249. See, e.g., Westervelt v. Nat'l Paper & Supply Co., 57 N.E. 552, 553 (Ind. 1900)
(issuing an injunction against defendant's use of plaintiff's trade secret paper bag machine
where defendant hired plaintiff's former employee to design a paper-bag folding machine
similar to the one the employee had designed for the plaintiff); Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4, 10 (Pa. 1904).
250. See, e.g., Hackett v. A.L. & J.J. Reynolds Co., 62 N.Y.S. 1076, 1078 (App. Div.
1900); Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 112 N.Y.S. 874,878 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
251. See, e.g., Stone v. Goss, 55 A. 736, 737 (N.J. 1903) ("The secret consisted in a
knowledge of the proper method of mixing the ingredients .... ).
252. Bd. Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236,250 (1905): F.W. Dodge Co.
v. Constr. Info. Co., 66 N.E. 204,205 (Mass. 1903).
253. Herold v. Herold China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 911, 917 (6th Cir. 1919) (dissolving
injunction against former employee using or disclosing alleged trade secret methods of
making, glazing, and firing pottery because, since plaintiff had refused to disclose the
secrets, the court could not determine how much the process involved "secret knowledge
or information, as distinguished from mechanical skill and experience").
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former employee, an engineer, from disclosing information about the
features of its new machines 54 The court declined to grant relief on
the ground that the allegedly secret features were well known.255
Other cases also insisted that general knowledge was not a trade
secret.
As the courts saw increasingly diffuse forms of knowledge as
trade secrets, their view of the employer's legitimate interest in
enforcing a restrictive covenant broadened as well. This was the
period in which courts first drew doctrinal and policy connections
between trade secrets and restrictive covenants. Protection of trade
secrets became the dominant justification for enforcement of post-
employment covenants not to compete, which was a profound change
in the law and vastly expanded the uses of such covenants against
employees.
As the line between trade secrets and general knowledge moved
to where it is today, the difficulty of drawing it grew. Sometimes,
employers sought to avoid this problem, as they still do, by drafting
broad noncompete agreements rather than by relying on the default
rules of trade secret protection. If the validity of the covenant were
challenged, however, the problem could not be avoided if the court
were willing to enforce the convenant only to the extent that it
protected trade secrets. Thus, even the discourse of free contract was
not a refuge from the difficult task of assigning ownership of
knowledge, and the assignment of such ownership rights still turned
upon distinguishing protectable trade secrets from non-protectable
general knowledge. The distinction between trade secrets and
general knowledge has always depended on understanding
complicated technology through the testimony of self-interested
witnesses. Beyond that, it has been and remains a core normative
judgment about the freedom and attributes of the creative employees.
As difficult as it may be to marshal the facts, the task of making the
normative judgment is harder. Then, as now, courts tended to hide,
254. Cameron Mach. Co. v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 115 A. 212 (NJ. Eq. 1921).
255. IL at 214. There the court stated:
It has been the practice of both companies and of other manufacturers of such
machines to give publicity to every feature of their machines by circularizing the
trade with advertising matter, illustrated by photographs or cuts, of the various
types of the their machines, and the machines are so large and their construction
and parts so open to inspection that it is conceded any one could easily copy
every feature of them ....
Id. See also Nat'l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 459 (1902) (discussed
supra note 203).
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perhaps from themselves, their normative judgments in their findings
of fact.
256
(4) Injunctions Against Work and the Origins of the Inevitable Disclosure
Rule
A serious practical problem with trade secret law has always
been the difficulty of proving that a former employee has used the
secret knowledge. A firm often could not readily determine what
processes its competitors were using or that the competitor derived
them illicitly rather than independently. Apart from the problem of
proof, employers have tended to think that even if the employee was
enjoined from using the secrets, his knowledge of the secret inevitably
would be useful as the competitor figured out other ways to
manufacture a competing product. Knowing that certain
combinations of ingredients do or do not produce a particular result,
what certain customers need, or how a machine can be designed more
efficiently inevitably helps the competitor, even if it does not copy the
former employer's recipe, strategy, or machines directly. Employers,
therefore, tend to think that only an injunction prohibiting the
employee from working in certain positions for competitors will
adequately ensure that the trade secrets would not be
misappropriated. Today, the courts occasionally will grant such an
injunction when convinced that any competitive employment will
inevitably result in the disclosure of the trade secrets.257 This rule of
256. Recent examples of using findings of fact to make significant choices about the
extent to which firms should be able to control employee mobility include: Hoskins Mfg.
Co. v. PMC Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (cable manufacturer failed to
prove that former employees who worked for competing firm would inevitably disclose or
use trade secrets rather than general knowledge); Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical
Innovations Assocs. Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999) (medical device
manufacturer failed to prove that former executives who started competing firm used
trade secrets rather than general knowledge in designing and marketing a competing
product); Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 699 (Utah 1981).
257. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (enjoining
Pepsi's former executive from assuming a position with a competitor in which he would
perform functions that would inevitably require him to use trade secret knowledge about
Pepsi's marketing plans); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 633-34 (E.D.N.Y.
1996); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1458 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Cardinal Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W. 2d 642, 646-47 (Ark. 1999)
(affirming injunction prohibiting former employees from conducting any business with
four customers). But see Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316 (S.D.N.Y
1999) (rejecting arguments about likelihood of inevitable disclosure and therefore
declining preliminary injunctive relief against former employee going to work for
competitor); Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120-21
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
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allowing broad injunctive relief has come to be known as the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. This doctrine gives the former
employer the benefit of a covenant not to compete without actually
having entered into one.
The inevitable disclosure doctrine remains as controversial today
as it was when it was first employed by a few courts in the late
nineteenth century.258 Courts were sympathetic to the claims that an
injunction would prevent the employee from using his hard-earned
knowledge and experience for the benefit of himself and the public.
As one court put it, "equity has no power to compel a man who
changes employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory." 9 Yet,
courts also were receptive to arguments about the ease with which
one company could benefit from its rival's expensive investment in
research and development simply by recruiting its competitor's key
employees. The trial court in E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland (Du Pont v. Masland) framed it as an almost insoluble
dilemma:
The iniquity of an employe [sic] who takes away with him the
property of his employer, existing in the form of valuable processes,
is as clear as if he asported any other form of property. The right of
the employee to use his abilities, developed through his
experiences, to the utmost of his capacity, is equally clear. This
right of the employee to use his abilities, developed through his
experiences, to the utmost of his capacity.... and his obligation to
preserve to the full the property rights of his employer are shaded
into each other by lines so fine that it is doubtful whether anything
but a nice sense of honor can keep them distinguished.
260
From the beginning, even the courts that enjoined an employee
not to work recognized that remedies for threatened trade secret
disclosure presented an unpleasant dilemma. In the earliest case to
grant such an injunction, 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski,2 61 the
Michigan Supreme Court thought the restriction was necessary in the
long run to secure employment in industries in which secret
258. See, e.g., D. Peter Harvey, "Inevitable" Trade Secret Misappropriation After
Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 531 PLI/PAT 199 (1998); Peter Huang, Preventing Post-Pepsico
Disaster: A Proposal for Refining the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 15 SANA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 379 (1999); Susan Street Whaley, The Inevitable Disaster
of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CINN. L. REV. 809 (1999).
259. Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 132 N.Y. S. 37, 39 (App. Div. 1911).
260. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 216 F. 271,272 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
261. 72 N.W. 140 (Mich. 1897).
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technology was important,262 and that the public would benefit
because "a larger output would be made of a useful article. ' 263 A
New Jersey court emphasized the appropriateness of an injunction
against competitive employment because simply enjoining the use of
"complainant's secret methods and processes, would afford it an easy
opportunity to obtain from [the employee], in spite of the injunction
against him, the knowledge which they seek, and which could be so
used as to make discovery very difficult, if not impossible. ' '264 The
broader injunction was necessary to prevent flouting of the narrower
one.
As a significant investor in research, Kodak was an early
advocate of the inevitable disclosure rule. In litigation against a
former research chemist, who had left to work for a competing film
products firm, Kodak convinced the court to enjoin the chemist from
working in the film business.265 The court explained:
[I]f he is permitted to enter this employ, injunctive relief in form
against the imparting of such special knowledge is more than likely
to prove inefficient. The mere rendition of the service along the
lines of his training would almost necessarily impart such
knowledge to some degree. Warren cannot be loyal both to his
promise to his former employer and to his new obligations to the
defendant company. 2
66
Other courts, however, thought a negative injunction weighed
protection of knowledge too heavily as compared to freedom to
work.267 "If the injunction issues," one court suggested, "it means
that hereafter no man can work for one and learn his business secrets,
262. Although the court indicated that the company sought an injunction restricting the
employee from communicating secret processes and knowledge of secret machinery, the
opinion seemed to suggest that the employee was enjoined from even working for
competitor. Id. at 144.
263. Id.
264. Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 65 A. 695, 702 (N.J. Ch. 1907), rev'd, 69 A. 186
(N.J. 1908). The appellate court reversed because Taylor Iron had not proved that all the
knowledge in question was its trade secret. But the court did say that Nichols might be
enjoined from working for a competitor during the term of his contract with Taylor Iron,
simply because it was a contract for exclusive employment. Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v.
Nichols, 69 A. 186, 188 (N.J. 1908).
265. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods, Inc., 179 N.Y.S. 325, 330 (App. Div.
1919).
266. Id.
267. For example, a Connecticut federal court in H.B. Wiggins Sons' Co. v. Cott-A-Lap
Co., 169 F. 150, 152 (D. Conn. 1909), declined to order a chemist not to disclose to his new
employer the secret formula and processes for the backings for wallpaper. Although there
was an express contract in which the chemist agreed not to disclose trade secrets, the court
nevertheless declined to enforce the contract by injunction. Id. at 151.
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and after leaving that employment engage himself to a rival in
business, without carrying on his back into that business the
injunctive mandate of a court of equity. '268 The court thought the
inevitable disclosure doctrine was premised on a jaundiced view of
human nature:
There is nothing whatever in the facts of this case, except the
opportunity to do wrong and a suspicion in the mind of the rival
that wrong will be done.... The chancellor ought never to come
into such a frame of mind that he assumes human nature to be
essentially and inherently evil.
2 69
There was legal precedent recognizing the power of equity courts
to enjoin employees from working for competitors in an effort to
protect the. employer's exclusive right to the employee's talent. The
most significant was the enticement case, Lumley v. Wagner,270 which
held that an opera singer who had contracted to perform at one
theater could be enjoined from performing elsewhere when she
threatened to breach her contract.271 The Lumley doctrine allowed
an employer to enjoin an employee with unique talent from working
for a competitor for the duration of a stated term contract because
that was the only way for the employer to get the benefit of its
contractual right to the defendant's exclusive services.272 Because
courts limited such injunctions mainly to performers and athletes,
however, Lumley did not become a widely used restriction on
employees.273 The case was, however, often cited in trade secret and
restrictive covenant cases.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the foundations of the
modem trade secret law were laid. A duty to guard trade secrets had
become an implied term in every employment contract, and a wide
range of workplace knowledge could be claimed as trade secrets. The
268. Id. at 152.
269. Id.
270. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
271. Id. at 693. See also Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 755 (Q.B. 1853) (enjoining a
theatre manager from soliciting an opera singer to break her exclusive engagement).
272. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. at 688
273. For that reason, the Lumley doctrine is not discussed in this Article. In addition,
the development of the doctrine is described with admirable thoroughness and insight in
Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's
Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE LJ. 775 (1992). Enticement was a related
cause of action that allowed employers to control dissemination of employee knowledge
or skill indirectly by preventing others from hiring away their employees. See generally
MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 70-74 (1989); Nockleby, supra note 19. Like Lumley,
enticement and cognate causes of action are beyond the scope of this Article.
January 2001] WORKING KNOWLEDGE
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
doctrinal development over the next two or three decades, and
certainly in the decades since, consisted in applying the trade secret
concept to increasingly diffuse forms of knowledge. The growth of
trade secret law in practice was in the awareness and the willingness
of employers to invoke the trade secret concept to protect a wide
variety of knowledge.
B. The Use of Restrictive Covenants to Protect Knowledge
As suggested above and explained below, the expanding
definition of trade secrets increased the possible uses of restrictive
covenants. Courts extending the horizon of contractual restrictions
on employment faced rhetorical challenges that both resembled and
differed from those of the trade secret cases. The effort to articulate
the employer's legitimate interest in restricting competition from
former employees was complicated by the challenge of fitting the
rules into the liberty-of-contract jurisprudence. A covenant not to
compete is both a contract in its own right and a restriction on future
freedom to contract. Not surprisingly, the laissez-faire jurisprudence
of the Gilded Age made interesting appearances on both sides of the
courtroom debates, as courts would cite liberty of contract and
property rights in labor as the basis for both granting and declining
injunctive relief to employers.2 74 The malleability of the freedom of
contract concept in this context, however, made it an unreliable
rhetorical move for the courts and the litigants.
Given the increased uses of restrictive covenants and the
difficulty of justifying their enforcement simply by reference to liberty
of contract, courts sought a new rationale. One of the most
persuasive was that the contract was necessary to prevent an
employee's "abuse of confidence. 2 75 As the trade secret concept
274. Compare New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 161 P. 990, 992 (Cal. 1916) (the
court refused to enjoin employee from collecting laundry for a company that competes
with his former employer because an injunction would interfere with employee's liberty:
"The laborer has the same right to sell his labor, and to contract with reference thereto, as
any other property owner .... ), with Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139 (Wis. 1851)
("[W]hile the avenues to enterprise are so multiplied, so tempting and so remunerative,
giving to labor the greatest freedom for competition with capital, perhaps, that it has yet
enjoyed, I question if we have much to fear from attempts to secure exclusive advantages
in trade, or to reduce it to few hands"; the court upheld a covenant restricting plaintiff
from purchasing wheat except under the direction of the defendant because the covenant
was supported by consideration and not in contravention of public policy); see also Beal v.
Chase, 31 Mich. 490, 530 (1875).
275. John H. Hannigan, The Implied Obligation of an Employee, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 970,
978 (1929) (lamented that the courts' emphasis on whether the knowledge constituted a trade
secret "mislead[s] courts to adopt an inadequate test .... The essential question is: Has there
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became a settled part of the late nineteenth-century tort doctrine, the
courts could justify restrictive covenants as an unobjectionable
contractual expression of the obligations that tort law imposed
already. Ironically, just as contract discourse was on an ascending arc
in trade secret cases, tort concepts popped up in cases involving
contracts not to compete. This whole body of law resembled an
amalgam of tort and contract, "contort," long before Grant Gilmore
coined that term.276
A large category of early cases enforcing covenants to protect
trade secrets were those involving recipes for patent medicine.277
Related, although more sophisticated, forms of knowledge, such as
chemical processes, also were deemed trade secrets that could be
protected by a restrictive covenant.278 In 1894, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court made it obvious that the courts should protect a wider
range of confidential information than had hitherto been considered
as legitimate basis for a restrictive covenant.279 In Fralich v. Despar,
an assistant in the manufacture of lubricating grease and oil had
contracted that he would never use or divulge the knowledge he
acquired about the manufacture of grease and oil.O After several
years, Despar began making grease for another firm. In enjoining
him, the court all but overruled an earlier case, Keeler v. Taylor,81
which had held unenforceable a contract by which an employee
been an abuse of confidence? If there has been, it is not necessary that the secret be a
business secret.").
276. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr 98 (1974). Of course, as Professor
Gilmore elgantly explained, the distinction between "contract" and "tort" was itself a
product of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Id. at 6. Inasmuch as the distinction
was never as sharp nor as firm as the Langellian imagination suggested, it should come as
no surprise that the concepts blurred in the area of trade secrets and restrictive covenants.
277. See e.g., C.F. Simmons Med. Co. v. Simmons, 81 F. 163, 173 (E.D. Ark. 1897)
(holding that recipe for patent medicine is a trade secret; enjoining former employee from
using recipe or from using packaging that would confuse the public as to whether they
were purchasing former employer's medicine; noting that the existence of a covenant
prohibiting use of recipe adds nothing to the protection that trade secret doctrine would
otherwise give plaintiffs).
278. See e.g., Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Ref. Co., 116 F. 304, 311 (7th Cir. 1902)
(holding that processes for manufacturing glucose and corn syrup from corn are trade
secrets that justify an injunction where an employee, plant superintendent, promised
during term of employment not to reveal trade secrets or to work for competitor and
superintendent quit and began working for competitor); see also e.g., Tode v. Gross, 28
N.E. 469, 470 (N.Y. 1891) (enforcing restrictive covenant ancillary to sale of cheese-
making business and secret recipe for cheese).
279. Fralich v. Despar, 30 A. 521 (Pa. 1894).
280. Id.
281. 53 Pa. 467, 470 (1866).
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promised not to reveal knowledge he had acquired about the
manufacture of scales.
282
Early twentieth-century advances in corporate research and
development enabled employers to argue more convincingly that
enforcement of restrictive covenants was essential to protect their
investment in a wide variety of secret knowledge. Kodak was, not
surprisingly, a particularly zealous litigant on this theory.283  In
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Products, Inc.,284 Kodak obtained
enforcement of a two-year restrictive covenant against a former
Kodak chemist. After describing Kodak's extensive research into
film manufacturing and the defendant employee's long tenure with
the company as a research chemist, the court explained the wide array
of knowledge that Kodak could legitimately protect:
[Tihe value of Warren's services to the defendant company arises
from his experience while in the plaintiff's employ, growing out of
the practical application of these trade secrets, and not otherwise.
It is because of his special training and special knowledge that the
defendant company must necessarily involve his bringing to their
aid such knowledge as he has, and which is entirely developed in
connection with these secret processes.
285
Thus, the expansion of the trade secret concept fueled a
corresponding growth in the possible uses of restrictive covenants.
By the end of the nineteenth century, courts began to regard
knowledge of customer identities and needs to be a trade secret,
easing the way to broader enforcement of covenants against former
employees. Most restrictive covenant cases involved traveling
salesmen or deliverymen, especially those assigned to routes to sell or
deliver things such as ice, laundry, or milk.28 6 A 1901 case enforcing a
282. Fralich, 30 A. at 521.
283. See, e.g., Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
284. 179 N.Y.S. 325 (App. Div. 1919).
285. Id. at 330.
286. See, e.g., Cahill v. Madison, 94 Ill. App. 216 (1900); Davies v. Racer, 25 N.Y.S. 293,
294 (Gen. Term 1893) (enforcing a covenant against a former clerk for a firm of
forwarding agents and customhouse brokers upon evidence that defendant had gone to
work for a competing firm, had solicited the plaintiff's customers, and some had switched
to the defendant's new firm). The Davies court determined that the employment was
sufficient consideration inasmuch as it enabled the defendant to become familiar with the
customers and trade of the plaintiffs. 25 N.Y.S. at 294.
English courts also allowed covenants for such purposes, although they cautioned that
the covenant could not be broader than the area in which the salesman actually solicited.
Refusing to enforce or to narrow a covenant that barred a collector from working within
twenty-five miles of London, where the defendant had worked only in one small area of
London, the House of Lords said:
It must be remembered that the real sanction at the back of these covenants is
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one-year covenant barring the delivery of milk in the city of Erie,
Pennsylvania, determined that a covenant could legitimately be used
to prevent the milkman from using what he had learned about the
"by-ways" of the city of Erie and about operating a milk delivery
business.287  Two dissenting judges believed an injunction was
inappropriate because the milkman did not possess the goodwill of
the business, the employer had not shown any loss, and the
knowledge of how to run a milk delivery business was not a legitimate
reason for a covenant32% On this reasoning, some courts would
decline to enforce the covenant in the absence of evidence that the
former employee did indeed have the ability to persuade customers to
switch to the rival employer.289 Thus, a New York appellate court
dissolved an injunction against a salesman of butchers' supplies who
left his employment and started a small business on the ground that
the employer had adduced no evidence that the defendant possessed
any trade secret knowledge of the plaintiff or that he had diverted the
trade of any of the plaintiff's customers.290 Four years later, however,
the terror and expense of litigation, in which the servant is usually at a great
disadvantage, in view of the longer purse of his master .... [T]he hardship
imposed by the exaction of unreasonable covenants by employers would be
greatly increased if they could continue the practice with the expectation that,
having exposed the servant to the anxiety and expense of litigation, the Court
would in the end enable them to obtain everything which they could have
obtained by acting reasonably.
Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., Ltd., A.C. 724,745-46 (Eng. 1913).
287. Erie County Milk Ass'n v. Ripley, 18 Pa. Super. 28,30,37 (Super. Ct. 1901).
288. Id at 39.
289. New Jersey equity judges were skeptical of covenants even in the types of cases in
which injunctive relief was most commonly granted. In Sternberg v. O'Brien, see 22 A. 348
(N.J. Ch. 1891), the court refused injunctive relief to a clothing sales business against a
former collector who had gone to work for a rival firm. See id. at 351. The court doubted
that the former collector had any influence over the customers of the complainant and
thus that he could cause them to switch their trade to a rival firm. See id. As a collector,
not a salesman, the court said, "[h]is intercourse with them was of a kind which was much
more likely to excite dislike and create antagonism than to inspire confidence." Id.
Moreover, his employment with the complainant lasted only five weeks, which was too
short to form relationships that would enable him to do any harm to the complainant's
business. Id
Similarly, in a case involving a former soliciting and selling driver, the New Jersey
high court determined that a covenant prohibiting him from working for others was too
broad and that, in any event, since the former employer had gone out of business, the
covenant was unenforceable. Steinmeyer v. Phenix Cheese Co., 102 A. 150, 150 (NJ.
1917). New Jersey equity courts did, however, grant injunctions in some cases. See e.g.,
Owl Laundry Co. v. Banks, 89 A. 1055 (N.J. Ch. 1914) (enforcing covenant against laundry
deliveryman); Am. Ice Co. v. Lynch, 70 A. 138 (N.J. Ch. 1908) (enforcing covenant against
ice deliveryman).
290. Oppenheimer v. Hirsch, 38 N.Y.S. 311,313-14 (App. Div. 1896).
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another New York decision found that a traveling wholesale grocery
salesman's knowledge of customers was a trade secret and therefore
enforced a restrictive covenant.
291
Some courts insisted that customer relations were protectable by
covenant only if they involved nonobvious knowledge. In 1923, the
New York high court declared that a salesperson's relationship with
customers was not per se a protectable employer interest and that
post-employment restrictive covenants were enforceable only to
protect such relationships if they were based on secret information.2 92
The court failed to see that the salesperson's knowledge was either
secret or uniquely valuable. "There was apparently no customer in
Rochester using wrapping paper who was not known to be a possible
customer to every one of plaintiff's competitors. '293 The court further
observed
[tihat the defendant has profited by the experience which he
obtained in the plaintiff's service [and that the experience made
291. Hackett v. A.L. & J.J. Reynolds Co., 62 N.Y.S. 1076, 1078 (App. Term 1900). In
this case, the court was not asked to grant injunctive relief, but merely to enforce the
covenant's stipulated damages clause. Moreover, the covenant barred the competing
employment for a shorter time than in Oppenheimer and within a smaller area. Further,
there was evidence that the former employee had succeeded in diverting his former
employer's customers to his new firm, which, not incidentally, had been founded by
employees of the former employer. Nevertheless, this case seems noteworthy as it is the
earliest New York case recognizing that knowledge of the identity and location of
customers is "in the nature of a trade secret." Id. at 1078. In an extended discussion, the
court in Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 112 N.Y.S. 874, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1908), recognized
that a list of customers is a trade secret that can be protected by use of a restrictive
covenant prohibiting salesmen from post-employment competition.
The names of customers of a business concern whose trade and patronage have
been secured by years of business effort and advertising, and the expenditure of
time and money, constituting a part of the good will of a business which
enterprise and foresight have built up, should be deemed just as sacred and
entitled to the same protection as a secret of compounding some article of
manufacture and commerce.
Id.
Shortly after that, another New York court determined that knowledge of the names
and needs of the customers of a metal manufacturing concern, as well as knowledge of the
terms of their contracts, was "confidential information" that an employer could use a
restrictive covenant to protect. Magnolia Metal Co. v. Price, 72 N.Y.S. 792,795 (App. Div.
1901). The defendant "entered the plaintiff's employ with no knowledge of the business
conducted by it" and shortly obtained "a complete knowledge of all its customers, and
analyses of the various metals that were used in the composition of the metal
manufactured by the plaintiff, copies of contracts with large customers of the plaintiff, and
a list of those in the trade who used what was known as 'Babbitt metal."' Id. at 795. The
former salesman induced the New England representative of the plaintiff and one of its
largest customers to form a new corporation and became the president of it. Id.
292. Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., Inc., 138 N.E. 485, 488 (N.Y. 1923).
293. Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 140 N.E. 708,710 (N.Y. 1923).
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him a more formidable competitor was] no legal wrong.
Experience, competency, and efficiency in selling goods are
qualifications which can hardly be so rare as to require the aid of
equity to prevent an irreparable loss to an employer who finds
himself compelled to substitute one salesman for another.
294
Even those courts that accepted the proposition that most
customer relations could be protected by restrictive covenants
sometimes tried to ensure that only the customer relations were
protected and that the employee remained free to use his talent or
knowledge of the business in competitive employment. Thus, courts
sometimes found prohibitions on all employment with competitors
within an area to be overbroad if the only interest was protecting
customer relations.295
294. Id. at 711. English courts reached a similar conclusion at the same time. Following
the House of Lords' 1916 decision in Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 A.C. 688 (Eng.
1916), courts were reluctant to find that customer relations justified the enforcement of a
restrictive covenant in the absence of evidence that something other than the employee's
own talents would enable him to lure his former employer's trade to a competitor. In
Herbert Morris, the Lords had emphasized that covenants ancillary to employment should
be judged under a more rigorous standard than those ancillary to the sale of a business and
decided that only customer relations and trade secrets would support the enforcement of a
covenant against an employee. Id. at 701 (opinion of Lord Atkinson); id at 709 (opinion
of Lord Parker of Waddington); id at 714 (opinion of Lord Shaw of Dunfermline). A few
years later, relying on that decision, the court of appeal denied relief in a case against a
tailor who had covenanted not to work within ten miles of the shop where he had been
employed. Attwood v. Lamont, 3 K.B. 571 (Eng. K.B. Div'l Ct. 1920). The court declined
to enforce the covenant on the ground that
it is the appellant's known personal skill as a cutter which attracts to him the
customers to whom he attended when with the respondent, and except that they
made his acquaintance when he was in the respondent's service, it was not his
position there, but it is his own skill which leads them to desire to have the
continued benefit of his services.
Id. at 592.
295. The Connecticut high court, for instance, determined in 1919 that a covenant
barring the former branch manager of a chain of retail clothing stores from working for a
competitor for five years was unenforceable. Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 108 A. 541,
544 (Conn. 1919). Although acknowledging that the employee could be enjoined from
soliciting the plaintiff's customers, the covenant barred all competitive employment in any
city in which plaintiff had a store and was thus overbroad. Id. In a similar vein is
Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 19 A. 712, 713-14 (R.I. 1890), which declined to enforce, as
overbroad, a covenant prohibiting a teacher from teaching French or German in the entire
state of Rhode Island because the only legitimate interest the plaintiff language school had
was prohibiting the teacher from enticing away the plaintiff's students. Id.
In an earlier Connecticut case, a flatware and hollow-ware manufacturer sought to
enjoin a former employee (who was in sales or perhaps management) from associating
with their competitor during the term of his twenty-five-year employment contract. Win.
Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 20 A. 467, 467 (Conn. 1890). In support of their claim, they
asserted that the competitors sought to use the defendant's name as a stamp on their
wares. Id. at 468. The court declined an injunction on the ground that there was no
January 2001] WORKING KNOWLEDGE
California courts paid particular attention to distinguishing
customer relationships that were business goodwill or trade secrets
from those that were not. Beginning in 1872, California prohibited
restrictive covenants except in connection with the sale of the
goodwill of a business or dissolution of a partnership.296 The only
basis for restricting subsequent competition from an employee was if
the employee sought to use trade secrets.297 In a number of cases in
which someone associated with a firm attempted to leave the
business, the parties arranged for the employee to sell his stock in the
business and entered into a restrictive covenant ancillary to that sale.
evidence that the plaintiffs were entitled to use his name, that they did use it, or that there
was an particular value to either the plaintiffs or the defendant in the use of it. Id. at 468-
69.
296. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1673 (1872) (repealed 1942) ("Every Contract by which anyone
is restrained from exercising a lawful trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as
provided by the next two sections, is to that extent void.... "); CAL.CIV. CODE § 1674
(1872) (repealed 1941) ("One who sells the good will of a business may agree with the
buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified county, so long as
the buyer, or any person deriving title to the good will through him, carries on a like
business .... ); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1675 (1872) (current version at CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 16602 (West 2000)) ("Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of a
partnership, agree that none of them will carry on a similar business within the same city
or town where the partnership business has been transacted or within a specified part
thereof .... ).
The reasons why California broadly prohibited restrictive covenants against
employees are unclear. California's 1872 code provisions on restrictive covenants were
adopted unchanged from Field's proposed New York code, which allowed covenants only
in connection with the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership. Neither Field's
reasons for including the broad ban on restrictive covenants in employment nor
California's for adopting it are recorded. On the legislative history of California's statute
on restrictive covenants, see Gilson, supra note 16 at 614-619. According to Gilson, Field's
commentary to his Code did not explain the inclusion of the provisions, and the California
commission responsible for the adoption of the Code did not either. The ban on
restrictive covenants evidently was not in the draft of the Code that Field had circulated to
judges and lawyers in 1862. Id. at 618 (citing [N.Y. CIV. CODE § 833 (1865) and [N.Y. Civ.
CODE (draft 1862)).
297. Michigan enacted a similar statute in 1905. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.761 (1905)
(repealed 1984). The Michigan statute invalidated all restrictive covenants, whether
"reasonable or unreasonable, partial or general, limited or unlimited." Id. There were
two exceptions. A noncompetition agreement could protect an employer for ninety days
from competition by a former employee who had been given a "list of customers or
patrons, commonly called a route list, within a certain territory." MICH. COMP. LAWS §
445.766 (1905) (repealed 1984). In Grand Union Tea Co. v. Lewitsky, 116 N.W. 1090
(Mich. 1908), the Michigan Supreme Court, applying the statute, refused to enforce a one-
year covenant against a traveling tea and coffee salesman. Michigan repealed the statute
in 1984. 1984 Mich. Pub. Laws 274, § 17 (and enacting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.787
(effective March 29, 1985)). Michigan now allows post-employment restrictive covenants
if they are reasonable in duration, geographical scope, and in the types of occupations
covered. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (1987).
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The California courts invalidated such covenants on the ground that
the sale of stock was not a sale of goodwill and that the covenant was,
therefore, void.298 However, after the state supreme court held in
Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier that knowledge of the customers'
identities and locations was a trade secret justifying injunctive relief
irrespective of the validity of a restrictive covenant,299 several cases
attempted to define when customer relations constituted a trade
secret0 °° The employees lost many of the cases while the California
Supreme Court persistently refused to define what made customer
relations a trade secret. In 1916, the California high court abandoned
that effort and compounded the confusion by holding that a laundry
route driver could not be enjoined from "receiving" laundry from
former customers, but could be enjoined only from "soliciting"
them.301 Notwithstanding the difficulty of distinguishing "receiving"
business from "soliciting" it, the prohibition against soliciting held
firm.
In 1935, the California Supreme Court apparently rejected that
approach in favor of one that characterized post-employment
competition as wrongful irrespective of the enforceability of the
restrictive covenant or the existence of trade secrets. The court
upheld an injunction against a seller of wholesale milk who went to
work for a competing wholesaler.3°2 The evidence suggested that the
customers whom the defendant had solicited were retailers who could
be readily identified by going down the public streets.303 The trial
court had justified the injunction on the ground that the employee
had "a regular job, and a permanent job" which he gave up "in order
298. Merchants' Ad-Sign Co. v. Sterling, 57 P. 468, 469-70 (Cal. 1899); Chamberlain v.
Augustine, 156 P. 479,480 (Cal. 1916).
299. 130 P. 1180,1183 (Cal. 1913).
300. Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co., 300 F. 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1924) (denying enforcement to a
covenant purporting to restrict a former salesperson from selling a competing product for two
years, but granting an injunction preventing the former employee from disclosing or using lists
of former customers or conducting business of the competitor in a way that might deceive the
public as to whose products he sold); Dairy Dale Co. v. Azevedo, 295 P. 10, 10 (Cal. 1931);
Pasadena Ice Co. v. Reeder, 275 P. 944,947 (Cal. 1929).
301. New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 161 P. 990, 993 (Cal. 1916). The court
described the "right of a citizen to pursue any calling, business, or profession he may
choose" as "a property right to be guarded by equity as zealously as any other form of
property," and protested that "[1labor is property." Id at 991-92. The court also noted
that the injunction would deprive laundry patrons of the freedom to select their
tradesmen, which it characterized as one of the "constitutional guaranties of liberty." Id.
at 992.
302. Gloria Ice Cream & Milk Co. v. Cowan, 41 P.2d 340,342 (Cal. 1935).
303. Id at 341-42.
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to hurt these people, the plaintiffs in the case. '304 The Supreme Court
assumed that the names of the customers along the milk route were
publicly available and thus not trade secrets.305  Yet, the court
deemed it wrongful that, wholly apart from the use of the customer
list, the defendant "deliberately left the employ of plaintiff and as
deliberately went about using whatever information he had acquired
as its agent during years of service for the purpose of, and with intent
of, injuring plaintiff's business.
'30 6
Distinguishing business goodwill from the personality and skill of
an employee was especially difficult in professional employment in
medicine and dentistry.3 7 The relationship between a physician and a
patient seemed to the courts to be particularly a product of the
doctor's skill and personality. Yet, the goodwill of a professional
partnership lay almost entirely in the patients' confidence in the
doctors' abilities. Finding patient confidence to be too closely
connected with the doctor's very self, New Jersey refused to enforce a
covenant attempting to restrict a physician's assistant from the
practice of medicine within the city of Newark "at any time" after the
termination of his employment.308 The senior physician had no
legitimate interest in preventing his patients from seeking treatment
from his former assistant.30 9 A lifetime restriction on the practice of a
"professional gentleman" also caused the court pause.310 Yet, the
court expressed a much broader hostility to post-employment
restraints:
[I]f this covenant is valid and enforceable in equity, then it is
competent for every merchant and trader, when he employs a clerk
or shop-girl, to require them, although the compensation he agrees
304. Id. at 341.
305. See id. at 342.
306. Id.
307. See generally Edwin Merrick Dodd, Contracts Not to Practice Medicine, 23 B.U. L.
REv. 305 (1943).
308. Mandeville v. Harman, 42 NJ. Eq. 185,185,194 (Ch. 1886).
309. Id at 193-94.
310. Id. at 194. Another case expressing concern about the public interest against
enforcing restrictive covenants against practice of a profession declined to enforce a five-
and-a-half year ban on practicing dentistry within twenty-five miles of Springfield, Illinois,
on the ground that the employer was not a licensed dentist and thus could not practice in
the place of the employee if he were barred from doing so and a covenant is unenforceable
if it is not shown that someone else will practice the profession of the one enjoined. Tarr
v. Stearman, 105 N.E. 957, 961 (Ill. 1914); see also Osius v. Hinchman, 114 N.W. 402, 404
(Mich. 1908) (declining to enforce a restrictive covenant against a dentist on the ground
that there had been no sale of goodwill and defendant learned no trade secrets during his
employment with the plaintiff).
[Vol. 52
to pay is no greater than that which is customarilypaid for such
service, to enter into a covenant that on quitting his service they
will not, at any time afterwards, accept like employment from any
other merchant or trader in the same town or city.
31'
On the other hand, some courts emphasized that young doctors
had the opportunity to gain credibility only because of the willingness
of established physicians to vouch for them. On that reasoning,
Massachusetts restricted post-employment competition in a 1907 case
involving the dissolution of a partnership of dentists.312 The dentists
had not agreed to a restrictive covenant, but the departing dentist, the
defendant in that case, had sold the goodwill of the partnership to his
partner, one of the plaintiffs.3 3 When, three years later, he opened
another dental office and sent letters to former patients announcing
his new office, the court implied a covenant not to compete from the
sale of the goodwill. 314 The court suggested that the covenant was
necessary to effectuate the sale of the goodwill of a professional
business even more than in "a mercantile partnership. '315 In the
latter, the goodwill depends largely on the locality, but in the former
"the personal qualities of integrity, professional skill, and ability
attach to, and follow the person, not the place. ' 31 6 The only way to
sell the goodwill of a professional partnership was to restrain the
departing partner from practicing 17 In sum, the medical and dental
partnership cases generally agreed that business goodwill grew mainly
from the intelligence and personality of the practitioners. Where the
311. Mandeville, 42 NJ. Eq. at 195.
312. Foss v. Roby, 81 N.E. 199,200 (Mass. 1907).
313. Id. at 199.
314. Id. at 199-200.
315. See id. at 200.
316. Id.
317. Id. The court did not prohibit the defendant from practicing entirely; it found that
the plaintiffs were sufficiently protected if the prohibition was limited to practicing in the
city of Boston. Id. at 200.
Likewise, an early New York case upheld a covenant ancillary to the sale of a medical
practice barring the defendant from practicing medicine in Oswego County. See Holbrook
v. Waters, 9 How. Pr. 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854). The court did not discuss the legitimate
interest that supported the restraint, finding only that the covenant was supported by
adequate consideration (the plaintiff had paid $500 for the furniture and goodwill of the
practice and $1000 for the house and lot) and that the restraint was not unreasonable in
geographic scope. See also Ryan v. Hamilton, 68 N.E. 781, 786 (Ill. 1903) (enforcing
covenant signed by physician in connection with sale of his medical practice).
There are very few cases involving lawyers, see Blake, supra note 5, at 662 n.112,
probably because it was considered unethical for lawyers to attempt to restrict a client's
choice of lawyer by restricting a lawyer from representing particular clients.
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courts disagreed was in whether to enforce express or implied
contracts alienating those qualities from individuals to the firms.
Until the 1930s, trade secrets and business goodwill were the
only forms of knowledge that courts consistently regarded as
legitimate bases for restrictive covenants. Contemporary scholars
and courts show considerable interest in justifying enforcement of
restrictive covenants on the ground that employers need them to
recoup training costs. 318 The modern argument is that during a period
of specialized training, the employee's compensation is greater than
the current value of his or services. Furthermore, "unless some
enforceable commitment or effective deterrent is possible, employers
will not be justified in making the optimum outlay on employee-
training programs; even an employee eager for training will be unable
to commit himself firmly enough to warrant the undertaking. '319
Thus, because personal services contracts are not specifically
enforceable, the employer cannot be sure that the employee will stay
long enough for the employer to recoup its investment in training.
That an employer might have a legitimate interest in restricting
competition from former employees in order to recoup training costs
is a development in the law that most clearly represents a rejection of
the norms of the artisanal workplace. After all, the traditional
justification for apprenticeships was to ensure quality production by
adequate training, and the common law hostility to a master's efforts
to restrict competition from a former apprentice represented a legal
judgment that the master received adequate recompense in the form
of the apprentice's low-cost labor during the term of the
apprenticeship. English regulation of apprenticeship and the guilds
revealed considerable concern about masters or guilds restraining
trade by restricting competition from former apprentices. 320 By the
nineteenth century, with the artisanal tradition becoming a relic of
the past, the English and the American courts reconsidered whether
to justify restrictive covenants on the ground that they facilitate the
recoupment of training costs.
318. See generally STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 381-89 (2d ed. 1998); Gillian Lester, The Future of Restrictive Covenants:
Regulating Opportunism or Restricting Opportunities?, 76 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2001);
Philip D. Levin, Non-Competition Covenants in New England, 39 B.U. L. REV. 482, 488
(1959); Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10
J. LEG. STUD. 93 (1981); Carrol R. Wetzel, Employment Contracts and Noncompetition
Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L. F. 61, 64-66.
319. Blake, supra note 5, at 652.
320. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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England accepted the training cost justification in 1843 but then
rejected it in the early twentieth century. The 1843 English decision
justified the use of covenants to recoup training costs on the ground
that "the public derives an advantage in the unrestrained choice
which such stipulation gives to the employer of able assistants, and
the security it affords that the master will not withhold from the
servant instruction in the secrets of his trade, and the communication
of his own skill and experience. ' 321 The early twentieth-century cases
rejecting that position emphasized that the skill and experience
acquired through work are integral to an employee's personality.
322
In Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, the Lords emphasized that the
plaintiff had employed the defendant as a draftsman when he left
school at the age of fifteen and that the defendant had risen through
the ranks.323 The court observed that the employee could not "get rid
of the impressions left upon his mind by his experience on the
appellants' works; they are part of himself."324 Thus, the court
concluded, to the extent that the employee might use that knowledge
and experience, and "raise the character of the output of those rivals,improve their methods, and thereby make them more formidable
competitors," the covenant could not be used to prevent such
competition.325 The plaintiffs counsel had argued that trade secret
protection ought to be extended to the whole of the business' method
of operations, including its "system of standardizing mechanical
apparatus capable of being used in more than one class of
machine. '326 The Lords allowed that sheets and cards containing
formulae for particular materials were protectable under the
321. Mallan v. May, 152 Eng. Rep. 967, 972 (Ex. D. 1843). It is unclear to what extent
courts prior to the nineteenth century accepted the need to recoup training costs as a
justification for enforcement of post-employment restraints. Cf. Handler & Lazaroff,
supra note 5, at 728 (asserting that courts sustained such restraints during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries but ceased to do so in the late nineteenth century, but the
support for this proposition is not detailed).
322. In Sir W.C Leng & Co. v. Andrews, 1 Ch. 763, 773 (Eng. 1909), Lord Justice
Farwell said:
The rule allowing reasonable restraint of trade does not mean that an employer
can prevent his employee from using the skill and knowledge in his trade or
profession which he has learned in the course of his employment by means of
directions or instructions from the employer. That information and the
additional skill he is entitled to use for the benefit of himself and the benefit of
the public who gain the advantage of his having had such admirable instruction.
Id.
323. 1 A.C. 688,703-05 (Eng. 1916).
324. Id. at 703.




covenant, but that the "organization and general method of the
business" were not.327 General business methods could not be
regarded as trade secrets for they were not the sort of discrete
information, like formulae or secret compilations of information, that
the trade secret concept encompassed.
328
Without the legacy of guilds and with a weaker artisanal
tradition, American courts justified their own refusal to enforce
covenants for recouping training costs differently. Although some
early twentieth-century commentators urged that covenants could be
used to recoup training costs, 329 the courts did not widely agree. Most
courts treated training costs simply as a variation on the issue of
whether covenants could restrict the use of general knowledge as
opposed to trade secrets.330 They concluded that, absent trade secrets
or customer goodwill, an employer could not use a covenant to
protect general knowledge about the business, even when the
employer trained the employee. For example, in a case in which the
employer-a seller of aluminum cooking equipment-had alleged
that it gave its sales staff extensive training in hygenics, food
preparation, and sales techniques, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court said as follows:
Knowledge confidentially gained in the course of employment may
be made the subject of restrictive agreement and acts in derogation
of such a contract will be restrained. But an employer cannot by
contract prevent his employee from using the skill and intelligence
acquired or increased and improved through experience or through
instruction received in the course of the employment.
331
In the period between 1800 and 1930, the courts invented and
developed the doctrine of trade secrets that allowed employers to
enjoin employees not to disclose economically valuable knowledge
learned at work and, in some cases, not to work for competitors at all.
During the same period, the courts expanded the enforcement of
327. Id.
328. Id. at 712.
329. Albert M. Kales, Contracts to Refrain from Doing Business or from Entering or
Carrying on an Occupation, 31 HARv. L. REV. 193, 195 (1917).
330. See Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 5, at 728.
331. Club Alum. Co. v. Young, 160 N.E. 804, 806 (Mass. 1928). The tendency to treat
cases involving training costs as involving nothing other than general knowledge persisted
throughout the twentieth century. Blake's three-paragraph discussion of training costs
(which cites only four cases), simply asserted that courts would not enforce covenants to
protect training costs. He noted, however, that the general rule of unenforceability of
covenants for that purpose was clouded by the fact that training in trade secret knowledge
can be a legitimate interest because trade secrets are protectable through covenants.
Blake, supra note 5, at 652-53.
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post-employment covenants not to compete by recognizing their
usefulness in protecting an ever-widening range of knowledge. With
some exceptions-notably the refusal to protect training costs and
some reluctance on the part of courts to designate particular
information as protectable either as a trade secret or through
contractual agreement-the law on the books in 1930 resembles the
law on the books today. Yet, company practice did not immediately
reflect the new law.
C. Technology and Legal Doctrine in the Early 20th Century: The
Laboratories and Law Offices at Du Pont
In the hundred years after Du Pont's difficulties with Charles
Munns and Thomas Ewell, a great deal of legal change enabled Du
Pont finally to assert ownership of its employees' knowledge. And
the law had become much more accessible to the company, partly
because of improvements in law publishing, and partly because Du
Pont was a very different sort of enterprise. Du Pont-now a very
large company, well on its way to becoming a diversified
conglomerate-was probably just as anxious to prevent employees
from departing with company secrets as it had been in 1814. Du Pont
employed dozens of research chemists working on an array of
projects in several locations by 1911.332 The research stations were
guarded, and the research notes were kept under lock and key.
333
These precautions differed little from the restrictions on entry into
the powder yards that the company had posted in 1811.334 It is quite
striking that Du Pont did not use the full arsenal of legal weapons
available to it until its trade secret litigation against Walter Masland
alerted company officials to the deficiencies of their extant practices
and the possibility of more aggressively protecting the company's
intellectual property through employment contracts.
The dialectic between doctrinal and social change is nowhere
better illustrated than in Du Pont's practices in the first two decades
of the twentieth century. Although the company instituted a famous
trade secret case and gained something of a reputation among
industrialists for its aggressive efforts to protect its intellectual
332. HOUNSHELL & SMITH, supra note 105, at 49.
333. Affidavit of Charles Reese, E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 216
F. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 773); Affidavit of Fin Sparre, E.L du Pont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Masland, 216 F. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 773).
334. See supra note 137.
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property from departing employees, in crucial respects the company
followed rather than led the wave of legal change. Most significantly,
its contracts did not restrict employees' use of trade secrets or impose
restrictive covenants.
In 1904, two years after Du Pont founded its first organized
research and development laboratory that later came to be known as
the Experimental Station, the company required all research lab
employees doing experimental work to sign form contracts. 335 The
contracts, which were supported by one dollar in consideration,
provided that Du Pont owned, and required the employee to assign to
Du Pont, all patents for, "any inventions, improvements, or useful
processes relating to explosives, their ingredients, manufacture or use,
or to the appliances or machinery connected therewith, or to the
treatment of byproducts thereof, which may be made or perfected,
wholly or in part, by the [employee], while in the employment
aforesaid. '336 Significantly, the contracts did not require employees
to refrain from disclosing the company's secrets, even though such
contracts would have been enforceable. Interestingly, Du Pont also
did not try to elicit agreements not to engage in post-employment
work in related research or industry.
Du Pont dealt with trade secrets by policy rather than by express
contract. In 1908, the company sent a notice to all the employees in
the smokeless powder plants and posted the same notice in the
research laboratories337 and the dynamite plants.338  The notice
advised employees that Du Pont "owns and possesses the right to
use.., secret processes.., in connection with the manufacture of
explosives and the appliances, packages, material, machinery and
other things relating to said business and used in connection
therewith." It warned employees that
[it is] illegal for you during your employment or after its
termination to reveal to any person, other than those in the employ
of the company whose business it is to know.., any information or
matter whatsoever relating to the said secret processes,
compositions, reagents, apparatus and machines. It is also illegal
during your employment, or after its termination, to use or employ
335. Letter from R. Mudge to Edwin Prindle (June 22, 1914) (on file with the Hagley
Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 680). Other
administrative issues associated with the coordination, staffing, and funding of the
research labs were also worked out during this period; these are described in HOUNSHELL
& SMITH, supra note 105, at 27-39.
336. Affidavit of Charles Reese, supra note 333, at Exhibits A & D.
337. Affidavit of Charles Reese, supra note 333.
338. Id.
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any of said processes, alone or in connection with others, except for
the Company while in its employment.
339
The notice concluded plaintively: "The Company appreciates the
high degree of loyalty and sense of right that has maintained with its
employees during the many years it has been engaged in business, and
feels that calling attention in this way to the legal status of secret
processes is all that is necessary."' 40 (No such letters or notices were
disseminated at the black powder plants, apparently because
company officials believed that there was nothing secret about the
manufacture of black powder, which was an older and well-known
technology.341)
Du Pont's major internal and legal struggle to define the
boundary between its intellectual property and its employees'
knowledge led to a famous trade secret case, E.L du Pont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Masland,342 that was litigated all the way up to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The case was a catalyst of corporate soul-searching
about the efficiency and limits of company efforts to restrict access to
its secrets. That the litigation reached an inconclusive end may also
have led some businesses to doubt the usefulness of litigation in
protecting trade secrets.
The events leading up to the litigation were a typical tale of a
frustrated entrepreneur working for a large corporation. In 1914, Du
Pont learned that the research chemist in charge of its artificial
leather work, Walter Masland, was considering leaving the company
to go into business with his brothers making artificial leather.
Masland had gone to work for Du Pont in 1904, after studying
chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania.343 By all accounts,
Masland was a gifted chemist. He had received numerous patents
which he had dutifully assigned to Du Pont.34 By 1914, the artificial
leather research had progressed to the point that the company was
339. Affidavit of Charles Reese, supra note 333, at Exhibit B.
340. Id.
341. Evidently, Du Pont did not resist the efforts of former employees to go into
business for themselves when they did so with technology that the company did not
consider secret. In 1902, when Du Pont was significantly reorganized, Robert S. Waddell,
who had been the general sales agent for the company, resigned in order to set up his own
Buckeye Powder Company to produce black powder for Illinois coal mines. CHANDLER,
JR., supra note 105, at 73. I found no records of company efforts to prevent his using their
black powder technology.
342. 216 F. 271,272 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
343. Answer of Walter Masland, E.L du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 216
F. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 773).
344. Affidavit of Fin Sparre, supra note 333.
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planning to build a plant to manufacture it for commercial sale.345 Du
Pont acquired a New York-based artificial leather maker, the
Fabrikoid Company, apparently to eliminate competition as well as to
acquire technology and a trademark brand.
Masland's reasons for leaving Du Pont were not unusual.
Masland's family had owned and operated a carpet manufacturing
business in Philadelphia since 1886346 and his brothers, who had made
money in business for themselves, urged him to join them.347 Masland
complained to Charles Reese, the head of Du Pont's Chemical
Department and chair of its Experimental Board, that Du Pont often
passed over for promotion men with talent in favor of men with
family connections.348 As a consequence, he complained, men at the
Experimental Station had few prospects for promotion.349 Masland
was particularly disappointed that, when Du Pont took over the
Fabrikoid Company and Fabrikoid's assistant superintendent-chief
chemist quit, Masland was not promoted to his job or given a raise
but was expected to pick up all of the departing chemist's work.350
Masland was not the only Du Pont chemist who felt
underappreciated. Some of the younger chemists complained that
Reese patented his subordinates' work in his own name and chafed at
his "intolerance and haughtiness of manner.
'351
Reese tried to persuade Masland that Masland's "moral
obligations" prohibited him from using his knowledge of artificial
leather in competition with Du Pont. According to Reese, Masland
replied that "he had given the matter of his moral obligations a great
deal of thought; that he did not believe he had a moral right to sell or
345. Bill of Complaint, E.L du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 216 F. 271
(E.D. Pa. 1914) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware,
Accession 1305, Box 773).
346. Bradstreet Report, in Letter from William Whitten to Prindle, Wright & Small (on
file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box
680).
347. Affidavit of Fin Sparre, supra note 333.
348. (Second) Affidavit of Walter Masland, E.L du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland, 216 F. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library,
Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 773).
349. Letter from Charles Reese to William Whitten (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 680). Masland repeated these
complaints in his Affidavit filed in the litigation. Affidavit of Walter Masland, E.L du
Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 216 F. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (on file with the
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 773).
350. Affidavit of Walter Masland, supra note 349.
351. HOUNSHELL & SMITH, supra note 105, at 26 (quoting an article on Reese
published in the Dictionary of American Biography, written by Du Pont's prominent dye
chemist, Herbert A. Lubs).
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give this confidential information to competitors, or to other
parties. '352 Significantly, however, Masland did believe (at least
according to Reese) "that he had the right to use personally any
information, confidential or otherwise, which he had obtained either
through his own efforts or efforts of others during his employment
with the company. '353 Masland's belief that he had a right to use
knowledge that Du Pont might regard as confidential, provided that
he had participated in its development,354 reflected an issue that had
vexed trade secret law for the past thirty years: Masland's own work
and intelligence had produced the advances in the chemistry of
artificial leather; yet, because he had been paid to do that work and
Du Pont wanted to keep the results of the research for itself, he had
no right to use the knowledge he had developed even though it had
never been patented. The perspective that Reese attributed to
Masland on the inalienability of the chemical knowledge that he had
gained through employment was the position that courts had moved
away from in the twenty years before.355
Du Pont lawyers and chemists corresponded and met frequently
to discuss the issues and plan strategy for the litigation. After
Masland had announced his intentions, but before he even left the
company, the lawyers and the company officials met and agreed
among themselves that "the moral questions involved group
themselves under two heads. ''356 First, there was "an implied contract
between the Company and Mr. Masland that he would not make use
in any way of any confidential matters concerning the Company and
its work. '357 Second, Masland's
proposed line of conduct places the Company under an unfair
handicap in competing with him. The Company has spent large
sums of money in perfecting the process under consideration.
When its good are placed on the market, therefore, it will have to
charge enough for its product to cover the cost of its investigations.
As Mr. Masland has borne none of this cost, he can sell at a lower
price than the company, and destroy its market. If he thinks this is
352. Letter from Charles Reese to William Whitten, supra note 349.
353. Id.
354. Affidavit of Fin Sparre, supra note 333; see also Affidavit of Charles Reese, supra
note 333; Letter from Charles Reese to William Whitten, supra note 349.
355. This was exactly the same conflict between competing moral pictures that existed
in the law of patent ownership for employee inventors during that era. Fisk, supra note 3,
at 1170-79.
356. Letter from Edwin Prindle to Charles Reese (June 4, 1914) (Accession 1405, Box
772) (on file with Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware).
357. Id.
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fair, his moral judgment is either very much atrophied or greatly
warped.
358
Thus, the company sought to translate a new legal concept-an
implied contract to keep trade secrets-and a relatively new
economic notion about a firm's entitlement to a fair return on its
investment in R & D into the terms of moral judgment that were
much older in trade secret law.
Masland saw things differently. In his view, all the processes for
making artificial leather that he planned to use were common
knowledge among chemists familiar with cellulose and artificial
leather.359 Masland himself never claimed in the litigation the view
that Reese had attributed to him, that he had a right to use the trade
secrets so long as he had invented them. We cannot know whether
this was because Masland never made such a statement, or because
his lawyer had coached him that the position Reese attributed to him
no longer found support in the cases. For whatever reason, Masland's
position in the litigation was that there were no trade secrets
involved.360 Furthermore, Masland claimed that he had signed the
contract requiring him to assign his inventions under protest and only
after Fin Sparre, who was then the chief chemist at the Experimental
Station, assured him that Sparre's own lawyer had advised that the
contract would be unenforceable.361 Furthermore, Masland asserted
that two employees had left Du Pont's artificial leather work and had
gone to work for competitors.362 He thus sought to establish that Du
Pont itself had not previously tried to claim the chemistry of artificial
leather as a trade secret.
The principal issue at the start of the Du Pont-Masland litigation
was whether Masland was using Du Pont's trade secrets in
manufacturing artificial leather, or whether he was using methods
that were common knowledge among chemists in that line of
business. The district court initially denied a preliminary injunction
because Masland insisted that he was not using Du Pont trade
secrets.363 During the litigation, Masland proposed to get expert
testimony to establish that the processes that Du Pont claimed as
trade secrets were in fact common knowledge among chemists
358. Letter from Edwin Prindle to E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. Chemical
Department, supra note 241.




363. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 216 F. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
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working on artificial leather. A dispute about Masland's proposal for
expert testimony led the litigation to digress to that issue, and it never
did return to the merits.
Fearing that litigation would reveal their secrets to their
competitors, Du Pont wanted to prevent Masland from drawing his
experts from the ranks of their competitors, preferring that he serve
as his own expert or that he use experts drawn from the Government
or academia. Masland contended that all the experts whom Du Pont
suggested either consulted for Du Pont, in the case of academics, or
relied on Du Pont for business, in the case of government.
364
Du Pont eventually got the district court to enjoin Masland from
revealing the company's alleged trade secrets to experts.365
Significantly, the court did not enjoin him from manufacturing
artificial leather because Du Pont had not asked for that remedy; Du
Pont asked only that he be enjoined from revealing its trade secrets to
expert witnesses.366 This was the order that was appealed up through
the Third Circuit and was left standing by the Supreme Court in a
unanimous opinion written by Oliver Wendell Holmes.367 Holmes'
opinion is only three paragraphs long. It states essentially that the
trial judge had discretion to determine whether disclosure of secrets
to experts was necessary to Masland's defense or whether it would
suffice that he could disclose "whatever public facts were nearest to
the alleged secrets.
'368
After Du Pont sued Masland, company officials began to
examine more closely their practices with respect to employee ideas.
They realized, to their chagrin, that the form contract that Masland
364. (Second) Affidavit of Walter Masland, supra note 348.
365. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 222 F. 340,341 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
366. ML
367. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917).
368. Id. The Masland opinion is often cited to demonstrate the ambiguity as to whether
trade secrets are a form of property or are, instead, the product of a duty of
confidentiality. Du Pont's lawyers had argued that if Masland were allowed to reveal the
secrets to his expert, litigation to protect trade secrets would deprive a trade secret owner
of property without due process. Id. at 102. Masland argued that the right to choose his
own experts was also essential to due process. Id. Justice Holmes avoided both due
process arguments by characterizing the trade secret obligation as a duty of
confidentiality:
[Tlhe starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of
them. These have given place to hostility, and the first thing to be made sure of
is that the defendant shall not fraudulently abuse the trust reposed in him. It is
the usual incident of confidential relations. If there is any disadvantage in the
fact that he knew the plaintiffs' secrets, he must take the burden with the good.
Id. at 102.
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and the other Experimental Station employees had signed in 1905
covered only patents and inventions related to explosives, not to the
newer lines of business such as artificial leather.3 69 The contract also
did not explicitly protect trade secrets. Du Pont's in-house counsel
became anxious that the litigation might publicize these deficiencies
in the contract, and might also alert employees to the fact that the
company had insisted that Masland (and others, presumably) assign
patents that plainly were not covered by the contract: "This, of
course, would be very suggestive to certain other employees in the
laboratory," he worried, adding that widespread knowledge of it "is
apt to be demoralizing" to "certain classes of employees of the
company. '370 In the years of the Masland suit, 1914-1917, the
company tried to get all employees working in its labs-not only
chemists and engineers, but also clerical employees-to sign contracts
not to disclose company secrets.
371
Although Du Pont got an injunction against Masland, the
company officials and its lawyers remained anxious, from the time
they brought suit until early 1918, that Masland was continuing to
manufacture artificial leather using Du Pont trade secrets. Du Pont's
lawyer, Edwin Prindle, employed a private detective agency for all
sorts of cloak-and-dagger snooping around the Masland factory over
the years. On one occasion, a detective snuck through a hole in the
fence around the Masland factory when the factory was closed.
Another time, a detective obtained a meeting with Masland by
pretending to be interested in purchasing artificial leather for
export.372 On a visit in early 1918, a detective applied for a job at the
Masland factory as a workman. He was not hired. He then
approached the Philadelphia Electric Company, seeking to pose as an
electric company employee. That tactic failed as well: The company
"was advised by counsel for the Philadelphia Electric Company that it
would be contrary to the policy of the central station, they having had
unpleasant experiences in similar matters before. '373 Some Du Pont
369. Affidavit of Walter Masland, supra note 349.
370. Letter from R. Mudge to Edwin Prindle, supra note 335.
371. Irenee du Pont Papers, (on file with the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington,
Delaware, Accession 228, Series H, Box 40, Files F-ID-42) (carbon copies of transmittal
letters asking that the contract be signed for the company; the contracts themselves are
not in the file. Many of the contracts were for chemists and engineers, but a couple
appeared to be for clerical employees working in the labs.).
372. Letter from Irving Klein to Edwin Hammer (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 679).
373. Letter from Irving Klein to Edwin Prindle (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 679).
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officials thought these tactics were unworthy of the company, which
suggests a continuing tension between aggressive protection of trade
secrets recommended by the lawyers and some officials' desire not to
alienate employees or to be perceived as overreaching.
374
Although Du Pont officers wanted to know what Masland was
doing, they wanted to find out at no risk to themselves. One of
Masland's employees applied to Du Pont-Fabrikoid for a job in
February 1918, claiming to know Masland's methods for making
artificial leather. Du Pont wrote a prickly letter in reply, stating "We
are not inclined to take on employees of competitors in order to
obtain possession of formulae. ' 375 On the one hand, this might be
regarded as a continuation of the company's longstanding policy not
to hire their competitors' employees.376 On the other hand, given the
absence of evidence as to whether this policy was invariably
followed 377 and the obvious possibility that Masland might consider a
countersuit if they hired his employees, one cannot be sure whether
Du Pont was merely following company policy as opposed to
responding to a particular situation.
When Du Pont's detective finally determined in March of 1918
that Masland was not manufacturing artificial leather,378 the company
settled its accounts with its lawyers and regarded the case as closed.
379
The litigation thus reached an inconclusive end. The company never
proved that Masland used its trade secrets, and it is unclear whether
he ever actually did. Du Pont research on artificial leather produced
average profits of 15% for the company in the period between 1911
and 1919, although the shoes made from Fabrikoid-which Du Pont
had had tested by forty Wilmington mail carriers and a local shoe
store-were of only middling quality.
38 0
The Masland litigation occurred at a point in the company's
history when it was changing from a family-controlled explosives firm
374. Hamilton Barksdale was among those who were reluctant to resort to this sort of
cloak and dagger tactic. Letter from R. Mudge to J. Laffey (on file with the Hagley
Museum & Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 679).
375. Letter from F. Kniffen to Louis Ruskey (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 679).
376. See supra note 192.
377. See infra text accompanying notes 382-383.
378. Letter from E.R. Hughes to Edwin Hammer (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 679).
379. Letter from J. Laffey to Prindle, Wright & Small (on file with the Hagley Museum
& Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1305, Box 679). All told, they paid their
outside counsel, Prindle, Wright & Small, nearly $12,000 for their work on the case. Id.
380. HOUNSHELL & SMITH, supra note 105, at 88.
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that happened to do enough chemical research to keep up with
technological developments in the industry to a firm that invested
substantial resources in applied chemical research so as to develop a
wide variety of new products. The more Du Pont began to emphasize
research, and the more that it depended on chemists who were not
family members, the more the company struggled to balance its desire
to control all the products of its research with the need to provide
incentives for its employees. While aggressively guarding its secrets
and requiring employees to assign patents to the company, Du Pont
also adopted a plan of paying bonuses in the form of company stock.
Some employees (including Masland) considered the bonus plan
unsatisfactory because the recipients of stock were restricted from
selling the stock; they received only the dividends on it.381
Du Pont's failure to make full use of the legal doctrines that were
available in 1914 to protect what the company regarded as its
intellectual property, and the mixed success when it eventually did so,
is revealing on many levels. First, to the extent that some legal
histories focus on the development of doctrine, one must be quite
careful in assuming that doctrinal change necessarily percolated down
to the practices of clients. Even large firms like Du Pont did not have
lawyers routinely advise them on how changes in the law should be
incorporated into the administration of their employment relations.
When they did, the lawyers may have missed certain issues or have
made recommendations that were never implemented. Du Pont
evidently made calculations about the harm to productivity associated
with poor morale, balanced against the likelihood of losing valuable
intellectual property rights, and concluded that certain measures were
not worth antagonizing employees. Finally, there must have been
some concern about whether instituting legal proceedings to protect
intellectual property rights was worth the expense. The outside
counsel for Du Pont in the Masland suit might have regarded the
litigation as a big success (for him it was a personal accomplishment
that he touted often), but it is unclear how much benefit the company
actually received from it.
The irony, from the historian's perspective, of the story behind
Du Pont v. Masland is that it simultaneously confirms and
undermines the thesis that legal change tends to lag behind social and
economic change. Additionally, the episode is doubly ironic because
the Masland suit effected important change itself. On the one hand,
Du Pont was a leader. It was conscious of the value of its employees'
381. Affidavit of Walter Masland, supra note 349.
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creative product and sought to claim it as its intellectual property long
before many manufacturing companies did. Furthermore, the
company's definition of what constituted a trade secret pushed the
envelope of what courts would recognize in 1916. On the other hand,
until the company filed suit, it had focused its bureaucratic personnel
practices retrospectively on the quintessential nineteenth-century
form of intellectual property (patents) and neglected the legal
protections available to it through nondisclosure agreements and
restrictive covenants. When it did aggressively try to invoke the new
trade secret doctrine, the litigation wound up side-tracked on a
procedural issue, and the company never did assure itself that its
litigation accomplished the goal of preventing Walter Masland from
using his knowledge (or the company's trade secrets) about the
chemistry of artificial leather.
One cannot generalize too much from the one dispute with
Masland. At the same time that Du Pont was more or less
strenuously asserting its trade secret rights against its own employees,
it was naively, or disingenuously, asserting the rights of employees to
take trade secrets with them to new employment. Du Pont during
World War I zealously tried to acquire Germany's traditionally
superior dye chemistry by hiring German dye chemists. One may
justly conclude that when Du Pont was a consumer of intellectual
property, rather than a producer, the company's attitudes toward
employees' rights to take papers and drawings were quite different
from the position they asserted in the Masland suit.
The story of the American efforts to capture the dye stuffs
business that German firms had dominated prior to the World War I
trade embargo is fascinating in itself. After the United States
confiscated German patents for dyes during the First World War, a
number of firms, including Du Pont, sought to enter the dye business.
They needed more than the confiscated patents, however; they
needed the chemists' know-how. To get it, Du Pont aggressively
recruited some German chemists familiar with dye techniques. 382
Some chemists' former employer, the leading German firm Bayer,
arranged to have the chemists, who had departed Germany with
suitcases of papers and drawings, arrested at the Dutch border or in
New York. Critics in both the United States and Germany attacked
Du Pont for its efforts to recruit German chemists. The company
president, Irenee du Pont, responded to the criticism in terms that
382. For an account of this episode of Du Pont's adventures in the dyestuffs business
during the First World War, see HOUNSHELL & SMITH, supra note 105, at 76-97.
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amusingly echoed the complaints of Thomas Ewell and Brown, Page
from more than a century earlier:
[W]e felt that many needless experiments could be avoided if there
were available in this country men who had practical experience in
the dye industry.... Neither Germany nor the United States has a
monopoly in brains, but there is a grave economic waste, both in
money and time, in slowly and laboriously performing over again
experiments which have already been made.
383
Indeed, as with Thomas Ewell and the competition over the
rights to make gunpowder for the United States to use in the War of
1812, notions of patriotism no doubt played a role in Du Pont's
thinking about who was entitled to benefit from whose knowledge.
This may underscore the extent to which one should be cautious in
inferring too much about Du Pont's overall attitude toward employee
intellectual property from any particular incident. Nevertheless, it is
quite clear that there was an enormous change between 1814 and
1914 in the knowledge that could be claimed to be legally protectable.
Du Pont and companies like it played a part in bringing about that
change, but they also responded to changes that originated in the
legal categories that they had no part in creating or even developing
for their use.
Conclusion
During the nineteenth century, trade secret doctrine was
invented and the law of restrictive covenants was adapted to prevent
employees from using workplace knowledge in ways that would have
been unimaginable to E.I. du Pont in 1810. These doctrines played a
significant role in enabling the rise of the corporate management of
intellectual property, although the Du Pont experience with Walter
Masland suggests that the potential of these doctrines was not fully
realized until later in the twentieth century. Courts were compelled
to reconcile the perceived demands of industrialization with the
ideology of freedom of contract and the realities of factory work, and
the corporate control of ideas with the ideology of free labor.384 The
383. Letter from Irenee du Pont to Eysten Berg (on file with the Hagley Museum &
Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Accession 1662, Box 35) (quoted in HOUNSHELL &
SMITH, supra note 105, at 94).
384. On aspects of the development of contract doctrine against the ideological
background of free labor and the ugly reality of slavery and factory wage labor, see
generally AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
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difficulty of reconciling these conflicts was manifested, in the tortuous
development of the doctrine.
Trade secrets and restrictive covenants have had an ambiguous
relationship to each other and to the employment relations that they
regulate. Then and now, the protection of trade secrets was the most
widely accepted justification for enforcing restrictive covenants. But,
the definition of a trade secret has always been too slippery to give
the courts much clarity in analysis or intellectual cover for the value
judgments they have made in deciding when an employer can lawfully
restrict an employee's future freedom to work. Trade secrets are that
which is learned "in confidence," the use of which outside of that
employment relationship would be "unfair." These terms are both
hopelessly vague and inescapably normative. To the extent that they
offered judges any fig leaf of objectivity, they seemed to rest on the
actual practices, norms, and expectations of the workplace. Yet the
Du Pont experience suggests the difficulty that lawyers and judges
faced in discovering and interpreting those practices and
expectations.
Both the doctrine and the practice reflected the contestability
during the nineteenth century of the inalienable attributes of self that
lay at the foundation of the discourse of free labor. The doctrine also
reflected the growing conflict between the free labor ideology and the
demands of industrialization which increasingly called for the
corporate control of every tangible and intangible product of work.
The century was dominated by an epic struggle over the meaning of
free labor and, yet, witnessed in its last days unprecedented
formalization of corporate power over all aspects of employment and
production. Drawing the line between what knowledge the firm
could own and that which remained the possession of every free
person was, in that context, an extraordinarily difficult task.
Given what was at stake, it is perhaps not surprising that cases
reached inconsistent results and that courts were vague about what
standards applied. Scholars today lament the absence of a coherent
justification and clear rules in trade secret and restrictive covenant
doctrine. The persistence of the multifactored, fact-based
reasonableness inquiry for restrictive covenants and of standardless,
factual tests for the existence and the remedying of the
misappropriation of trade secrets may be evidence that the value
choices at the heart of these legal issues remain as wrenching today as
they were when courts first created the doctrines that set employee
freedom to switch jobs on a collision course with the corporate
control of intellectual property.
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